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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
This dissertation analyzes market-wise implications of behavioral finance by means of
agent-based simulations of financial markets. The goal is to explore agent-based arti-
ficial markets as a tool for studying various behavioral biases of individual investors.
We aim to show that such models can contribute to behavioral finance research by
providing the link between micro and macro behavior that is often lacking in other
research methodologies applied to behavioral finance. In addition, this thesis aims
at bringing the topics of behavioral finance closer to the modeling community as well
as at highlighting the challenges in this field.
Economics and financial theories have for long been dominated by the Efficient
Markets Hypothesis (EMH), which posits that market prices fully reflect all available
information (Fama, 1970). Efficient markets do not allow investors to earn above-
average returns without accepting above-average risks (Malkiel, 2003). ”It has been
applied extensively to theoretical models and empirical studies of financial securities
prices, generating considerable controversy as well as fundamental insights into the
price-discovery process” (Lo, 2007). Financial theories and models have also been
rooted in the representative agent framework, that rests on a formal representation of
an individual who acts as a utility maximizer, given his preferences and constraints,
and adheres to the axioms of rational choice theory. Over the past decades, how-
ever, psychologists and behavioral scientists have documented robust and systematic
violations of principles of expected utility theory, Bayesian learning, and rational
expectations - questioning their validity as a descriptive theory of decision making
(De Bondt, 1998). Furthermore, Herbert Simon has emphasized the importance of
bounded rationality, taking into account the limited ability of humans to adapt opti-
mally, or even satisfactorily, to complex environments (Simon, 1991).
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The idea of individual investors who are prone to biases in judgment, are frame-
dependent, and use various heuristics, which might lead to anomalies on the market
level, has been explored within the field of behavioral finance. Behavioral finance
builds itself upon two pillars: (i) limits to arbitrage and (ii) psychology (Barberis
and Thaler, 2003). While psychology lists a number of possible deviations from
rationality, the limits to arbitrage argue that rational investors may not be able to
exploit opportunities created by irrational investors. If irrational investors (noise
traders) create dislocations in asset prices (departures from fundamental values),
rational investors (arbitrageurs) should be able to correct this mispricing through
the process of arbitrage. However, it has been recognized in literature (Barberis and
Thaler, 2003), that arbitrage strategies in real financial markets (as opposed to the
strict definition of arbitrage) can involve cost, risk, or various constraints, so the
inefficiencies may persist for a long period of time.
Artificial financial markets are models for studying the link between individual
investor behavior and financial market dynamics. They are often computational mod-
els of financial markets, and are usually comprised of a number of heterogeneous and
boundedly rational agents, which interact through some trading mechanism, while
possibly learning and evolving. These models are built for the purpose of studying
agents’ behavior, price discovery mechanisms, the influence of market microstructure,
or the reproduction of the stylized facts of real-world financial time-series (e.g. fat
tails of return distributions and volatility clustering). A similar bottom-up approach
has been utilized in agent-based computational economics (ACE) - the computa-
tional study of economies modeled as evolving systems of autonomous interacting
agents (Tesfatsion, 2006). A methodology analogous to agent-based modeling has
also been used in the physical sciences, for example the Microscopic Simulation - a
tool for studying complex systems by simulating many interacting microscopic ele-
ments (Levy et al., 2000).
Since agent-based models can easily accommodate complex learning behavior,
asymmetric information, heterogeneous preferences, and ad hoc heuristics (Chan
et al., 1999), such simulations are particularly suitable to test and generate various
behavioral hypotheses. Hence, the behavioral finance and agent-based computational
economics can be considered to be complementary. This complementarity of behav-
ioral finance research and the agent-based methodology has been recognized in the
literature: ”It is important to note that agent-based technologies are well suited for
testing behavioral theories. They can answer two key questions that should be asked
of any behavioral structure. First, how well do behavioral biases hold up under ag-
gregation, and second which types of biases will survive in a coevolutionary struggle
against others. Therefore, the connections between agent-based approaches and be-
havioral approaches will probably become more intertwined as both fields progress”
(LeBaron, 2006).
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So far, research in the combination of behavioral finance and agent-based meth-
ods has been sporadic. Some of the early studies that pursue the idea of explicit
accounting for behavioral theories in agent-based financial market simulations are
Takahashi and Terano (2003) and Hoffmann et al. (2007). In Takahashi and Terano
(2003) the focus is on overconfidence and loss aversion, while Hoffmann et al. (2007)
study social interaction between investors. Therefore, the confluence of behavioral
finance and agent-based methods represents a nascent research area with a multitude
of open questions and research opportunities.
1.2 Research Objective and Research Questions
In this thesis, we address the gap between behavioral finance and agent-based models
of financial markets. We study various biases commented in the behavioral finance
literature and propose novel models for some of the biases from the literature. Over-
all, the research objective is defined as follows.
Research Objective:
Contribute to the research areas of behavioral finance and agent-
based artificial markets by providing mathematical representations
for a number of behavioral phenomena and by studying their market-
wise implications using agent-based simulations.
We consider four research questions for achieving the research objective.
Research Question 1
What are the relevant aspects of investor behavior that could be studied using
an agent-based simulation approach?
Studying behavior of market participants is important because of its potential impact
on asset prices and the dynamics of financial markets. Agent-based market models
have been proposed as a tool for studying such impact of individual investor behavior.
However, in order to build bottom-up models of financial markets we need to have
an overview of the relevant aspects of investor behavior, particularly those studied
in the behavioral finance literature.
Research Question 2
How can we implement various behavioral phenomena such as overconfidence,
sentiment (optimism, pessimism), loss aversion, biased self-attribution, and re-
cency and primacy effects, within existing agent-based artificial stock markets?
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Behavioral finance approach is interesting for us as it focuses on realistic elements of
the behavior of market participants, as opposed to normative financial theories that
rely on very strong assumptions of investor rationality, which have been empirically
questioned or disproved. Hence a lot of attention in this thesis has been given to
various investor heuristics and psychological biases that constitute departures from
such rational behavior. The challenging aspect of studying behavioral phenomena by
means of agent-based simulations is how to devise their mathematical definitions and
computational implementations. In this thesis we aim to provide implementations
for a number of behavioral phenomena that have been proposed and studied in the
behavioral finance literature.
Research Question 3
What is the influence of implemented behavioral phenomena on market dynam-
ics and investor performance? Conversely, what is the influence of market
dynamics or investor performance on investor behavior/psychology?
One of the most challenging questions in behavioral finance literature is how and
to what extent individual behavior influences the market dynamics. Particularly,
whether various investor irrationalities can cause anomalous market behavior. In
addition, it is important to understand if heuristic and biased behaviors are detri-
mental to the investor performance, and if such behavioral phenomena can emerge
or disappear over time, especially after taking into account feedback from the market
and the success of investment strategies.
Research Question 4
Which models can be developed to study different definitions of the same behav-
ioral phenomena, such as the overconfidence?
Another difficulty in studying the implications of behavioral biases is that their def-
initions and implementations can vary, which could lead to opposing results and
different implications. In this thesis we study two distinct manifestations of investor
overconfidence, miscalibration and better-than-average effect, and compare the con-
sequences of those behavioral biases.
1.3 Research Methodology
To address the first research question we use literature review. By reviewing behav-
ioral finance literature, including existing surveys of behavioral finance, we aim to
identify important behavioral aspects of investment decisions, paying special atten-
tion to the behavioral biases of individual investors. The main findings are presented
in a conceptual model, which provides an overall structure to consider specific im-
4
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plementations of agent-based models for studying the influence of behavioral biases
of investors.
To motivate the use of agent-based simulations for the rest of our research ques-
tions, we briefly discuss some alternative methodologies that can be used for studying
the research topics of behavioral finance. Traditionally, behavioral finance had relied
mostly on experiments, and there have been many studies in which subjects partic-
ipated in various investment tasks. Furthermore, most of the behavioral biases and
heuristics originate from experiments conducted by cognitive psychologists. One of
the common critiques of these experimental studies is that they are often conducted
only with student participants, rather than actual traders and investors. This cri-
tique is not always valid, since robust findings obtained with student participants can
often be generalized to a broader population. One example are experiments with my-
opic loss aversion, in which professional traders exhibited this bias even to a greater
extent than students (Haigh and List, 2005). Another disadvantage of experiments
is that participants face such financial outcomes (almost exclusively gains), which
cannot be compared to gains and losses that investors face in real financial markets.
It is considered that shifting from laboratory to field experiments, where possible,
would increase external and ecological validity.
A different methodology used in (behavioral) finance is the quantitative analysis
of actual trading records. These databases are very difficult to obtain, but to a
researcher who has acquired such a database they provide a compelling argument of
working with actual trades made by investors. However, even though the performance
of individual investors can be determined from the data, the explanatory variables
used in such studies often do not go beyond simple demographics, such as age, gender,
and education. However, we would like a richer description of investors, possibly
about their strategies, psychological profiles, propensity to behavioral biases etc.
This could be explored by using questionnaires with market participants to proxy for
hardly observable psychological traits. Unfortunately, such information is difficult to
obtain from real investors and traders, even if decoupled from the database of their
actual trades1.
Whereas experiments are good in capturing behavior in controlled environments,
they might lack generalizability to real financial markets2. Would similar behavior
occur in financial markets, how would it affect the performance of individual investors,
and how would it aggregate to the market level? Quantitative analysis of financial
data may answer some of these questions, but it is not always clear what is the
1Dorn and Huberman (2005) is an example of such a study, where survey responses are combined
with trading records in order to give a better understanding of why investors fail to buy and hold a
well diversified portfolio. In this study stated perceptions and self-assessments are used to develop
proxies for psychological traits such as risk attitude and overconfidence.
2Given that most biases shown in these experiments come from hypothetical static risky choice
problems, a great caution should be exercised when introducing such results into highly dynamic
financial models (Chen and Liao, 2003).
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exact behavior of market participants that lead to it. Agent-based artificial financial
markets are potentially able to fully bridge this gap between individual investor
behavior and aggregate market phenomena, by allowing the modeler to specify the
behavior of market participants, to implement various market mechanisms, and to
analyze the resulting asset prices. In such a way, artificial financial markets could be
used as a tool to generate and/or test various behavioral hypothesis and theories, to
study scenarios for which empirical data do not exist, or are difficult to obtain.
In this thesis we develop and present models of various behavioral biases and study
them within an existing agent-based financial market. We employ the incremental
approach according to which an existing computational model is first replicated and
then a new investor behavior, in our case a behavioral bias, is introduced into the
model. By comparing the results of the original model with the results of the in-
cremented model, we can study the implications of the newly introduced (biased)
behaviors. The incremental approach is built upon the choice of an artificial market
model that we selected to use in our studies. We have opted for an agent-based
artificial financial model developed by Levy et al. (2000), also known as the LLS
model.
Although there are many agent-based models of financial markets, at the moment
there is no model which would be considered standard or the best. The reason for
this is that agent-based financial markets include a wide variety of models, all of
which have their own strengths and weaknesses, and which differ in many aspects,
such as the representation of investor behavior and the market rules including the
price generation mechanism. While some models may be more realistic in terms of
the prices that they can reproduce, others may have better behavioral foundation
of their agents, be more related to the theoretical concepts of the standard financial
theory, or have more analytical tractability. An overview of some of the well-known
agent-based models of financial markets is presented in Chapter 4.
The advantage of the LLS model is that it is a well-studied model with well-known
results and properties. This enables us to make the comparison between the results of
the original model and the results obtained after having included various behavioral
biases. In addition, one investor type in the LLS model, the so-called Efficient Market
Believers, uses an ex-post distribution of stock returns to predict future returns,
which allowed us to introduce various behavioral biases by modeling their impact
on the shape of this distribution. Another practical reason for choosing the LLS
model is related to the issue of replicability, which often receives little attention in
agent-based models. Since there are many implementation choices in computational
studies, if left unreported, they can render replication of a study very difficult or
impossible. LLS model has in that sense been described quite meticulously in Levy
et al. (2000), which facilitated our replication of the original study.
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1.4 Outline of the Thesis
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 presents a survey of behavioral fi-
nance literature with special emphasis on psychological biases of individual investors.
In Chapter 3 we present a conceptual model of individual investor, which purpose
is to give a structured representation of elements of investor behavior that could be
interesting for implementation into an agent-based financial market. Chapter 4 gives
an overview of some of the well-known artificial financial market models including a
few agent-based studies which have focused explicitly on behavioral finance topics.
In addition, the chapter discusses the modeling aspects of artificial financial markets
and their statistical properties. Chapter 5 is a study of investor overconfidence within
the financial market of Levy, Levy, and Solomon (2000; hereafter the LLS model),
and Chapter 6 is a study of investor sentiment within the LLS model. Chapter 7
presents a general model of investor confidence and sentiment, and studies the influ-
ence of recency and primacy effects. Chapter 8 contains a study of a self-attribution
bias and loss-aversion within the LLS model. Chapter 9 is a study of better-than-
average overconfidence in the SSE model. Chapter 10 contains the summary and the
conclusion of the thesis.
In addition to reading this thesis sequentially, it is possible to read the chapters
independently. However, some chapters are best read in a sequence due to their
dependencies (see Figure 1.1). For example, the conceptual model of Chapter 3
has been developed based on the insights from the literature review presented in
Chapter 2, and Chapter 4 gives an overview of agent-based artificial markets by
discussing their stylized representations of the elements of the conceptual model
presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 through Chapter 8 are all based on the LLS model,
so each of them starts with a brief introduction to the original model. Nonetheless,
we suggest that a reader starts with Chapter 5 because it contains a more detailed
description of the LLS model, including an appendix with implementation details.
Furthermore, Chapter 7 presents a general sentiment-confidence model of investor
behavior, which is based on Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Chapter 8 is an extension of
Figure 1.1: Guideline for reading the chapters of this thesis.
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the model presented in Chapter 7. A study of better-than-average overconfidence in
Chapter 9 compares the results of the SSE model with the LLS model and also with
the study of overconfidence developed in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Behavioral Biases in Investor
Decision Making∗
2.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on individual investor decision making. It particularly draws
on the heuristics and biases strand of the behavioral finance literature. By taking
a descriptive point of view, we are mostly interested in how investors make their
investment decisions in a real world setting, as opposed to rational/optimal behavior
proposed by normative financial theories. This chapter incorporates results of the
research on investment decisions from fields of behavioral finance and cognitive psy-
chology, and is based on a review of existing studies, which themselves were conducted
using various research methodologies.
In the rapidly growing field of behavioral finance it becomes more difficult to de-
vise a unifying taxonomy of all the behavioral phenomena, as they arise from various
mechanisms, manifest on different levels of behavior and cognition, and have been
discovered using various methodologies (e.g. experiments vs. quantitative analysis of
market data). Nonetheless, a unifying taxonomy that captures the majority of these
biases would be useful from both a theoretical and a practical point of view. In this
chapter we survey behavioral finance literature and present taxonomies proposed by
different authors.
∗A preliminary version of this chapter appears in M. Lovric, U. Kaymak, and J. Spronk. The
conceptual model of investor behavior. ERIM Report Series ERS-2008-030-FA, Erasmus Research
Institute of Management, 2008.
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2.2 Behavioral Finance
A research into individual investors and their behavior has received a lot of consider-
ation during the past, and is increasingly in the focus of interest of many scientists,
not being confined only to economists. However, the particular way of looking at
individual investor has been subject to a great paradigmatic shift with the inclusion
of the findings and the methodology of psychology into the financial studies1. De-
spite many ongoing debates, this has slowly led to the establishment of behavioral
economics and behavioral finance as widely recognized subdisciplines.
”Behavioral finance, as a part of behavioral economics, is that branch of finance
that, with the help of theories from other behavioral sciences, particularly psychology
and sociology, tries to discover and explain phenomena inconsistent with the paradigm
of the expected utility of wealth and narrowly defined rational behavior. Behavioral
economics is mostly experimental, using research methods that are rarely applied in
the traditional, mainstream finance literature.” (Frankfurter and McGoun, 2000).
In social sciences, particularly economics, the term Homo Economicus has been
used for a formal representation of an individual, who acts as a utility maximizer,
given his preferences and other constraints. An economic man adheres to the axioms
of rational choice theory. Even though this hypothetical construct has been useful in
formulating economic theories and models, over the past decades psychologists and
behavioral scientists have documented robust and systematic violations of principles
of Expected utility theory, Bayesian learning, and Rational expectations - questioning
their validity as a descriptive theory of decision making (De Bondt, 1998). Further-
more, Simon (1991), to whom the term bounded rationality is usually attributed, has
emphasized ”the limits upon the ability of human beings to adapt optimally, or even
satisfactorily, to complex environments.”
The efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), developed in the 1960’s independently
by Paul Samuelson and Eugene F. Fama, posits that market prices fully reflect all
available information. The EMH is much intertwined with the Random Walk Hy-
pothesis (RWH) according to which securities prices are unpredictable. ”It has been
applied extensively to theoretical models and empirical studies of financial securities
prices, generating considerable controversy as well as fundamental insights into the
price-discovery process” (Lo, 2007). Meir Statman, a notable proponent of behavioral
finance, pleaded for ”accepting market efficiency in the sense of beating the markets,”
however, rejecting the definition in the sense of rationality, by which ”rational prices
reflect only utilitarian characteristics, such as risk, not value-expressive characteris-
tics, such as sentiment” (Statman, 1999). Burton G. Malkiel, one of the proponents
1Statman (1999), however, gives another perspective: ”Some people think that behavioral finance
introduced psychology into finance, but psychology was never out of finance. Although models of
behavior differ, all behavior is based on psychology.” Yet another view is that economists distanced
themselves from the psychological foundations of individual behavior during the development of
neo-classical economics.
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of the EMH, embraces the definition of market efficiency ”that such markets do not
allow investors to earn above-average returns without accepting above-average risks”
(Malkiel, 2003). Also, ”What I do not argue is that the market pricing is always per-
fect. After the fact, we know that markets have made egregious mistakes, as I think
occurred during the recent Internet ’bubble.’ Nor do I deny that psychological factors
influence securities prices...” (Malkiel, 2003). Therefore, even though final opinions
on EMH differ among academics, there appears to be at least some confluence of
thought.
In order to reconcile the theory of efficient markets with behavioral finance, Lo
(2005) proposes an alternative theory in which both can coexist - the Adaptive Mar-
kets Hypothesis. In this evolutionary model individual market participants adapt
to changing environment by using heuristics. In other words, Lo provides us with
a theoretical framework in which we could easily fit our conceptual model of the
individual investor. Lo (2005) believes that if we were able to measure changes in
investor population, changes in investor preferences, and changes in the investment
environment, it might be possible to build actively managed portfolios that better
suit an investor’s needs.
One of the most influential contributions to the theory of decision making under
uncertainty and risk was made by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) with their Prospect
Theory. The robustness and pervasiveness of this cognitive-psychological research
have bolstered its impact on the economic theory, as well as finance (whose Modern
Portfolio Theory is also based on the assumption of rational agents). Individual
investors - who use heuristics, depend on framing of the problem, and are prone to
biases, which in turn may lead to various anomalies at the market level - are subjects
of research in the area of behavioral finance. ”An empirical result qualifies as an
anomaly if it is difficult to ’rationalize’ or if implausible assumptions are necessary
to explain it within the paradigm,” as said by Thaler (1987) throughout his series of
papers on anomalies.
Behavioral finance builds itself upon two blocks: limits to arbitrage and psy-
chology (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). Psychology lists a number of possible devi-
ations from rationality, while limits to arbitrage argue that rational investors may
not be able to exploit opportunities created by irrational investors. If irrational in-
vestors (noise traders) create dislocations in asset prices (departures from fundamen-
tal values), rational investors (arbitrageurs) should be able to correct this mispricing
through the process of arbitrage. However, the arbitrage can be too costly, too risky,
or simply impossible due to various constraints, so the inefficiencies may persist for a
longer period (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). Behavioral finance finds its applications
on various levels of financial markets: on the aggregate market level, on the cross-
section of average returns, on individual investor behavior, and on corporate finance
(Barberis and Thaler, 2003).
One of the earlier comprehensive studies of individual investors who manage their
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own equity portfolios, De Bondt (1998) identified four classes of anomalies on the level
of individual investor behavior: Firstly, investors are prone to biases in the perception
of asset price movements. In his 1987-1992 study, De Bondt conducted a mail survey
among 125 investors affiliated with the American Association of Individual Investors
(AAII), where he documented an extrapolation bias, that is, ’the expected continu-
ation of past price changes.’ Quite the opposite, in his 1991 study, by interpreting
Livingston surveys data, he concluded that economic experts are contrarians in their
predictions. Furthermore, investors predict too narrow confidence intervals in the
subjective probability distributions of prices (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Sec-
ondly, the perception of asset’s value is largely dependent on popular models (Shiller,
1990), that is socially shared tips from peers, financial advisors, news in the media
(and nowadays, especially, on Internet portals, forums, and news groups). De Bondt
and Thaler (1985) found evidence that stock market overreacts, i.e. violates Bayes’
rule, as portfolios of prior losers outperform portfolios of prior winners. Thirdly, when
managing risk and return, many investors do not diversify their portfolios. This may
be due to false beliefs that the risk is defined at the level of an individual asset rather
than the portfolio level, and that it can be avoided by hedging techniques, decision
delay, or delegation of authority (De Bondt, 1998). Additionally, in their portfolios
investors hold surprisingly large amounts of fixed-income securities (bonds), despite
the empirical fact that stocks outperform them on the long run. Benartzi and Thaler
(1995) have offered an explanation to this famous equity premium puzzle (Mehra and
Prescott, 1985), by investors’ myopic loss aversion - a combination of high sensitivity
to losses, and frequent monitoring of one’s wealth2. Finally, although traders are
often precommitted to certain rules and techniques, even professionals seem to fail
to maintain discipline and consistency (Slovic, 1972). Trading practices are highly
influenced by two strong reference points - performance of the market index, and the
price at which the asset was purchased.
A number of surveys and books on behavioral finance and behavioral economics
have been published, including some popular books aimed at individual investors
(Shefrin, 2000; Goldberg and von Nitzsch, 2001; Barberis and Thaler, 2003; Camerer
et al., 2004; Altman, 2006; Peterson, 2007). An excellent review paper about neu-
roeconomics is written by Camerer et al. (2005). Neuroeconomics and neurofinance
are yet another emerging fields, which aim to combine neuroscience methods with
economic and financial theory. Neuroscience uses imaging of brain activity and other
techniques to infer the details about how the brain (the ultimate ”black box”) works
(Camerer et al., 2005). Neuroconomists are particularly interested in neural evidence
that can elucidate our assumptions on the economic constructs such as utility, risk
attitude, time preference etc.
2Haigh and List (2005) conducted an experimental analysis, and showed that not only undergrad-
uate students exhibit myopic loss aversion, but also professional traders recruited from the Chicago
Board of Trade (CBOT); the latter even to a greater extent.
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2.3 Dimensions of Investment Decisions
The question of investor decision making is in financial literature often conceptualized
as a process consisting of different stages. In this section we address a number of
relevant (and most likely interdependent) sub questions, which correspond to the
investment process often described in the financial literature. In addition, we discuss
other relevant topics which are often studied in the area of behavioral finance, but
sometimes neglected in traditional finance. Hence, this section presents a literature
review on the following topics.
1. Profiling investors on their preferences and risk attitude.
2. Portfolio allocation in practice, diversification in practice, and the influence of
various constraints.
3. Portfolio management, performance measurement, frequency of updating, em-
ployed strategies.
4. Information processing and learning.
5. Social interaction and peer influence.
6. The role of emotions
7. Heuristics, biases, and departures from rationality.
2.3.1 Risk Attitude
The crucial concept for investments, and decision making in general, is the concept of
risk. Yet, there are many definitions of risk with its meaning varying across different
domains. In standard decision theory, a risky prospect is expressed as a set of events
and event-contingent outcomes, with probabilities assigned to each event. Knight
(1921) made the distinction between decisions under risk and decisions under un-
certainty, with risk being measurable (quantitative) and uncertainty non-measurable
(non-quantitative). However, it is possible to conceive decision under risk as a spe-
cial case of decision under uncertainty, where objective probabilities are known, and
used in place of subjective probabilities. The most influential theories for decisions
under risk and uncertainty are known as Expected Utility Theory (Bernoulli (1954),
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)), Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1979), Rank-Dependent Utility Theory (Quiggin (1982), Schmeidler (1989)),
and Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Traditional eco-
nomics and finance have been dominated by these probabilistic models of uncertainty.
However, other theories for dealing with uncertainty, ambiguity, or vagueness exist:
e.g. Fuzzy Set Theory3 (Zadeh, 1965), Dempster-Shafer Theory (Shafer, 1976), and
Rough Set Theory (Pawlak, 1991).
3An example of a financial application is the article of Almeida and Kaymak (2009), which
proposes a probabilistic fuzzy system (PFS) for Value-at-risk (VaR) estimation.
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A decision maker’s attitude towards risk can be characterized as risk-aversion,
risk-seeking (risk-tolerance, risk-taking, risk-loving), or risk-neutrality; and can be
defined in a classical sense as a preference between a risky prospect and its expected
value (the method of revealed preference). In these theoretical considerations risk
attitude is usually captured through the curvature of utility function, or alternatively,
through nonlinear weighting of probabilities. Another strong empirical phenomenon
that is driving risk aversion to a large extent is known as loss aversion (Kahneman
and Tversky (1979), Markowitz (1952)). ”Losses loom larger than gains,” and while
people are typically risk-averse for gains, they are risk-seeking in the domain of
losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This highlights reference dependence, i.e.
the importance of reference point against which outcomes are coded as losses or
gains. Loomes (1999) suggests that the current evidence in literature is more in
favor of the notion that individuals have only basic and fuzzy preferences, and that
each decision problem triggers its own preference elicitation. This is in line with the
claim that preferences are constructed (not elicited or revealed) as a response to a
judgment or choice task (Bettman et al., 1998).
Slovic (1998) argues that although knowledge of the dynamics of risk taking is
still limited, there is an evidence of little correlation in risk-taking preferences across
different domains and situations. Only those tasks highly similar in structure and
payoffs have shown any generality. Also, previous learning experiences in specific
risk-taking settings seem more important than general personality characteristics.
Furthermore, risk attitude can change depending on the outcomes of previous de-
cisions. Thaler and Johnson (1990) found that previous gains increase risk-seeking
behavior (house money effect), while in the presence of previous losses, those bets
which offer a chance to break even seem particularly attractive (break-even effect).
These are examples of what Thaler refers to as mental accounting. It is an impor-
tant question whether investors have risk attitudes related to the gains and losses
defined on the individual stock level (narrow framing), on parts of the portfolio, on
the overall portfolio, or on their total wealth.
Risk in investments is usually considered as the standard deviation of asset re-
turns. Next to volatility, other common measures of risk are downside risk, shortfall
probability, and Value-at-Risk. Finance and econometrics literature are the source
of other more sophisticated risk modeling techniques. In an early study of the judg-
mental processes of institutional investors, Cooley (1977) found that most investors
perceive variance as a synonym or a large part of investment risk. A substantial
number of investors, however, identified an additional dimension of risk in asym-
metry (left skewness). Kurtosis, on the other hand, was perceived as risk-reducing.
Investor perception of risk in security valuation can be biased. Shleifer (2000) illus-
trates this on an example of value and growth stocks, and conjectures that if this
biased perception affects the demand for securities, while having nothing to do with
the fundamental risk of a portfolio, it would still generate the same returns as we can
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observe in the data. Ganzach (2000) found in experiments that judgments of risk
and return for familiar financial assets were consistent with their ecological values
(a positive relationship between risk and return). However, for unfamiliar assets he
found that both judgments were based on a global attitude, which resulted in a neg-
ative relationship between risk and return (assets were perceived to have high risk
and low return, or low risk and high return).
2.3.2 Portfolio Allocation
Behavioral finance takes a descriptive perspective, by studying how individual in-
vestors actually allocate their portfolios. Conversely, Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT)
(Markowitz, 1959) lays the foundations of portfolio allocation from the normative
point of view. In portfolio theory one of the crucial concepts is diversification, a
risk-management technique where various investments are combined in order to re-
duce the risk of the portfolio. However, many investors do not (sufficiently) diversify
their portfolios. This may be due to beliefs that the risk is defined at the level of an
individual asset rather than the portfolio level, and that it can be avoided by hedging
techniques, decision delay, or delegation of authority (De Bondt, 1998).
Benartzi and Thaler (2001) studied naive diversification strategies in the context
of defined contribution saving plans. They found an evidence of 1/n heuristic, as
a special case of diversification heuristic, in which an investor spreads his or her
contributions evenly across available investment possibilities. As the authors convey,
such a strategy can be problematic both in terms of ex ante welfare costs, and ex post
regret (in case the returns differ from historical norms). Naive diversification does not
imply coherent decision making. Although it may be a reasonable strategy for some
investors, it is unlikely that the same strategy would be suitable for all investors,
who obviously differ on their risk preferences and other risk factors, such as age.
1/n heuristic can produce a portfolio that is close to some point on the efficient
frontier. However, the exact point might not match investors’ risk preferences -
which can create a significant ex ante welfare costs, as exemplified by Brennan and
Tourous (1999). Nevertheless, naive diversification portfolio strategy is actually a
very strong benchmark, as shown by DeMiguel et al. (2007). By comparing out-
of-sample performance of various optimizing mean-variance models, they found that
no single model consistently beats the 1/n strategy in terms of the Sharpe ratio or
the certainty-equivalent return. Poor performance of these optimal models is due to
errors in estimating means and covariances (DeMiguel et al., 2007).
Benartzi and Thaler (2001) also found a support for mental accounting on the
company stock : when company stock is in the array of available investment options,
the total exposure to equities is higher than when it is not available. It seams that
company stock is given a separate mental account different from the rest of equity
classes. Home bias is another robust finding in portfolio allocation. Despite the
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advantages of international portfolio diversification, the actual portfolio allocation of
many investors is too concentrated in their domestic market (French and Poterba,
1991). So far, the literature has not provided a generally accepted explanation for
the observed home bias. Huberman and Jiang (2006) argue that ”familiarity breeds
investment,” and that a person is more likely to invest in the company that she
(thinks) she knows. Instances of this familiarity bias are investing in domestic market,
in company stocks, in stocks that are visible in investors lives, and stocks that are
discussed favorably in the media.
Goetzmann and Kumar (2001) examined the diversification of investors with re-
spect to demographic variables of age, income, and employment. They found that low
income and non-professional categories hold the least diversified portfolios. They also
found that young active investors are overfocused and inclined towards concentrated,
undiversified portfolios, which might be a manifestation of overconfidence.
2.3.3 Portfolio Management
Before discussing some of the main findings on how investors manage their portfolios,
it is noteworthy mentioning that both EMH as well as much empirical evidence under-
mine practical relevance of active portfolio management4. While financial literature
on active portfolio management offers various techniques for beating the benchmarks,
behavioral literature focuses on how individual investors manage (or make changes
to) their portfolios. A common tendency to hold losers too long and sell winners to
soon, has been labeled by Shefrin and Statman (1985) as the disposition effect. They
attributed their findings to loss aversion, the issue of self-control, mental accounting,
and the desire to avoid regret.
Odean (1998) found that a particular class of investors sell winners more readily
than losers. Even when the alternative rational motivations are controlled for, these
investors continue to prefer selling winners and holding losers. Their behavior is
consistent with two behavioral hypothesis: the prospect theory, and a mistaken belief
that winners and losers will mean revert. This investor behavior appears not to be
motivated by a desire to rebalance portfolios or by a reluctance to incur the higher
trading costs of low priced stocks. It is also not justified by subsequent performance,
as, in fact, it leads to lower returns (Odean, 1998). Investors trade too much due to
their overconfidence. For successful investors this overconfidence can be reinforced
through self-attribution bias, i.e. belief that their trading success should be attributed
mostly to their own abilities.
4”Switching from security to security accomplishes nothing but to increase transactions costs
and harm performance. Thus, even if markets are less than fully efficient, indexing is likely to
produce higher rates of return than active portfolio management. Both individual and institutional
investors will be well served to employ indexing for, at the very least, the core of their equity
portfolio” (Malkiel, 2005).
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While some investors may trade too much and often change their strategies, others
may exhibit the tendency of ”doing nothing or maintaining one’s current or previous
decision.” This is how Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) defined the status quo bias.
Explanations for the status quo bias fall into three main categories. The effect may
be seen as the consequence of (1) rational decision making in the presence of tran-
sition costs and/or uncertainty; (2) cognitive misperceptions; and (3) psychological
commitment stemming from misperceived sunk costs, regret avoidance, or a drive for
consistency. The status quo is related to loss aversion (framing as gains and losses) in
the sense that current position (status quo) is seen as the reference point. Other ex-
planations, such as anchoring, sunk costs, regret avoidance, the drive for consistency,
the avoidance of cognitive dissonance, and the illusion of control, may contribute to
the perseverance of the status quo bias. It is also related to the influence of default
option on choices.
2.3.4 Information Processing
Market participants are exposed to a constant flow of information, ranging from
quantitative financial data to financial news in the media, socially exchanged opinions
and recommendations. Processing all this information is a daunting task, so it would
not be surprising that during this process people apply many heuristics. According
to the representativeness heuristic people may overreact to a series of evidences, and
see patterns where they do not exist. However, people can sometimes underreact to
news, i.e. in the light of a new evidence they update their beliefs conservatively, and
not in a fully Bayesian manner.
Processing information from the investment environment is important as it gives
inputs for decision making and belief updating, gives feedback on investment strate-
gies, and fosters learning. However, the confirmation bias may play an important
role in how investors acquire and process this information. It suggests that people
have a tendency to search for information that supports their current beliefs and
decisions, while neglecting information that confronts those beliefs.
Oberlechner and Hocking (2004) studied information sources, news, and rumors
in the foreign exchange market. In their study foreign exchange traders and finan-
cial journalists rated the importance of different information sources, such as wire
services, personal contacts, analysts, daily newspapers, financial television etc. An
interesting finding of this study is that the information speed, expected market im-
pact, and anticipated market surprise are rated as more important than the reliability
of the source, and the accuracy of information.
2.3.5 Social Interaction
Financial economists have borrowed more from the psychology of the individual than
from social psychology (Hirshleifer, 2001). For example, they have examined how in-
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formation is transmitted by prices, volume, or corporate actions. However, person-to-
person and media contagion of ideas and behavior also seems important (Hirshleifer,
2001).
Shiller (1990) has emphasized the importance of conversation in the contagion of
popular ideas about financial markets. In a survey of individual investors, Shiller and
Pound (1989) found that almost all of the investors who recently bought a particular
stock had their attention drawn to it through direct interpersonal communication.
The influence of conversation on trading may arise from individuals’ overconfidence
about their ability to distinguish pertinent information from noise or propaganda
(Hirshleifer, 2001).
Social psychology provides evidence of various social effects which might be im-
portant in the context of financial markets as well. Conformity effect, or the tendency
of people to conform with the judgment and behavior of others, was studied by Asch
(1956). Bond and Smith (1989) confirmed the conformity effect, showed its historical
change, and emphasized its cultural dependence. Other effects found in the social
context are fundamental attribution error and false consensus effect (see Hirshleifer,
2001). Herding behavior or mimetic contagion has been proposed as the source of
endogenous fluctuations (bubbles and crashes) in financial markets (Kirman, 1991;
Topol, 1991). This view is interesting as it suggests that such market fluctuations
may arise endogenously, irrespective of exceptional news or other exogenous shocks
to the market.
2.3.6 Emotions
Emotions have powerful effects on decisions, and decision outcomes have powerful
effects on emotions (Mellers et al., 1998). Emotions can have both a predecision and
postdecision effect. Most of the research focused on a unidimensional model in which
a predecision emotion can be either positive or negative. However, a more detailed
approach is needed given the variety and domain-specificity of emotions (Mellers
et al., 1998). Positive emotions are shown to increase creativity and information
integration, promote variety seeking, but also cause overestimation of the likelihood
of favorable events, and underestimation of the likelihood of negative events. Negative
emotions promote narrowing of attention and failure to search for alternatives. They
promote attribute- vs. alternative-based comparisons (Mellers et al., 1998).
One of the most studied emotions that can follow a decision is the feeling of regret.
Gilovich and Medvec (1995) showed that in the short run people experience more
regret for actions rather than inaction, while in the long run they experience more
regret for their inactions. Anticipated emotions, such as regret and disappointment,
have drawn most attention of the economists, whereas immediate emotions (experi-
enced at the moment of decision making) have been mainly studied by psychologists
(Loewenstein, 2000). Loewenstein (2000) emphasizes that economists should also
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pay attention to immediate emotions and a range of visceral factors which influence
our decisions.
One evidence for the importance of emotions in decision making comes from
patients with brain lesions in regions related to emotional processing. Shiv et al.
(2005) made an experiment with 20 rounds of investment decisions (choosing whether
to invest 1 dollar in a risky prospect with a 50-50 chance of winning 2.5 dollars or
nothing), and found that target patients (with brain lesions in emotion-related areas
of brain) made more investments than the normal participants and control patients,
and thus earned more on average. Normal and control patients seem to have been
more affected by the outcomes of previous decision - upon winning or losing they
adopted a conservative strategy and less invested in subsequent rounds. However,
the inability to learn from emotional signals (Somatic Marker Hypothesis, Damasio
et al. (1996)) can also lead to unadvantageous decisions such as excessive gambling.
Thus, emotion and cognition both play a crucial role in decision making.
Loewenstein et al. (2001) propose ”risk-as-feelings” perspective on decisions un-
der risk and uncertainty, which differs from classical cognitive-consequentialist per-
spective in the sense that feelings or affects play a crucial role in decision making:
emotional evaluations of risky choices may differ from cognitive, and when such a di-
vergence occurs, they often drive behavior. Both emotional and cognitive evaluations
are influenced by expected outcomes (and expected emotions) and subjective prob-
abilities. However, emotional evaluations are also influenced by a variety of factors,
such as vividness of associated imagery, proximity in time, etc.
Goldberg and von Nitzsch (2001) describe a personal experience of a trader (mar-
ket participant) who goes through various emotional states during profit-and-loss cy-
cles. The feelings of hope and fear, depending on the success or failure on the market,
can be transformed to the states of euphoria or panic (or even total recklessness).
Hope → pleasure → elation(exuberance) → euphoria
Fear → anxiety → desperation → panic/recklessness
During these transitional states there is a selective perception of information - positive
information is perceived and often exaggerated, while negative information is ignored.
In final states of euphoria or panic, information has almost no role to play (Goldberg
and von Nitzsch, 2001).
2.3.7 Heuristics and Biases
Much of the behavioral finance literature focuses on individual investor psychology,
particularly the use of heuristics and various biases in judgment. Organizing and pre-
senting these heuristics and biases is by no means an easy task, given that they arise
from a wide range of mechanisms. However, a simple but comprehensive framework
is important if one aims to use it for descriptive or prescriptive purposes.
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Table 2.1 presents different frameworks in which most known judgment heuris-
tics and biases from behavioral finance and behavioral economics literature can be
organized and presented. The intention of these frameworks was most likely not to
unify all possible heuristics and biases, but more to give an overview of behavioral
phenomena that different authors deemed relevant. We can see that there is a signif-
icant overlap of heuristic and biases listed in various frameworks, although they are
classified according to different criteria.
A traditional approach describes decisions as choices between risky prospects. A
decision maker forms beliefs about probabilities of events and about values (utilities)
of outcomes contingent on those events. Finally, he or she makes preferences between
risky options. Biases can arise both in the process of forming beliefs and preferences.
In the more general sense, a bias can be defined as a departure from normative,
optimal, or rational behavior.
Heuristics are mechanisms (rules, strategies) for processing information to ar-
rive at a quick (not necessarily optimal) result following little effort (Goldberg and
von Nitzsch, 2001). In their seminal work, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) investi-
gated heuristics that people often employ when making decisions under uncertainty.
Heuristics are useful because they make the difficult task of assessing the probabili-
ties related to uncertain events much easier. However, these heuristics can also lead
to systematic biases in judgment. Three heuristics to which people are particularly
susceptible are the following: Representativeness, Availability, and Adjustment and
anchoring.
Hirshleifer (2001) proposed a unified explanation for most known judgment and
decision making biases in the context of investor psychology and asset pricing. Shefrin
(2000) distinguishes between heuristic-driven bias and frame-dependence. He consid-
ers heuristics as rules of thumbs, usually generated through a trial and error process,
which can also lead to systematic biases. Frame dependence refers to the distinction
between the substance and the form, and means that the way in which a decision
problem is presented also matters. Kahneman and Riepe (1998) focus on biases in
beliefs and preferences of which financial advisors should be particularly aware, and
provide recommendations how to avoid them or mitigate their harmful effects. Gold-
berg and von Nitzsch (2001) divide heuristics into two major groups: heuristics for
reducing complexity and quick judgments. Rabin (1998) discusses various behavioral
aspects he finds important from the perspective of economics. Barberis and Thaler
(2003) survey behavioral finance literature with a focus on the aggregate market
level, on the cross-section of average returns, on individual investor behavior, and on
corporate finance. Individual perspective is an application of psychology to financial
markets. Barberis and Thaler (2003) list known biases that can arise when people
form their beliefs and preferences.
Shefrin (2000) takes the so-called debiasing view, by which costly mistakes can
be avoided if practitioners learn how to recognize mistakes, understand the underly-
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ing reasons, and finally avoid them. Kahneman and Riepe (1998) find the ability to
recognize situations in which one is likely to make a large error a useful skill for a
decision maker. Critical or analytical thinking must be employed, whenever intuition
cannot be trusted. Goldberg and von Nitzsch (2001) believe that individuals could
increase their trading success by ”knowing thyself,” by being aware of these mech-
anisms, and by a little discipline. Many proponents of behavioral finance seem to
share this view. However, some questions immediately arise, as it is not completely
clear what the prerequisites for a successful implementation of this debiasing are.
How do investors realize they are biased - is it through market feedback, their own
introspection, or social interaction? How do they implement debiasing, and how do
they evaluate this process? ”Why don’t people simply learn their way out of biased
judgments? To some extent they do. One barrier is that learning is just too hard.
The other barrier arises from self-deception” (Hirshleifer, 2001). Some biases may
be avoided by careful framing of problems or by learning effects of repetition. How-
ever, there is no guaranty that financial decision problems will be presented in such
a way which promotes an unbiased decision making process, as noted by Hirshleifer
(2001). Inexperienced market participants should be particularly careful, as they
have not been exposed to these positive learning effects. Similarly, Kahneman and
Riepe (1998) identify three necessary conditions for a good calibration (i.e. avoid-
ing overconfidence): (1) Facing the same problem every day; (2) Making explicit
probabilistic predictions; (3) Obtaining swift and precise feedback on outcomes.
It could be argued, however, that individual biases are not that important, as
individuals differ, so their biases should cancel out in the equilibrium. However, it
is well-known that some biases can be systematic and persistent (Hirshleifer, 2001).
Repeated patterns can even be used as a basis for prediction of behavior of oth-
ers, which is very important in the context of financial markets (Goldberg and von
Nitzsch, 2001)5.
Behavioral finance literature gets into the very heart of the debate about ratio-
nality and irrationality of market participants. Thaler (1991) makes an interesting
remark about that: ”If most individuals tend to err in the same direction, then a
theory which assumes that they are rational also makes mistakes in predicting their
behavior.” A typical example in a game-theoretical setting is a game (reminiscent of
beauty contest games) in which every participant must write down a number between
0 and 100. The winner of the game is the participant whose number is the closest to
two thirds of the average value of all the numbers given by the participants. Even
though the rational solution to the problem is 0, experiments show that winning
5The issue whether this could be exploited so as to create profitable opportunities is still rather
controversial, and is related to a stance on the market efficiency. ”I am skeptical that any of the
’predictable patterns’ that have been documented in the literature were ever sufficiently robust so
as to have created profitable investment opportunities, and after they have been discovered and
publicized, they will certainly not allow investors to earn excess returns” (Malkiel, 2003).
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numbers are usually larger. A proposed explanation for this out-of-the-equilibrium
behavior involves subjects engaging in a finite-depth of reasoning about other sub-
jects’ beliefs (Nagel, 1995). A player who wants to win the game should deliberately
depart from the Nash equilibrium solution, by taking into account that not all players
are fully rational (Thaler, 2000). Financial markets might be a real-world example
where rational behavior does not necessarily imply success. While learning would
lead players to the equilibrium in the previously mentioned repeated game, in the
real market there may be not be such learning opportunities, and/or there might be
an inflow of new irrational investors.
Importantly, heuristics and biases should not be treated as synonymous, even
though we can often read about them together in behavioral finance literature. Not
all biases arise from heuristics, and, also, not always the use of heuristics leads to
biases. However, even when it does (with respect to some normative rational theory),
a heuristic behavior may actually result in a successful performance compared to an
optimal strategy, which was demonstrated in a seminal paper by Gigerenzer and
Goldstein (1996). A financial example of a successful heuristic is naive diversification
(1/n heuristic), which is costly ex ante, but ex post serves as a very strong benchmark
(DeMiguel et al., 2007).
The following list presents some of the most known heuristics, biases and effects
found in behavioral finance literature. It includes brief definitions, experimental
examples, and financial examples or possible implications for investment decisions.
Ambiguity Aversion
Ambiguity aversion refers to the preference for known risks over unknown risks (un-
certainty). ”The emotional aspect of the aversion to ambiguity is the fear of un-
known” (Shefrin, 2000).
Anchoring and Adjustment
Adjustment and anchoring is a heuristic which starts from an initial value (given
by the problem formulation, or by some partial computation) and then adjusts it
towards the final value. The problem with this heuristic is that the adjustment is
often insufficient, which means that the final value will heavily depend on the initial
value. The consequence of this heuristic is that people overestimate conjunction of
events (with high individual probabilities), and underestimate a disjunction of events
(with low individual probabilities). Anchoring effect is also present in the assessment
of subjective probability distributions, resulting in overly narrow confidence intervals.
Overstrong anchoring to the status quo often results in underestimation of the
probability of extreme movements (Lichtenstein et al, 1982). Setting confidence
intervals overly narrow means that people get surprised more frequently than what
they expect (Shefrin, 2000). In financial markets anchors can be based on opinions
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or attitudes of friends or experts. Even data and forecast that initially appear to be
unrealistic can still have an anchoring effect (Goldberg and von Nitzsch, 2001)
Availability
Availability is a judgmental heuristics in which a frequency/probability of a class/event
is assessed on how easy it is to recall its instances (retrievability), how easy it is to
mentally construct its instances (imaginability), or how easy it is to associate two
instances (illusionary correlation), as studied by Tversky and Kahneman (1974).
In Tversky and Kahneman (1973), the authors analyze availability, a heuristic
which uses the strength of association between instances to assess their probabilities.
For example, in one study subjects were asked to compare the frequencies of words
starting with letter ’r’, and words that have letter ’r’ in the third position. Even
though the latter are more frequent, the participants opted for the first case, because
it is much easier to mentally construct words by using their first letter. Similar
results can be obtained when testing different mental operations. For retrievability,
the frequency of instances which are more easily brought to mind (retrieved) looms
larger. Another availability heuristic assesses the frequency of co-occurrences by the
ease of making association between objects.
Conditional Probability Fallacy
Conditional probability fallacy means confusing conditional probability p(a|b) with
p(b|a), and can be in a broader view considered as the fallacy of confusing cause
and effect. Goldberg and von Nitzsch (2001) give a financial example where the
probability of a stock market crash in October is overestimated based on the historical
observation that most stock crashes occurred in October.
Conservatism
People respond too conservatively to new information. This is related to Anchoring
and Adjustment heuristic. In a narrow sense conservatism means that people are not
perfect Bayesian updaters.
Endowment Effect
Once a person comes to possess a good, the person immediately values it more
(Thaler, 1980; Knetsch and Sinden, 1984).
Frame Dependence
A frame is the form used to describe a decision problem, and frame dependence
means that the form is relevant for behavior (Shefrin, 2000).
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Gambler’s Fallacy
The gambler’s fallacy is the false belief that if deviations from expected behavior
are observed in repeated independent trials of some random process, then these
deviations are likely to be evened out by opposite deviations in the future. In the
case of a fair coin tosses, this fallacy would manifest as thinking that the coin is more
likely to toss heads after having tossed tails a number of times in a row. See also the
law of small numbers and representativeness.
Hedonic Editing
Hedonic editing means that people prefer some frames over others. It is the way
people organize their mental accounts. For instance, ”transferring assets” is an
expression that emphasizes reallocation from one mental account to another, and
can hide the fact that the first mental account was closed at loss. (Shefrin, 2000)
People like to separate gains, and integrate losses. In financial markets investors
who experience capital gains like to separate dividend payments, while in declining
markets they can use dividends as silver linings which buffer capital losses. Thaler
and Johnson (1990) study how prior gains or losses affect risk-taking. They find
evidence of the house money effect (prior gains increase risk seeking), as well as
break-even effect (under previous losses, gambles which offer a chance to break even
seam very attractive).
Law of Small Numbers
Misapplication of the law of large numbers to small samples is also known as the law
of small numbers or a gambler’s fallacy. The phenomenon is related to representa-
tiveness heuristic - people under-use base-rate information when forming their beliefs
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). In the financial context, ”we underestimate how of-
ten a good financial analyst will be wrong a few times in a row, and underestimate
how often a clueless analyst will be right a few times in a row” (Rabin, 1998).
Loss Aversion
Loss aversion is a pervasive phenomenon in human decision making under risk and
uncertainty, according to which people are more sensitive to losses than gains. It
plays a crucial role in Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Tversky and
Kahneman (1992)). A typical financial example is in investors’ difficulty to realize
losses. Shefrin (2000) calls this phenomenon ”get-evenitis,” that is, people hope that
markets will work in their advantage and that they will be able to terminate their
investment without incurring any losses.
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Money Illusion
A natural way for people to think about money is in terms of nominal rather than
inflation-adjusted values (Shefrin, 2000). Thus, under hyperinflation people will view
nominal wage increase more favorably than it really is.
Overconfidence
Overconfident people are not well calibrated. In their predictions they set confidence
bands overly narrow, which means they get surprised more frequently than they an-
ticipated (Shefrin, 2000). This type of overconfidence is known as miscalibration.
A more general definition of overconfidence is the one by which people overestimate
their own capabilities, usually with respect to capabilities of other people on average.
This is also known as better-than-average overconfidence. In financial markets over-
confident investors are considered those who actively trade in such a way that the
difference between the stocks they buy and those they sell does not cover transaction
costs (Odean, 1998).
Regret
Regret is the emotion experienced for not having made the right decision. It is the
feeling of responsibility for loss (Shefrin, 2000). In a financial context the minimiza-
tion of possible future regret plays an important role in portfolio allocation. It is also
related with preference for dividends in financing consumer expenditures, because
selling a stock that may rise in the future carries a huge potential for regret.
Representativeness
Representativeness bias occurs when it is required to assess the probability of an ob-
ject A belonging/originating to/from a class/process B. The heuristic rule says that
if object A is highly representative (highly similar to a stereotypical object) of class
B, the probability of A originating from B is judged as high, and vice versa (Tver-
sky and Kahneman, 1974). The problem with this heuristics is that it persists even
when facts, which should affect the judgment of probabilities, are introduced. For
instance, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) showed that representativeness is insensi-
tive to the prior probability (base-rate frequency) of outcomes, when (uninformative)
description is provided. Furthermore, it is insensitive to the sample size, when people
estimate the probability related to the sample randomly drawn from a large popula-
tion, based on the similarity with the population parameter. People also expect the
global characteristics of a process to be present in each local part, which deviates
from the chance expectations (i.e. expecting more randomness in a series of coin
tosses; gambler’s fallacy). The representativeness heuristic often neglects different
levels of predictability, and may lead to the illusion of validity when the predicted
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outcome is highly representative for a given input. In this case people also neglect
the phenomenon known as regression to the mean, which explains why people might
overestimate the efficiency of a punishment, and underestimate the efficiency of a
reward.
According to Shefrin (2000), representativeness heuristic is a judgment based on
stereotypes. Representativeness is high when an observation fits the pattern (Gold-
berg and von Nitzsch, 2001). Some of the most important applications of this heuris-
tic are in predicting the market, picking stocks, choosing mutual funds, selecting
money managers, and investing in initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity
offerings (SEOs), (Shefrin, 2000).
A financial example is the winner-loser effect documented in De Bondt and Thaler
(1985). Investors who use the representativeness heuristic are too optimistic about
past winners, and too pessimistic about past losers. This creates a temporary mis-
pricing (overvaluation of past winners, and undervaluation of past losers), which is
eventually reversed, as the portfolio of past losers outperforms the market, while the
winners portfolio underperforms.
Another example is a misapplication of regression to the mean, which predicts
that future returns will be closer to the historical average. However, practitioners
often predict that after having a long period of high returns they are more likely to
be below, which is a wrong prediction in positively autocorrelated financial markets.
(Shefrin, 2000). Analogously, in an experiment where subjects could ostensibly buy
an asset (whose price moved randomly), Maital (1986) found that the majority ex-
pected prices to rise after a long downward trend and consequently held on them
longer on average.
Representativeness can cause illusory correlation, that is, overestimation of empir-
ical relationships. Furthermore, empirical relationships are often turned into causal
relationships, which may or may not be true (Goldberg and von Nitzsch, 2001).
Self-Control
The issue of self-control and hedonic editing underlies reasons for investors’ preference
for portfolios that feature high dividends. To finance their consumer expenditures
some investors prefer dividends rather then selling assets (the heuristic ”don’t dip
into capital”). This is due to framing/hedonic editing, because dividends are labeled
as income, not as capital (Shefrin, 2000).
Status Quo Bias
People prefer status quo to changes that involve losing some goods, even when these
losses are offset by gains (Knetsch and Sinden, 1984). It is related to the endowment
effect and loss aversion.
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2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has given an overview of behavioral biases in investor decision making.
We have started with an introduction to behavioral finance and explained the main
motivation and challenges in that field. After that, we have given an overview of
the main dimensions of investment decisions, and summarized the main findings in
behavioral finance related to those dimensions.
For the last dimension, namely the heuristics and biases, we have presented an
overview of taxonomies that various authors used to classify heuristics and biases.
As we can see, there are similarities between these framework in the sense that they
contain similar heuristics and biases. Nonetheless, they are grouped according to
different criteria. Some authors emphasize the distinction between quick judgments
(that ease the mental effort) and framing effects (the way problems are presented),
while others make distinction between effects resulting from cognitive processing and
those resulting from emotional aspects of decision making. This motivated us for
the incorporation of dual-processing theories into a conceptual model of individual
investor.
While psychology studies behavioral biases in order to understand how they arise
and manifest themselves, behavioral finance aims to understand how they aggregate
across individuals, whether they have impact on the market dynamics and ramifica-
tions for investor performance. In order to study such implications of investor biases
it is important to understand the most relevant aspects of investor behavior as well
as the environment in which they are operating. Although there is a significant body
of literature on those topics, surprisingly, not much attempt has been made to con-
ceptualize and give more structure to this body of knowledge. This is what we aim
in the following chapter.
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A Conceptual Model of Individual
Investor∗
3.1 Introduction
A conceptual model of the individual investor behavior presented in this chapter is
built for the purpose of further implementation into an agent-based artificial financial
market. It has already been acknowledge in the literature that agent-based models of
financial markets can be useful for studying the topics of behavioral finance, but not
much attempt has been made to conceptualize the knowledge of behavioral finance in
a form that meets the needs of an agent-based modeler. One example in this direction
is the paper by Chen (2008), where cognition, personality and culture are mentioned
as the potential topics for agent-based studies in economics. Agent models inspired
by cognitive ability, personality traits and culture are concerned with mechanisms
which generate human decision and behaviors, and which have to a large extent and
for a long time been considered as a black box (Chen, 2008).
Of course, individual behavior could be directly implemented into computational
models of investors. However, building a separate conceptual model has a number of
advantages. A conceptual model is a structured representation of the large diversity,
complexity, and interdisciplinarity present in the field. By building a conceptual
model we can become aware of the interrelations between components we may not
otherwise see, we can indicate the strength of these relationships, and we can identify
those areas which are still largely unknown, thus fostering future research. From a
∗A preliminary version of this chapter has been published in M. Lovric, U. Kaymak, and J.
Spronk. A conceptual model of investor behavior. In S. Nefti-Meziani and J. O. Gray, editors,
Advances in Cognitive Systems. IET Control Engineering Series, 71, chapter 13, pages 369-394.
Institution of Engineering and Technology, London, UK, 2010c.
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modeler’s perspective, a conceptual model gives a structure that is easier to imple-
ment. On top of the same conceptual model various implementations can be made,
for instance, using mathematical, or computational modeling techniques. Hence, we
expect that this model will be particularly useful for a modeler of agent-based arti-
ficial markets who needs a short, yet rich description of behavioral phenomena that
can play a role in investor behavior.
In this conceptual model, investment decisions are seen as an iterative process of
interactions between the investor, as represented by the cognitive model (Figure 3.1)
and the investment environment (Figure 3.2). This investment process is influenced
by a number of interdependent variables and driven by dual mental processes. The
interplay between these systems contributes to boundedly rational behavior in which
investors use various heuristics and can exhibit biases. In the modeling tradition
of cognitive science, the investor is seen as a learning, adapting, and evolving entity
that perceives the environment, processes information, acts upon it (make changes to
portfolio), and updates its internal states. Finally, the investor behavior is influenced
by social interactions with his or her peers. This model can be used to build stylized
representations of (classes of) individual investors, and further studied using the
paradigm of agent-based artificial financial markets. Although investor agents could
be built so that they incorporate many concepts presented in this model, in this thesis,
we have focused primarily on heuristic and biases, for which we have conducted a
number of studies and presented them in Chapter 5 through Chapter 9.
3.2 A Cognitive Model of the Investor
The central part of our cognitive model of the investor (Figure 3.1) is based on a
two-dimensional framework of neural functioning proposed by Camerer et al. (2005).
This is conceived as a central information processing and decision making unit that
interacts with the investment environment through the perception-interaction-action
interface, and is influenced by a number of variables, including risk attitude, time
preference, strategies, goals, motivation, emotions, heuristics and biases, personality,
demographics and other factors. For modeling purposes, it is possible to assume
that all the variables have constant values, such as a constant risk aversion, constant
strategies, constant degree of biases etc. However, it is also possible to consider the
dynamics of those variables over time. For example, in Chapter 8 we have studied
the dynamics of investor confidence and sentiment. Furthermore, the dependencies
between those variables could also be taken into account. In the rest of the sec-
tion, each element of the cognitive model is explained in more detail, except for the
heuristics and biases, which have been explained in Chapter 2.
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Figure 3.1: A cognitive model of the individual investor
3.2.1 Dual-Process Systems
A two-dimensional framework of neural functioning by Camerer et al. (2005), dis-
tinguishes between affective and cognitive, and between controlled and automatic
processes. A distinction between controlled and automatic processes can be found in
psychology literature under various names of dual-processing theories (see Camerer
et al., 2005)). Controlled processes are serial (step-by-step), evoked deliberately, they
cause the subjective feeling of effort, and are accessible by introspection. Automatic
processes operate in parallel, they are relatively effortless, and are inaccessible to
consciousness. A distinction between affect and cognition is also pervasive in con-
temporary psychology and neuroscience literature (Camerer et al., 2005). Most of
the affective processing operates unconsciously. The central role of affective process-
ing is in human motivation - affects address ”go-no go” questions, while cognitive
processes address ”true or false” questions (Camerer et al., 2005). It is only when
affect states reach a certain threshold level that the affective processing is associated
with feeling states for which we have different names (Camerer et al., 2005). These
feeling states include emotions such as happiness, sadness, anger, fear, greed etc, and
in the cognitive model they are represented by the variable emotions. The role of
some of these emotions has been discussed in Section 2.3.6.
In dual-process theories the choice is determined as the result of the interplay
between the cognitive and affective system. This interaction can be collaborative
(when both systems work in the same direction), or competing (in which one system
wins and overrides the other system). A number of variables can influence the rela-
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tive strength of these systems, e.g. cognitive load can undermine controlled cognitive
processes. Much of the findings in behavioral economics and finance can be inter-
preted in the light of the dual-process theories (see Camerer et al., 2005). Hence, for
a modeler, it might be just an appropriate level of abstraction, without the need to
go into more complex details of cognitive mechanisms and neural functioning.
3.2.2 Risk Attitude
The conceptual model captures important variables in financial decision making, such
as risk attitude and time preference. Risk attitude (risk aversion, risk neutrality, risk
seeking) is influenced by the competition and collaboration between the cognitive
and affective system (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Cognitive system is assumed to
deal with risk in a probabilistic fashion, similar to traditional choice theories. Risk
averse behavior is driven by fear and anxiety responses to risk and the stored pain
of experienced losses (Camerer et al., 2005). Risk taking behavior is driven by the
pleasure of gambling (Camerer et al., 2005). The feelings need not be mediated by
the cognition. In the light of the Prospect Theory, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue
(2004) propose that the affective system contributes to the risk attitude through
loss aversion and nonlinear (usually S-shaped) probability weighting. However, the
deliberative system responds to risk in a way predicted by Expected Utility Theory
(or perhaps Expected Value). To support this interpretation, the authors point
to research which suggests that emotional responses depend on mental images of
outcomes, whereas they tend to be insensitive to probabilities.
Risk component of the model is related to risk factors such as gender and age. A
meta-analysis study by Byrnes et al. (1999) confirmed a significantly higher propen-
sity for risk taking in male participants. In addition, they found age-related shifts
in this gender gap, particularly the tendency of the gender gap to decrease with
age. Donkers et al. (2001) show that an individual’s risk attitude and probability
weighting function is influenced by gender, education level, age and income.
Besides demographic factors, such as gender and age, an important variable in-
fluencing risk attitude is the investment horizon. ”Most investment practitioners
subscribe to the time diversification principle, which states that portfolio risk de-
clines as the investment horizon lengthens. Accordingly, practitioners commonly ad-
vise younger clients to allocate a larger proportion of their retirement money to risky
assets than older clients do. In contrast, many respected theorists argue that time
diversification is a fallacy” (Jaggia and Thosar, 2000). In their opinion, the answer
lies in the psychology of risk-taking, particularly as it relates to time horizon. In fa-
vor of the time diversification position, they ”argue that risk perception is not only a
function of age (and other cross-sectional idiosyncratic factors) but also of the tem-
poral distance between the initial investment point and the cash-out point typically
represented by the individual’s retirement” (Jaggia and Thosar, 2000).
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Gilovich et al. (1993) have studied the effect of temporal perspective on subjective
confidence, and they found that people tend to lose confidence in their prospects for
success as they come closer to the ”moment of truth,” i.e. ”the risk-assessment
becomes more conservative with shorter temporal distance.”
3.2.3 Time Preference
Time preference is in standard economic theory captured with the discount factor of
the discounted utility (DU) model (Samuelson, 1937). However, a behavioral point
of view suggests that modeling time preference with a constant discount rate may
not be suitable for descriptive purposes. Hyperbolic discounting has been proposed
to capture an empirical observation that between now and a point in the future
people discount more than between two other temporally equidistant points in the
far future, i.e. the discount rate is declining over time (Laibson, 1997). An opposing
finding by Read (2001) suggests that an observed pattern of time preference could
also be explained by subadditive discounting, i.e. the finding that the amount of
”discounting over a delay is greater when the delay is divided into subintervals than
when it is left undivided” (Read, 2001).
Frederick et al. (2002) review time discounting literature, and list the anomalies
which contradict the DU model, namely: (1) the sign effect; (2) the magnitude effect;
(3) the delay effect; (4) preference for improving sequences; and (5) violations of in-
dependence and preference for spread. They conclude: ”we believe that economists’
understanding of intertemporal choices will progress most rapidly by continuing to
import insights from psychology, by relinquishing the assumption that the key to un-
derstanding intertemporal choices is finding the right discount rate (or even the right
discount function), and by readopting the view that intertemporal choices reflect many
distinct considerations and often involve the interplay of several competing motives.”
Time domain enters the conceptual model when choosing the investment hori-
zon, the frequency of update, as well as in planning, forecasting, and discounting.
An interplay between cognitive and affective mechanisms might give even more re-
finement in modeling time preference. Affective system is inherently myopic and
impulsive, motivating behaviors that have short-term goals, whereas higher order
cognitive functions of the prefrontal cortex can take long-term consequences and
planning into account (Camerer et al., 2005; Shefrin and Thaler, 1988). According
to Camerer et al. (2005) factors which strengthen or weaken an affective or cognitive
system will influence people to behave more or less impulsively. Any factor which im-
poses cognitive load on the prefrontal cortex, i.e. the controlled cognitive system, will
decrease the influence of this system on behavior. Other factors which can diminish
the power of self-control are a previous exercise of self-control, alcohol, stress, and
sleep deprivation. Analogously, ”the activation of affective states should accentuate
temporal myopia” (Camerer et al., 2005).
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3.2.4 Strategies, Goals and Motivation
There is an abundant pool of strategies that investors use for the valuation of assets,
for stock picking, and market timing. To obtain an overview of the basic groups of
strategies, we looked at a standard investment book. In Sharpe et al. (1999) invest-
ment decision-making is described as an iterative process comprised of several steps:
(1) Investment Policy refers to determining investor’s objectives and constraints, e.g.
financial goals in terms of risk-return tradeoff, the amount of investable wealth, tax
status, policy asset mix, investment benchmarks etc. (2) Security Analysis is the
analysis of individual securities within previously identified broad asset classes, and
can be either (a) technical (forecasting future price movements on the basis of histor-
ical data), or (b) fundamental (estimating the intrinsic price as the present value of
future cash flows). (3) Portfolio Construction means determining in which assets to
invest and what proportion of wealth. (4) Portfolio Revision is a periodic repetition
of previous steps, as over time investors objectives and prices of securities can change.
(5) Portfolio Performance Evaluation involves measuring the return and the risk of
portfolio, as well as benchmarking.
The normative/prescriptive approach of standard investment books is essentially
a top-down approach in which an important step is asset allocation, i.e. investment
decision on the level of broad asset classes. Asset allocation can be strategic (based
on long-term forecasts) or tactical (based on short-term forecasts). However, a fully
bottom-up approach occurs in practice too. It focuses on specific assets that offer
most attractive investment opportunities, without much concern for the resulting
asset allocation, and as such may lead to a portfolio that is industry- or country-
specific, or exposed to one source of uncertainty (Bodie et al., 2006). A descriptive
model must be able to describe the behavior of investors who follow any of the two
approaches to asset allocation, as well as various investment styles.
Investor behavior, like most human behaviors, can be conceptualized as goal-
oriented, which means that investors make decisions in order to reach their various
financial and non-financial goals. Goals are in the broad sense defined as mental
(internal) representations of desired states (Austin and Vancouver, 1996). Here we
study preferences, objectives, and constraints. Custers and Aarts (2005) summarize
modern theories of motivation and goal-directed behavior: ”the probability that a
given goal state is set, adopted, and enacted depends on people’s ability (a) to men-
tally access the representation of the goal; (b) to subjectively assess the expected (or
incentive) value of the goal state; (c) to activate, select, and execute instrumental ac-
tions; (d) to detect, assess, and reduce the discrepancy between the actual and desired
state.” In this framework of Custers and Aarts (2005), positive affect linked to a goal
representation is capable of directly feeding the motivation system, thus, propelling
the goal pursuit behavior (aimed at attaining the desired state).
In a more standard framework, preferences (including risk attitude) are captured
by an agent’s utility function, while the objective is the maximization of expected
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utility. While economic agents are classically assumed to be self-interested, the list
of motivators could be enriched by taking into account also social preferences, such
as fairness, altruism, revenge, status seeking and survival.
3.2.5 Perception - Interaction - Action
Perception, interaction and action are processes which describe the way in which the
investor interacts with the investment environment in which he or she is situated.
Processes such as perception and action are commonly included in cognitive models
(e.g. Sloman (2001)).
Perception is the process of acquiring information coming from various sources
in the investment environment (classical media, such as television, radio, and paper
news, as well as various Web applications). Through communication channels, other
market participants (peers) can also serve as sources of information. Information
can be quantitative or qualitative, and can include financial data, corporate news
announcements, analysts recommendations, tips, etc.
Information processing of the acquired information could also be interpreted in
the light of the dual-process systems. For instance, information could be used for
controlled deliberative reasoning (e.g. whether it fits expectations), but also by
an affective system (e.g. emotional response to price changes). Cognitive system is
expected to deal with information processing by applying simplifying heuristics, while
emotional system can be susceptible to hedonic editing and confirmation bias. These
inputs from the environment are necessary to establish a feedback mechanism as the
basis for learning. A dual-process view taken in this chapter suggests that learning
processes are likely ”a splice of cognitive and affective processes” (Camerer et al.,
2005). Since literature on individual and social learning is vast, we also suggest a
review paper by Brenner (2006), which presents different types of learning that could
be implemented within intelligent economic agents.
Interaction is that part of the model which deals with peer influence and social
factors, and can be introduced into the model as the formation of information cas-
cades and herding type of behavior. In the study of Hoffmann et al. (2007), the
agents are connected in a social network of two different topologies with different
information diffusion characteristics. Such implementation also allows a study of
agent’s (over)confidence, as each agent can give different weight to his or her own
information relative to the aggregate information of other agents in the social net-
work. Instead of information, agents can also exchange their strategies. This mimetic
contagion of behavior (herding) can cause market fluctuations in the form of bubbles
and crashes (Kirman, 1991; Topol, 1991). Agents can copy other agents’ strategies
based on different reasons. For example, they can copy strategies of investors who
are wealthier (this also captures the evolutionary idea that more successful strategies
survive in the market). Switching between strategies can also involve some type of
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uncertainty, as in the probabilistic switching mechanisms (Kirman, 1993). Finally,
agents can differ in their personal propensity to imitate dominant behavior of people
in their social network. Hoffmann et al. (2007) offer an explanation based on so-
cial psychology and people’s preference for simplifying or clarifying strategies, where
simplifying means copying the behavior of others and clarifying means collecting
information from others.
Action is performed when an investor wants to change his or her current portfolio.
It can be characterized by the security that investors wants to buy or sell, a type
of order, the size of the order, the timing, and other parameters characteristic to
a particular type of order (e.g. price contingencies). The most common types of
orders are market order and limit order. More about various types of orders and
their properties can be found in Harris (2003). Our conceptual model can account
for various underlying causes for a particular action, such as a trading strategy, peer
influence, or an emotional response to financial news or price changes.
3.2.6 Personality
Psychological literature on personality has settled around a five-factor model (Dig-
man, 1990): (1) Extraversion, (2) Agreeableness, (3) Conscientiousness, (4) Neu-
roticism, and (5) Openness. Recent studies have examined a possible influence of
personality traits on financial decisions, particularly in the context of daily traders.
Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2004) conducted a study among 118 professional traders em-
ployed at investment banking institutions, and showed that successful traders tend
to be emotionally stable introverts open to new experiences. Contrary to these re-
sults, Lo et al. (2005) found the lack of correlation between personality traits and
trading performance. ”This raises the possibility that different personality types may
be able to function equally well as traders after proper instruction and practice. Al-
ternatively, it may be the case that individual differences pertinent to trading success
lies below the level that can be assessed through personality questionnaires, and may
become visible only at deeper physiological and neuropsychological levels, or with a
larger or more homogeneous sample of traders” Lo et al. (2005).
Given the current inconclusive results, the link between personality traits and
investment performance might still be far-fetched. However, the relationship between
personality and risk attitude, time preference, investment strategies, or susceptibility
to particular behavioral biases might be relevant for practical investment purposes -
especially given the availability of various batteries for testing personality types, and
given the stability of personality traits during a long period of a lifetime.
The link between personality traits and risk propensity has been fairly studied
in the literature. McCrae and Costa (1996) found sensation-seeking, a sub scale of
the Extraversion dimension, to be highly correlated with most risk-taking domains,
while overall risk propensity was higher for subjects with higher Extraversion and
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Openness scores and lower for subjects with higher Neuroticism, Agreeableness, and
Conscientiousness scores (Lo et al., 2005). Zuckerman and Kuhlman (2000) studied
the relationship between personality types and risk-taking behavior in various do-
mains: smoking, drinking, drugs, sex, driving, and gambling. They found impulsive
sensation seeking, sociability, and aggression to be related to risk-taking behavior,
whereas neuroticism/anxiety and activity were not related.
The influence of personality traits has also been studied in various game-theoretical
experiments, as summarized by Lo et al. (2005): ”For example, higher extraver-
sion and emotional stability—the opposite of neuroticism—appear to be related to
a higher level of stability in intertemporal consumption patterns (Brandsta¨tter and
Gu¨th, 2000). In Dictator and Ultimatum games, higher benevolence as a person-
ality trait facilitated more equitable choices in offers to powerless opponents, and
reciprocity orientation induces powerful recipients to set higher acceptance thresh-
olds (Brandsta¨tter and Gu¨th, 2002). Greater internal locus of control, better self-
monitoring ability, and higher sensation-seeking have all been linked to higher levels
of cooperative behavior in Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments (Boone et al., 2002)”.
3.2.7 Demographics and Other Factors
Demographics have been included in the conceptual model since they encompass
variables which can have significant effects on investor behavior and cognition. Due
to their availability, demographics variables are often used in research as explanatory
variables. In the behavioral finance literature, for example, gender has been used
as a proxy for overconfidence, since men have been found to exhibit this bias to a
greater extent than women (see Odean (1999)). The research also suggest that an
individual’s risk attitude can be explained by a number of demographic variables,
including gender, education level, age and income (Donkers et al., 2001).
There are probably many other factors that can influence investor behavior which
have not been explicitly and individually included in the conceptual model. For in-
stance, they could include activities outside of the investment world or any excep-
tional events that can have impact one investors’ cognition and behavior. Under the
assumption that such events happen randomly and independently, one could capture
their effects by means of a Gaussian noise. Noise is sometimes included in computa-
tional models in order to account for variability in investor behavior caused by such
events (for example, see the implementation of the so-called EMB investors in the
model of Levy et al. (2000) used in Chapter 5 through Chapter 8).
3.3 Investment Environment
The investment environment in which investors operate (Figure 3.2) is based on the
description of trading industry in Harris (2003). Harris defines traders as people who
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trade, and who may either arrange trades for themselves, have other people arrange
trades for them, or arrange trades for others. Accordingly, he distinguishes between
proprietary traders who trade for their own account and brokerage traders (such
as agency traders, commission traders, commission merchants) who arrange trades
as agents for their clients. This distinction is particularly important as it can be
expected that traders who trade with other people’s money have different incentives
and goals than those who trade for their own account. Furthermore, trading industry
can according to Harris be grouped into two sides of traders: Buy side - traders who
buy exchange services, such as liquidity, or the ability to trade when they want (e.g.
individuals, funds, firms, governments); and Sell side - traders who sell exchange
services to the buy side (e.g. dealers, brokers, and broker-dealers).
According to Harris, investors are seen as traders who trade in order to move their
wealth from the present to the future. Borrowers, hedgers, asset exchangers, and
gamblers, on the other hand, have other incentives for trading. What is interesting
in Harris’ taxonomy is that a trader is a generic term that encompasses all market
participants. From another perspective, a trader, such as a day-trader, could be
seen as a special type of investor who has a very short investment horizon. In such
a context investors are usually market participants who have a longer investment
horizon and employ some sort of portfolio management. Agent-based literature also
does not always precisely define what is meant by investors or traders, so terms such
as investors, traders, and agents are often used interchangeably. What we have in
mind in this conceptual model is a broader definition of investor (which includes
different types of traders), as we think that various classes of market participants
could be represented by an appropriate instantiation of the elements of the model,
particularly goals, strategies, and time horizons.
Trade facilitators are institutions that help traders trade (Harris, 2003). Ex-
changes provide forums for traders (dealers, brokers, and buy-side traders) to meet
and arrange trades. At most exchanges only members can trade, while non-members
trade by asking member-brokers to trade for them. Historically, traders used to meet
at the trading floor, but now they meet via ECNs (electronic communication net-
works). At some exchanges traders arrange trades when they see fit, while other
exchanges have order-driven systems that arrange trades by matching buy and sell
orders according to a set of rules. OTC (over the counter) is trading that occurs out-
side exchanges, arranged by dealers and brokers. Trade facilitators which help traders
settling their trades are known as clearing agents, settling agents, and depositories
and custodians (Harris, 2003).
Trading instruments can be organized into asset classes, such as real assets, finan-
cial assets, derivative contracts, insurance contracts, gambling contracts, and hybrid
contracts (Harris, 2003). Real assets include physical commodities, such as real es-
tates, machines, or patents and other intellectual properties; Financial assets include
instruments that represent ownership of real assets and the cash flows that they pro-
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Figure 3.2: The investment environment
duce; Derivative contracts encompass instruments that derive value from the value of
underlying instruments upon which they are based; Insurance contracts are instru-
ments that derive value from future events related to losses; Gambling contracts are
instruments that derive value from future events related to gains; and Hybrid con-
tracts are instruments that embody elements of more types of instruments. These
classes can further be divided into subclasses. For instance, financial assets can be
divided into domestic and international, based on size (big, mid, small caps), based
on style (value, blend, growth), etc. These asset classes have an important role in
the process of asset allocation. By studying the behavioral finance literature, we
can observe that most of the literature focuses on financial assets, particularly on
equities. The same can be said about the agent-based literature, since most of the
artificial financial markets are actually artificial stock markets. Nonetheless, model-
ing other types of financial assets could be relevant when the goal is a more realistic
representation of the investment environment.
The investment environment (Figure 3.2) consists of a number of market par-
ticipants, each of which can be represented by the cognitive model of an individual
investor. One investor is represented inside the investment environment to show how
he or she would interact with other elements of the environment. The investor is
endowed with a portfolio that consists of a number of different assets. We can see
three arrows coming to/from the investor which correspond to the three arrows of
the perception-interaction-action interface of the cognitive model (Figure 3.1). The
investor is perceiving information (e.g. about the market value of assets in his or her
portfolio) and using that information to update believes and make investment deci-
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sions. The investor is connected to peers with whom there is a bidirectional exchange
of information or strategies (e.g. herding type of behavior). Actions the investor can
take include different types of orders, which are submitted to the intermediaries and
which, if executed, result in an updated portfolio.
3.4 Conclusion
Studying behavior of market participants is important because of its potential impact
on asset prices. Agent-based simulation, as a methodology often used in studies of
complex systems, can bridge this gap between the micro level of individual investor
behavior and the macro level of aggregate market phenomena. Since agent-based
simulation constitutes a bottom-up approach, we need to start from a realistic de-
scription of the behavior of market participants. For that purpose we looked at the
behavioral finance and psychological literature with an aim to describe how individ-
ual investors behave in the markets. The conceptual model of individual investor
behavior presented in this chapter aims to summarize a part of this vast knowledge
on individual investor behavior, and gives the first level of structure necessary for
the development of agent-based artificial financial markets.
The aim of this model is descriptive, that is, we want to be able to capture and
describe observed behavioral phenomena. However, these behavioral phenomena
stem from a wide variety of cognitive mechanisms and other sources, which makes
it difficult to integrate them into a simple and parsimonious framework. It is a
rather ambitious task to determine the nature of all these mechanisms and variables.
Nonetheless, it is possible to indicate some of the relationships by finding evidence
in the existing behavioral finance literature.
A descriptive model of individual investor behavior presented in this chapter sees
investment decisions as an iterative process of interactions between the investor and
the investment environment. This investment process is driven by dual mental pro-
cesses (cognitive and affective), and the interplay between these systems contributes
to boundedly rational behavior which manifests itself through various heuristics and
biases. In the modeling tradition of cognitive science and artificial intelligence, the
investor is seen as a learning, adapting, and evolving entity that perceives the en-
vironment, processes information, acts, and updates its internal states. Finally, the
investor behavior is influenced by social interactions.
In the next chapter we will give an overview of some of the existing agent-based
models of financial markets. We will look at them in terms of the proposed conceptual
model in order to see what aspects of individual investor behavior and investment
environment have been taken into account.
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An Overview of Agent-Based
Artificial Financial Markets
4.1 Introduction
A novel bottom-up approach to studying and understanding stock markets comes
from the area of computational finance as artificial financial markets (or, more specif-
ically, as artificial stock markets). Agent-based artificial financial markets can be
mathematical or computational models, and are usually comprised of a number of
heterogeneous and boundedly rational agents, which interact through some trading
mechanism, while possibly learning and evolving. These models are built for the
purpose of studying agents’ behavior, price discovery mechanisms, the influence of
market microstructure, the reproduction of the stylized facts of real-world financial
time-series (e.g. fat tails of return distributions and volatility clustering). A number
of reviews of studies with artificial financial markets are available, e.g. for computa-
tional models (LeBaron, 2006), and for mathematical models (Hommes, 2006).
A similar approach to studying economies has become known as agent-based
computational economics (ACE) - the computational study of economies modeled
as evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents (Tesfatsion, 2006). ACE re-
searchers use computational laboratories to study the evolution of decentralized mar-
ket economies under controlled experimental conditions. The construction of econ-
omy starts with an initial population of agents - both economic agents (e.g. traders,
financial institutions, etc.) and socio-environmental agents (e.g. government, land,
weather, etc.). The initial state of the economy is specified as initial attributes of the
agents, such as type characteristics, internalized behavioral norms, internal modes
of behavior (including modes of communication and learning), and internally stored
information about itself and other agents. The economy then evolves over time and
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arises from agent interactions, without further intervention from the modeler (Tes-
fatsion, 2006).
Analogous methodology to agent-based modeling comes from the physical sci-
ences, namely the Microscopic Simulation. This methodology is a tool for studying
complex systems by simulating many interacting microscopic elements, and has been
also applied to financial markets by Levy et al. (2000). They believe that Microscopic
Simulation models could be used to extend existing analytical models in finance by
inspecting the role of their assumptions, or to build new models that could be as
realistic as desired, e.g. models that incorporate various technical and fundamental
strategies observed in experiments and real markets; dynamic models with heteroge-
neous investors that can learn and change strategies.
Despite many studies with artificial financial markets, not many attempts have
been made to incorporate complex behavioral phenomena into agents’ behavior.
These attempts may have been hindered by multiple reasons. For instance, complex
behavior implies highly parameterized models which are difficult to examine and that
often lie beyond analytical tractability. Some studies implement very simple behavior
(e.g. zero-intelligence agents with budget constraints by Gode and Sunder (1993)) as
they want to put more emphasis on other issues, such as the market microstructure.
Also, sometimes it is interesting to examine what kind of complexity can emerge from
very simple behavior, with the addition of some heterogeneity, interaction, and/or
learning. The famous spatial proximity model by Schelling (1978) is an example of an
early agent-based work where unexpected aggregate pattern of segregation appears
on the macro level even though it was not coded as such in the micro-level behavior
of agents. Sugarscape model (Epstein and Axtell, 1996) is another example of a sim-
ple local behavior that leads to interesting macro patterns. The idea of complexity
which emerges from nonlinear interactions between heterogeneous components forms
the foundation of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS), which is closely related to the
agent-based modeling approach (Figure 4.1).
However, an agent-based approach inspires us to seek for homeomorphic mod-
els (Harre´, 1970), that not only reproduce the stylized facts of real-world markets,
but also achieve them through processes that are grounded on reasonable (psycho-
logically plausible) assumptions, and resemble actual human behavior and realistic
market mechanisms. ”Agent-based models can easily accommodate complex learning
behavior, asymmetric information, heterogeneous preferences, and ad hoc heuristics”
(Chan et al., 1999). It is far from the truth that everything is known about human
behavior and cognition pertaining to the investment decisions, but as various fields
(such as neuroeconomics and neurofinance) progress to open up these black boxes,
a methodology that can utilize such knowledge may be given more opportunities in
the future (see Chen, 2008).
Figure 4.1 compares the properties of analytical (or mathematical) and com-
putational agent-based market models. Analytical models can be more related to
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Figure 4.1: Complex Adaptive Systems view on agent-based market models.
Figure 4.2: Distinction between analytical and computational agent-based artificial
markets.
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financial theories, such as asset pricing theories, which are deeply rooted in mathe-
matics. Mathematical representations and proofs ensure the analytical tractability of
the model. However, this can also be considered a hinderance, since there are many
limitations on what can be expressed, solved, or proven analytically. Computational
models, on the other hand, can be considered more general as they can easily imple-
ment mathematical models, but they can also go further with complex algorithms
and intricate interactions between agents. This ability to capture complex behaviors
and interactions enables potentially more homeomorphic models, since it is possi-
ble to model realistic investor behaviors and trading strategies, as well as realistic
market mechanisms that are employed in actual markets. For that reason, we deem
computational models better suited for studying behavioral finance topics and the
role of individual investor biases.
In the rest of this chapter, we would like to give a brief overview of a few examples
of such studies, focusing on the representation of behaviors, market mechanisms, and
obtained market dynamics. Furthermore, we discuss a few agent-based models that
have studied behavioral phenomena, and relate them to the conceptual model from
Chapter 3.
4.2 Modeling Aspects of Artificial Financial Markets
Even though the agent-based modeling approach allows for the implementation of
arbitrary complex agent behaviors, perhaps such that would implement many aspects
of the conceptual model proposed in Chapter 3, most agent-based artificial markets
developed so far have focused on relatively simple agent behaviors. It seems that
many artificial market models subscribe to the Complex Adaptive Systems view on
systems modeling, according to which simple local behaviors with the addition of
interaction and nonlinearity are sufficient to give rise to the emerging complexity in
the system.
Artificial financial markets that are based on a small number of highly stylized
behaviors have been labeled as few-type models (LeBaron, 2006). Typically, strategies
(or agents who employ them) can be divided into two groups: fundamental who trade
based on a perceived fundamental value of an asset, and technical who trade based
on the past prices, e.g. some form of trend extrapolation. In addition, many models
have been rooted in the zero-intelligence framework in which agents basically trade
randomly, possibly subject to a budgetary constraint. Sometimes a small number of
such agents is included into a few-type model in order to provide liquidity for other
agents.
Depending on their type, agents will have access to different types of information.
Typically, all agents will have information about the current market price, which will
allow them to update their wealth status and possibly tune their strategies (in case
learning mechanisms are employed). They will also receive news, such as dividends
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on risky assets and interest on risk-less assets. However, some agents will also have
information about the determinants of the fundamental price, such as the dividend
generating process. Depending on their strategies, agents will translate their price
expectations or predictions into orders or demand functions, which will be cleared
using a specific market mechanism, and finally a new market price will be formed.
In agent-based financial markets, the behavioral aspects of individual agents are
not determined only through fixed strategies, but also through learning (evaluating
and updating strategies based on the past performance) and social interaction (ex-
changing/combining information and/or strategies with other market participants,
which can lead to herding type of behavior). Such aspects are sometimes conceptu-
alized and modeled using the paradigm of genetic algorithms. This idea is explored
in the many-type models, where the pool of strategies is co-evolving with market
conditions in order to see which ones will survive and which ones will fail (LeBaron,
2006). Depending on their strategies, investors can use different information sources
to assist their decision making and update their expectations. All investors are in-
formed about the current market price which can be used to update the value of
their portfolio and sometimes evaluate their strategies. Often there is an information
asymmetry in the sense that some investors also know the fundamental price or the
properties that allow them to estimate it (e.g. dividend process). When investors
receive different news about the traded assets, they could also resort to their social
connections in order to obtain information from their peers (see Hoffmann et al.,
2007).
The investment environment presented in the conceptual model of Chapter 3 and
showed on Figure 3.2 describes a number of asset classes existing in real markets.
Asset classes modeled in agent-based markets are usually only a few, and they typ-
ically include risky assets (stocks), risk-less assets (bonds), and cash (Figure 4.3).
In addition, many agent-based models generate and study time-series of only one
risky asset. At first, this may seem as a very strong restriction, especially for models
that aim to be realistic. However, that is not necessarily a strong restriction, if the
focus is on modeling the financial market as a whole, in which case the risky asset
could be interpreted as a market index. Furthermore, in many artificial markets gen-
eralizations to multiple assets would be straightforward. However, a more realistic
approach with a multi-asset environment would introduce more intricacies into the
model, which would stem from the correlations among those assets. For example, it
would open the door to more complicated strategies and behaviors of agents.
Modeling trade facilitators shown on Figure 3.2 is a challenge itself, particularly if
one wants to model financial exchanges as realistic as possible. Most existing agent-
based studies, however, do not go into that level of detail, and instead use simple
and more abstract market mechanisms. These mechanisms are pricing mechanism
which translate the demand and supply of market participants (e.g. market orders,
limit orders, demand and supply functions) into a price at which trade occurs, i.e.
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Figure 4.3: Investment environment in agent-based artificial markets
the market clears. Figure 4.3 shows four of such market mechanisms, which are
described in LeBaron (2006). They include:
1. Temporary market equilibrium is a market clearing mechanism where the price
is determined so that the total demand of agents equals the total number of
shares in the market. Given that the demand of each agent typically has to be
determined for different hypothetical prices until the equilibrium price is found,
this mechanism can be computationally costly. This is particularly the case if
the demand functions do not allow for an analytic solution, in which case a
numerical solution needs to be sought.
2. Price impact function formalizes a price adjustment process in which the new
price is determined from the past price and net order (the difference between
demand and supply) scaled by a fixed parameter α:
pt+1 = pt + α(D(pt)− S(pt)). (4.1)
This captures the basic intuition that excess demand raises the price, while
excess supply lowers the price. The main advantage of this pricing mechanism
is that it is computationally very fast, while some of the disadvantages are that
the price changes are very sensitive to the choice of the liquidity parameter
α, and the issue of who fills in the excess demand or supply in the market
(LeBaron, 2006). A variant of this mechanism is a log-linear price impact
function (Farmer and Joshi, 2002), which additionally ensures that the price
remains positive.
46
4.3. Statistical Properties of Artificial Stock Markets
3. Order book is a pricing mechanism where actual order book is simulated, and
buy and sell orders of agents are crossed using a certain well-defined procedure.
This approach can be considered more realistic because it allows a detailed
analysis of trading mechanisms (LeBaron, 2006). This particularly contrasts
with the equilibrium-based mechanism where explicit trading is not modeled.
4. Matching is the type of mechanism where agents (randomly) meet, and, if it
suits them, trade with each other. This mechanism may be appropriate for
situations where no formal trading markets have been established, so there
are no institutions to help buyers meet sellers in a less-than-random fashion
(LeBaron, 2006).
4.3 Statistical Properties of Artificial Stock Markets
One way of examining artificial stock markets is by comparing their outputs (i.e.
generated time-series) with real-world financial data. Assessing to what extent these
artificial time-series are realistic is usually done by finding similarity between their
statistical properties and the statistical properties of empirical data. A set of prop-
erties, found across many financial instruments, markets and time periods, has been
observed by independent studies and classified as stylized facts (Cont, 2001). An
overview of stylized facts observed in asset returns or prices can be found in Cont
(2001), and they are listed below:
• Heavy tails. The unconditional distribution of returns tends to be non-
Gaussian, sharp peaked and heavy tailed (see Figure 4.4).
• Gain/loss asymmetry. It is possible to observe large downward movements
in stock prices and stock index values, but not equally large upward movements
(an exception are exchange markets which are quite symmetrical).
• Aggregational Gaussianity. The shape of the distribution is not the same
for all time scales; as the time scale is increased (returns are calculated over a
longer period) the distribution becomes more normal.
• Conditional heavy tails. Returns that have been corrected for volatility
clustering still exhibit some degree of heavy tails.
• Absence of autocorrelations. (Linear) autocorrelations in asset returns are
often insignificant, except for very high-frequency data where microstructure
starts playing a role.
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• Volatility clustering. Nonlinear functions of returns (e.g. absolute or squared
returns) exhibit significant positive autocorrelation. In time-series of asset re-
turns this can be seen as periods of higher volatility clustered together (see
Figure 4.5).
• Slow decay of autocorrelation in absolute returns. Autocorrelation func-
tion of absolute returns decays in time approximately as a power law.
• Intermittency. At any time scale, returns display a high degree of variability.
• Leverage effect. There is a negative correlation between the volatility of
returns and returns themselves.
• Volume/volatility correlation. Trading volume is correlated with volatility
measures.
• Asymmetry in time scales. Coarse-scale volatility measures predict fine-
scale volatility measures better than the other way round.
Cont (2001) points out that those stylized facts should all be considered as mostly
qualitative properties of asset returns since they may not be precise enough to dis-
tinguish between different quantitative models (for example, many distributions can
be used to fit heavy-tailed data). Nonetheless, even as qualitative, these properties
can be quite constraining, since it is difficult to come up with stochastic processes or
models that can produce a lot of them at the same time Cont (2001).
The existing artificial financial markets differ in the stylized facts they can repro-
duce, and the most commonly reported ones are heavy tails of return distributions,
volatility clustering in time-series of returns and/or the occurrence of bubbles and
crashes (see Boer-Sorban, 2008). Some models are able to produce even more refined
features, such as the power-law tails of the return distributions, thus concretizing the
general notion of fat tails (see Samanidou et al., 2007).
Developing models of financial markets that are able to produce realistic outputs
which are qualitatively similar to the empirical data is important, but it constitutes
only one possible goal of these simulations. Different models can be focusing more
on other aspects of agent-based modeling, such as realistic representations of agents’
behavior, their interactions, or realistic market mechanisms. Incorporating realistic
elements of agents’ behavior can be achieved by implementing those behaviors that
have been observed and documented in behavioral finance literature, which is the
approach taken in this thesis.
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Figure 4.4: The histogram of daily returns (1/7/1963 - 30/6/2010) on the US equity
market (NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ).
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Figure 4.5: Time-series of daily returns (1/7/1963 - 30/6/2010) on the US equity
market (NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ).
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4.4 Examples of Artificial Financial Markets
In this section, we give an overview of a number of existing agent-based models
of financial markets, and explain them in terms of the proposed conceptual model.
We emphasize those elements of the conceptual model that have been taken into
consideration in the models, and also summarize the main results of the simulations.
Even though most agent-based models incorporate some behavioral aspects into the
agents’ implementation, the last two examples given in this overview are interesting
because they have explicitly accounted for a number of behavioral finance topics.
Overviews of artificial financial markets from different perspectives can also be found
in LeBaron (2006), Levy et al. (2000) and Boer et al. (2005).
1. Kim and Markowitz - Portfolio Insurers Model.
Although the model of Kim and Markowitz (1989) is not the first computational
study in the area of finance, it is considered one of the first modern agent-based
models of the financial market. The motivation for this model was the stock
market crash of 1987, and the main focus of the study was exploring the link
between portfolio insurance strategies and market volatility.
Investment Environment. In this model the market consists of two types of
investors: Rebalancers and Portfolio Insurers. There are two asset classes in
the market: a risky stock that and cash with zero interest. At the beginning of
the simulation all investors are endowed with the same value of the portfolio,
allocated half in stock and half in cash. The pricing mechanism is based on the
order book. Buy and sell orders are stored in the order book and executed in
the case of a match (or kept until the end of the trading day).
Individual Investors. The strategy of Rebalancers is to keep the same proportion
of their wealth in stocks (50%) and in cash (50%). The strategy of Portfolio
insurers is based on the so-called Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance of
Black and Jones, according to which the proportions of wealth in stock is kept
in a constant proportion to the cushion (the value of the portfolio above some
minimal level of wealth called floor). Timing in the model is discrete with
trading happening at random time points and with each agent reviewing his or
her portfolio at random intervals. Investors do not interact directly amongst
themselves. However, they can perceive all orders places by other investors and
use that information to form their prediction of the price. If their allocation
according to a predicted price does not match their portfolio strategy, they will
act by issuing a buy or sell order. Other exogenous influences on investors are
modeled as randomly occurring withdrawals or deposits of random amounts of
cash.
Findings. The main result of the simulations is that portfolio insurance strategy
can have a destabilizing effect on the market, therefore, providing a possible
explanation for the occurrence of the market crash.
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2. Brock and Hommes - Adaptive Belief Systems.
This paper of Brock and Hommes (1989) investigates market dynamics in a
simple present discounted value asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs.
The authors investigate possible bifurcation routes to complicated asset price
dynamics, by using a mixture of bifurcation theory and numerical methods. A
few simple belief types are considered in the experiments.
Investment Environment. Investors can choose between two asset types: one
risky asset and one risk free asset. The risky asset is paying a dividend that is
exogenously given as a stochastic process. Price fluctuations in the market are
driven by an evolutionary dynamics between different expectation schemes.
Individual Investors. Agents choose from a finite set of predictors of future
prices of a risky asset and revise their beliefs in each period. Predictor selec-
tion (i.e. strategy selection) is based upon a fitness or performance measure
such as past realized profits. Intensity of choice is a parameter measuring how
fast agents switch between different prediction strategies. If intensity of choice
is infinite, the entire mass of traders uses the strategy that has highest fitness.
If intensity of choice is zero, the mass of traders distributes itself evenly across
the set of available strategies. In terms of their goal all investors can be charac-
terized as myopic mean variance maximizers with a homogeneous degree of risk
aversion. Simple belief types that are characterized in experiments are: trend
chasers, contrarians, upward biased type, downward biased type, fundamental-
ists (who believe prices revert to their fundamental value) and rational agents
with perfect foresight (who not only know past prices and dividends, but also
the market equilibrium equation and fractions of other types in the market).
Findings. Brock and Hommes (1989) present numerical evidence of chaotic
attractors when the intensity of choice to switch prediction strategies is high.
The paper shows how an increase in the intensity of choice to switch predictors
can lead to market instability and the emergence of complicated dynamics
for asset prices and returns. This includes irregular switching between phases
where prices are close to the fundamental value, phases of optimism where
traders extrapolate upward trends, and phases of pessimism where traders are
causing a sharp decline in asset prices (Brock and Hommes, 1989).
3. Levy, Levy, Solomon - Microscopic Simulation.
Levy, Levy, Solomon model (LLS) is a prominent model of the financial market
based on the microscopic simulation approach which has roots in physics. It is a
numerical model developed in the framework of expected utility maximization.
In this thesis we have focused on the variant of the model presented in Levy
et al. (2000).
Investment Environment. In the LLS model, the market consists of two types
of investors: Rational Informed Investors (RII) and Efficient Market Believers
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(EMB). There are two asset classes in the market: a risky stock that pays a
dividend following a multiplicative random walk and has a finite number of
outstanding shares; and a risk-less bond that pays a sure interest and has an
infinite supply. At the beginning of the simulation all investors are endowed
with the same amount of wealth that is comprised of cash and a number of
shares. The trade facilitators and the sell side of financial services are not
explicitly modeled in the LLS model. Instead, the pricing mechanism based
on the temporary market equilibrium (LeBaron, 2006) is used to determine the
price in such a way that the total demand for the risky asset equals the total
number of outstanding shares.
Individual Investors. The goal of all the investors in the LLS model is the
maximization of the expected utility of the next period wealth. The risk at-
titude of the investors is risk aversion, and is captured by the parameter of
the utility function. In the LLS model of Levy et al. (2000), a myopic power
utility function with DARA (Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion) and CRRA
(Constant Relative Risk Aversion) properties is used. Due to this myopia prop-
erty of this utility function, it can be assumed that investors maximize their
one-period-ahead expected utility, regardless of their actual investment horizon
(Levy et al., 2000). An additional temporal characteristic of EMB investors is
their memory length of past return realizations which are used in the prediction
of future returns. Even though both RII and EMB investors have the same goal
of expected utility maximization, their strategies are different because of the
differences in information that they possess. RII investors know the properties
of the dividend process, and can estimate the fundamental price of the risky
asset as a discounted stream of future dividends. That fundamental price is
used in their prediction of the next period return. EMB investors, however,
do not know the dividend process, and must use ex post distribution of re-
turns to estimate ex ante distribution. EMB investors use a rolling window of
a fixed size, and in the original model are called unbiased if, in the absence
of any additional information, assume that returns come from a discrete uni-
form distribution. In each period investors perceive information about the new
price and new dividends, which they can use to update their wealth status.
Both types of investors are expected utility maximizers, which is considered as
the cornerstone of rationality. Nonetheless, with EMB investors some noise is
added to the optimal proportion to account for other factors that could cause
such departures from optimal behavior (Levy et al., 2000). In the LLS model,
investors do not interact in the sense of the exchange information or strate-
gies. If there is some volume (the change in portfolio holdings) of an individual
investor, we can say that some trading occurred because the shares have ex-
changed hands. However, in this model we are not concerned with how exactly
that happened. Actions, such as market orders, are not modeled explicitly,
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since this is a model based on the temporary market equilibrium.
Findings. One of the main results of the simulations is that investors who
use past information create cyclic bubbles and crashes which can be related
to the size of their memory window. This happens in the case when investors
are homogeneous with respect to their memory lengths. When investors are
heterogeneous in memory lengths, the market dynamics becomes more realis-
tic in the sense that it does not display such prominent and semi-predictable
bubbles. Levy et al. (2000) have also applied this model to investors who are
characterized by Prospect Theory type of preferences.
4. Lux and Marchesi - Stochastic Interaction and Scaling Laws.
The model of Lux and Marchesi (1999) is an agent-based model of the financial
market that follows the tradition of earlier attempts to capture herding behavior
by means of stochastic modeling. An example of this is the ant recruiting model
of Kirman (1993), which has also been proposed as an analogy for herding
behavior of investors in the financial markets.
Investment Environment. The market consists of two types of investors, fun-
damentalists and non-fundamentalists, and two types of investments, a risky
stock and a risk-free asset. In addition, the risky asset pays out a stochastic
dividend at the beginning of each period. The market mechanism is based on
the price adjustment process which determines the market price based on the
differences between the supply and the demand.
Individual Investors. According to their type of strategy, agents can be either
fundamentalists or chartists (which are further divided into optimists (buyers)
and pessimists (sellers)). In addition, there is a probabilistic switching between
these groups of agents. The probabilities of switching between two types of
chartists is based on the majority opinion and current price trend, while the
probabilities of switching between chartists and fundamentalists is based on
the observed differences in profits.
Findings. The model is able to generate the following properties of the market
prices: unsystematic deviations of the market price from the fundamental price,
heavy tails of return distributions, and volatility clustering.
5. Takahashi and Terano - Investment Systems Based on Behavioral
Finance. Although various behavioral aspects of agents, including investor
biases, have been studied in earlier literature, the model of Takahashi and
Terano (2003) is to our knowledge one of the first agent-based models that
explicitly studied a number of investor biases proposed in the behavioral finance
literature.
Investment Environment. The market consists of two types of investors, fun-
damentalists and non-fundamentalists, and two types of investments, a risky
stock and a risk-free asset. In addition, the risky asset pays out a stochastic
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dividend at the beginning of each period. Market mechanism is based on the
temporary market equilibrium, i.e. the traded price of the stock is derived so
that the demand meets the supply.
Individual Investors. Fundamentalist investors use a strategy based on the fun-
damental value of the stock, which they estimate using a dividend discount
model. Non-fundamentalist investors are trend predictors, and since they use
past information to predict future prices, they could also be classified as tech-
nical traders or chartists. Both fundamental and non-fundamental investors
predict next period price and dividend. Non-fundamental investors have addi-
tional temporal parameters, in the sense of short-term, medium, or long-term
trend predictors. Two types of biases are studied within the model, overcon-
fidence of investors and loss-aversion. There is no social interaction between
various investor groups.
Findings. When the market consists of the same number of fundamental and
technical traders, the market price agrees with the fundamental price. However,
when there is a large fraction of technical traders in the market, the market
price deviates largely from the fundamentals and fundamentalists are eventually
eliminated from the market. There are also deviations from the fundamental
price in the case of overconfident investors and when non-fundamentalists act
asymmetrically towards losses.
6. Hoffmann et al. - SimStockExchange Model.
Following the tradition of Takahashi and Terano (2003), the paper of Hoffmann
et al. (2007) is another study that combines a number of behavioral phenomena
within an agent-based simulation of the financial market. Hoffmann et al.
(2007) focus especially on the social aspects of investor behavior and study
consequences of two distinct network topologies.
Investment environment. Asset classes available in the market are one risky
stock and cash. The market mechanism is based on the order book. Using
the rules of this mechanism, the limit orders submitted by agents are mutually
crossed and executed. The market price is calculated as the average of the bid
and ask prices, weighted by the number of asked and offered shares. The model
of Hoffmann et al. (2007) also models the news arrival process, as a normally
distributed noise around the current price.
Individual Investors. The investors are characterized by their level of confi-
dence, which determines how much their private information (price expecta-
tion) is weighted compared to the expectations of their neighboring investors.
Strategy used by investors is based on the comparison between the current mar-
ket price and the expected market price of the stock: when the expected price
is higher than the current price, it is attractive to invest in stock, and when the
expected price is lower, it seems attractive to divest. The strategy also deter-
mines the proportion of cash to invest or the proportion of stock to divest. The
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perception of risk depends on investors’ level of confidence. Investors who have
high confidence perceive lower risk, whole those investors who have lower levels
of confidence perceive high risk and apply risk reducing strategies, which can
be a simplifying strategy (heuristic) or a clarifying strategy (collecting more
information). Time perspective of investors is myopic. They base their deci-
sions only on the currently available information and expectations for the next
period. Agents perceive information about the current market price, the news
about the stock, and the price expectation of investors in their social network,
which are all finally translated into their own market price expectation. The
model of Hoffmann et al. (2007) is interesting as it pays special attention to
the social interaction between agents. In different experiments the investors
are connected in two different types of social networks which are used for the
dissemination of market price expectations. Investors who exhibit social type
of simplifying risk reducing strategy copy the behavior of other investors in the
social network, while those who exhibit social type of clarifying risk reducing
strategy ask other investors for more information. The investors act by sending
limit orders, which consist of the number of shares that they want to buy or
sell, and the limit price which is set to their expected price.
Findings. The results of the simulations indicate that the structure of the social
network of investors influences the dynamics of the prices. When investors were
forming a Barabasi and Albert scale-free network, there was no indication of
volatility clustering in the market, but when they were forming a torus network,
such evidence was found. The authors speculate that networks of investors may
behave more like torus networks with respect to information diffusion, and
that information may sometimes take longer to travel to distant parts of the
networks, allowing the old shocks to influence the presence for a considerable
period of time (Hoffmann et al., 2007).
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have given an overview of a number of well-known agent-based
artificial financial markets. Agent-based artificial financial markets are bottom-up
models of financial markets which allow us to study their dynamics and emerging
properties. They do so by focusing on the behaviors of individual market participants
and well-defined market mechanism which are able to translate those behaviors into
artificially generated asset prices. One of the aims of these models is to reproduce
realistic asset prices which contain the stylized facts of real-world time-series, such
as leptokurtic returns, volatility clustering, bubbles and crashes etc.
Since agent-based modeling constitutes a bottom-up approach, deciding on the
elements of agents’ behaviors to implement and which market mechanism to use is
of uttermost importance. Most agent-based models use very stylized market mech-
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anisms, as well as highly stylized representations of investor behaviors (e.g. fun-
damental, technical, zero-intelligence agents). However, complexity can easily be
introduced into the models by, for example, allowing the agents to learn, co-evolve
with the market, or (stochastically) switch between different strategies. The work
of Boer et al. (2007) is an extension of a discrete-time agent-based financial market
(as most models are) into a continuous-time asynchronous model, and it shows that
a continuous-time framework entails much more intricate market dynamics. Some
of the newest developments in the field of agent-based financial markets are to look
for inspiration into the behavioral finance literature, especially for various behavioral
biases of investors. This thesis aims to contribute to this literature.
In the following chapters we will present models of various behavioral biases and
study them within an existing agent-based financial market, namely the market of
Levy et al. (2000), also known as the LLS model. We will employ the incremental
approach according to which an existing computational model is firstly replicated
and then a new behavior is introduced into the model. By comparing the results
of the original model with the results of the incremented model, we can study the
implications of the newly introduced (biased) behaviors of investors.
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Chapter 5
Overconfident Investors in the
LLS Financial Market∗
5.1 Introduction
Overconfidence as a judgmental bias has received a lot of attention in financial studies.
It has been proposed as an explanation for the observed high levels of trading in
financial markets, as well one of the causes for poor investor performance: some
investors trade too much, which might be a manifestation of their overconfidence
(Odean, 1999). The behavioral foundation for including overconfidence in financial
studies is very strong, given the evidences that most people exhibit overconfidence in
many different contexts. However, the problematic aspect of early financial studies
on overconfidence is that overconfidence was not directly measured (instead, a gender
variable was used as a crude proxy), so it was difficult to establish the direct link
between overconfidence and overtrading (Glaser and Weber, 2007).
In order to study the effects of overconfidence, one could measure investor overcon-
fidence by means of psychometric tests (survey responses) and relate those measures
to trading records of the same persons. Such studies have recently become available
(e.g. the study of Glaser and Weber (2007)) and they shed important light on a
number of behavioral phenomena, including overconfidence. On another note, they
also show challenges in conducting empirical research on behavioral finance topics,
which stem from the data collection efforts needed to close the gap between the
micro-level investor behavior and the macro-level effects of those behaviors. Such
∗A preliminary version of this chapter has been published in M. Lovric, U. Kaymak, and J.
Spronk. Overconfident investors in the LLS agent-based artificial financial market. In Proceedings
of the IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence for Financial Engineering (CIFEr), pages
58-65, Nashville, USA, March-April 2009b.
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micro-macro mapping is one of the main advantages of agent-based simulations of
financial markets.
An important question for all studies on investor confidence is what type of over-
confidence is under study. A type of overconfidence that has been prevalently con-
sidered in theoretical and computational studies is the miscalibration, which means
overestimating the precision of own information, e.g. by setting too narrow confi-
dence intervals in the assessment of the value of a financial asset. In the experimental
market of Biais et al. (2005), miscalibration was found to have an effect of reducing
trading performance. One of the first papers to explicitly study a number of behav-
ioral biases in an agent-based model of the financial market (Takahashi and Terano,
2003), also models overconfidence as miscalibration, more specifically as underesti-
mated variance of stock returns. In this chapter we make a similar implementation of
overconfidence in the sense of miscalibration, on top of an existing artificial market
model of Levy et al. (2000).
Agent-based artificial financial markets (or, more specifically, artificial stock mar-
kets) are models for studying the link between individual investor behavior and finan-
cial market dynamics. A similar bottom-up approach has been used in agent-based
computational economics (ACE) - the computational study of economies modeled as
evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents Tesfatsion (2006). A methodol-
ogy analogous to agent-based modeling also comes from the physical sciences as the
Microscopic Simulation - a tool for studying complex systems by simulating many
interacting microscopic elements Levy et al. (2000).
Since agent-based models can easily accommodate complex learning behavior,
asymmetric information, heterogeneous preferences, and ad hoc heuristics (Chan
et al., 1999), it seems that such simulations could be particularly suitable to test and
generate various behavioral hypotheses. This complementarity of behavioral finance
research and the agent-based methodology has been recognized in the literature and
it is a nascent research with many opportunities ahead. Rare examples of agent-based
papers that pursue the idea of explicit accounting for behavioral theories in financial
market simulations are Takahashi and Terano (2003) and Hoffmann et al. (2007). In
Takahashi and Terano (2003) the focus is on overconfidence and loss aversion, while
Hoffmann et al. (2007) focus on social dimensions of investor behavior.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 explains the basics of the LLS
model in which we implement the investor overconfidence. In Section 5.3 we show
replicated results of the original LLS model (Levy et al., 2000). Section 5.4 presents
the results of the simulation experiments. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter and
discusses possible extensions for the future research. The appendix of this chapter
explains some implementation details of our simulations, including the pseudo-code
of the main program and the pricing mechanism. It also includes extended replication
and simulation results.
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5.2 Model Description
The model is based on the LLS microscopic simulation model of Levy et al. (2000),
the variant with a small homogeneous subpopulation of EMBs (Efficient Market
Believers) as described in Levy et al. (2000). LLS model is a well-known and early
econophysics model, rooted in a standard utility maximization framework. Variants
of the model have been published by the same authors in a number of articles and
a book, and the model has also been critically evaluated in Zschischang and Lux
(2001)1.
5.2.1 Asset Classes
As in the LLS model, there are two investments alternatives: a risky stock (or market
index) and a riskless asset (bond). This is in line with many of the agent-based
artificial financial markets, which typically do not deal with portfolio selection in
multi-asset environments. The risky asset pays at the beginning of each period a
dividend which follows a multiplicative random walk
D˜t+1 = Dt(1 + z˜), (5.1)
where z˜ is a random variable uniformly distributed in the interval [z1, z2]. The bond
pays interest with a rate of rf .
5.2.2 Agent Behavior
Many early agent-based artificial financial markets were based on a small number
of relatively simple strategies. Such markets have been labeled as few-type models
in LeBaron (2006). Typically, strategies (or agents who employ them) could be
divided into two groups: fundamental (based on a perceived fundamental value) and
technical (based on the past prices, e.g. some form of trend extrapolation). Zero-
intelligence framework in which agents trade randomly, might be useful for studying
the influence of market microstructure, and sometimes a small number of such agents
can be included into a few type model to provide liquidity for other agents. LLS model
is a two-type model based on two groups of investors, named as Rational Informed
Investors (RII) and Efficient Market Believers (EMB).
1Zschischang and Lux (2001) have studied how initial conditions of the model influence the
emerging wealth distribution among agents. For example, they have studied the influence of different
types of utility functions and different degrees of risk aversion, and found that less risk averse
investors tend to dominate the market. Also, when a group of investors characterized by a fixed
proportion of shares in their portfolio is included, these investors over time take up the majority
of the available wealth. The authors have also examined the sensitivity of the model’s long term
outcomes to the random price history given at the start of the simulation.
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LLS model follows a more standard framework where preferences (and risk at-
titude) are captured by an agent’s utility function, and the objective is the maxi-
mization of expected utility2. However, even in such a framework there are many
possibilities for the functional form of the utility, which differ both in their descriptive
validity and analytical tractability. Levy et al. (2000) explain that, when empirical
support is taken into account, most evidence suggests DARA (Decreasing Absolute
Risk Aversion) and CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Aversion), which motivates their
choice of power (myopic) utility function:
U(W ) =
W 1−α
1− α . (5.2)
LLS model contains two types of investors: (1) RII (Rational Informed Investors)
and (2) EMB (Efficient Market Believers).
RII investors
(1) RII investors are ’informed’ about the properties of the dividend process. They
do not know exact future dividend realizations, but by knowing the distribution from
which they are generated, they can estimate the fundamental value as a discounted
stream of future dividends, according to the Gordon model:
P˜ ft+1 =
Dt(1 + z˜)(1 + g)
k − g , (5.3)
where k is the discount factor of the expected rate of return demanded by the market
for the stock, and g is the expected growth rate of the dividend. RII investors
assume that the price will converge to the fundamental value in the next period, i.e.
P˜t+1 = P˜
f
t+1.
In each period RII investor i chooses the proportion of wealth to invest in stocks
and bonds so that he or she maximizes the expected utility of wealth in the next
period, given by the following equation from Levy et al. (2000)3:
EU(W˜ it+1) = EU
(
W ih[(1− x)(1 + rf ) + xR˜t+1]
)
, (5.4)
where W ih represents a hypothetical wealth of investor i in period t given that the
price in period t is some hypothetical price Ph. W ih consists of the previous period
wealth W it−1 , interest and dividend accumulated from the last period, and capital
gains or losses incurred on the difference between Ph and Pt−1.
2Not all agent-based artificial financial markets endow their agents with a utility function. In
some models agents are simply characterized by their wealth (see overviews of agent-based markets
in LeBaron (2006) and Boer-Sorban (2008)).
3Rationality in the name Rational Informed Investors refers to the maximization of the expected
utility of next period wealth. RII will never depart from this optimal investment proportion.
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Next period return is a random variable influenced by the uncertainty in dividend
realizations4:
R˜t+1 =
P˜t+1 + D˜t+1
Pt
=
Dt(1+z˜)(1+g)
k−g + Dt(1 + z˜)
Pt
. (5.5)
Therefore, the expected utility of next period wealth can be calculated by inte-
grating over all possible values of the random variable z˜:
EU(W˜ it+1) =
(W ih)
1−α
(1− α)
∫ z2
z1
[
(1− x)(1 + rf ) (5.6)
+x
(
Dt(1+z˜)(1+g)
k−g + Dt(1 + z˜)
Pt
)]1−α
f(z)dz,
which for a uniform distribution of z on the interval [z1, z2] results in:
EU(W˜ it+1) =
(W ih)
1−α
(1− α)(2− α)
1
(z2 − z1)
(
k − g
k + 1
)
Ph
xDt
(5.7)
×
{[
(1− x)(1 + rf ) + x
Ph
(
k + 1
k − g
)
Dt(1 + z2)
](2−α)
−
[
(1− x)(1 + rf ) + x
Ph
(
k + 1
k − g
)
Dt(1 + z1)
](2−α)}
.
Based on the optimal proportion5, x, which maximizes the expected utility of next
period wealth, RII investors determine the number of stocks demanded by multiplying
their wealth with this optimal proportion. The rest of their wealth is invested in the
risk-less asset. Since all RII investors are assumed to have the same degree of risk
aversion (parameter α), they will all have the same optimal proportion x. The actual
number of demanded shares might differ only if investors differed in their wealth.
However, as in the experiments of Levy et al. (2000) we assume that they all start
with the same initial wealth.
EMB investors
(2) EMB investors believe that the price accurately reflects the fundamental value.
However, since they do not know the dividend process, they use ex post distribution
of stock returns to estimate the ex ante distribution.
4Notice that in Levy et al. (2000) the return is defined as a fraction between the prices, instead
of the usual relative difference. Hence, the investment proportion x is in Equation 5.4 directly
multiplied by R˜t+1. If actual rate of return is needed, one can subtract one or take logarithm.
5According to Levy et al. (2000), the constraint of no borrowing and no short-selling is imposed,
i.e. 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, ”in order to avoid problems of negative wealth, bankruptcy, and negative prices”.
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EMB investor i uses a rolling window of size mi, and is in the original model
of Levy et al. (2000) said to be unbiased if, in absence of additional information,
he or she assigns the same probability to each of the past mi return observations.
Hence, the original, unbiased EMBs assume that returns come from a discrete uniform
distribution:
Pri(R˜t+1 = Rt−j) =
1
mi
, for j = 1, ...,mi. (5.8)
The expected utility of EMB investor i is given by
EU(W˜ it+1) =
(W ih)
1−α
(1− α)
mi∑
j=1
Pri(R˜t+1 = Rt−j) (5.9)
× [(1− x)(1 + rf ) + xRt−j ](1−α) .
In accordance with the LLS model, for all EMB investors an investor specific
noise is added to the optimal investment proportion x∗ (that maximizes the expected
utility) in order to account for various departures from the rational optimal behavior:
xi = x∗i + ε˜i. (5.10)
ε˜i is for each investor drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard
deviation of 0.2. When needed, the value of noise is truncated so that 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1
is satisfied, imposing the constraint of no borrowing and no short-selling (see also
footnote 5).
New Agent Behavior: Normal EMB and Overconfident EMB
In our model we create two new EMB types: normal EMBs and overconfident EMBs.
(a) Normal EMBs assume that returns come from a stable normal distribution,
and in each period estimate the mean μˆ and standard deviation σˆ using the rolling
window of size mi. Based on the estimates of this distribution, they assign proba-
bilities to each of the past mi returns observations by calculating the values of the
probability density function (pdf) of the estimated normal distribution at each ob-
served return, and by normalizing these values so that they add up to one. In such
a way we obtain the probability mass function (pmf) for each investor i:
Pri(R˜t+1 = Rt−j) =
pdf(Rt−j |μˆ, σˆ)∑mi
k=1 pdf(Rt−k|μˆ, σˆ)
, (5.11)
pdf(x|μ, σ) = 1
σ
√
2π
e
−(x−μ)2
2σ2 . (5.12)
(b) Overconfident EMBs also estimate normal distribution from the sample, but
they underestimate the standard deviation of the distribution, making it more peaked
around the mean: σ = oc× σˆ, where oc is the overconfidence coefficient, 0 < oc < 1.
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The probabilities are calculated and normalized using the pdf of that peaked normal
distribution:
pdf(x|μ = μˆ, σ = oc · σˆ) = 1
oc · σˆ√2π e
−(x−μˆ)2
2(oc·σˆ)2 . (5.13)
In experiments we study different levels of overconfidence (oc = 0.75, oc = 0.5,
oc = 0.25). In the special case of the full overconfidence (oc = 0), EMBs predict with
certainty that the return will be equal to the mean of the sample, so the expected
utility of wealth is given by:
EU(W˜ it+1) =
(W ih)
1−α
(1− α) [(1− x)(1 + rf ) + xμˆ]
(1−α)
. (5.14)
Figure 5.1 shows an example of obtained probability mass functions for a specific
sample of observed returns. The case of uniform distribution represents the original,
unbiased EMBs from the LLS model. As the overconfidence increases (overconfidence
coefficient decreases) observed returns that are closer (further) to the mean are given
a higher (lower) probability, so that the distribution becomes more peaked. The
special case oc = 0 is the full overconfidence where all the probability mass is given
to the sample mean.
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Figure 5.1: Probability mass functions of observed past returns for different levels of
overconfidence.
63
Chapter 5. Overconfident Investors in the LLS Financial Market
5.2.3 Market Mechanism
LeBaron (2006) describes four types of market mechanisms used in agent-based ar-
tificial financial markets. (1) The first mechanism is based on a price adjustment
process, where new price is determined from the past price and the net order scaled
by a factor called liquidity. This captures the basic intuition that excess demand
raises the price, while excess supply lowers the price. A variant of this mechanism
is a log-linear price impact function (Farmer and Joshi, 2002), which additionally
ensures that the price remains positive. The main advantage of this mechanism is
that it is computationally very fast, while some of the disadvantages are that the
price changes are very sensitive to the choice of the liquidity parameter, and the is-
sue of who takes the excess demand or supply. (2) The second mechanism is clearing
in a temporary market equilibrium, where the price is determined so that the total
demand equals the total number of shares in the market. Given that the demand
of each agent has to be determined for different hypothetical prices, this mechanism
can be computationally costly, particularly if there are no analytical solutions for de-
mand functions. (3) The third mechanism is a more realistic one, where actual order
book is simulated, and buy and sell orders are crossed using a certain well-defined
procedure. (4) The final mechanism is the one in which agents (randomly) meet, and,
if it suits them, trade with each other.
In this chapter, as in the LLS model, we use clearing by using the temporary
market equilibrium. RII and EMB investors determine optimal proportion in the
stock so as to maximize the expected utility of their wealth in the next period. How-
ever, expected utility is the function of the future price that is in the current period
unknown. Investors therefore determine optimal proportions for various hypotheti-
cal prices Ph and respective demands for shares, and the equilibrium price is set to
that price for which the total demand of all investors in the market equals the total
number of outstanding shares, such that
N ih(Ph) =
xih(Ph)W
i
h(Ph)
Ph
. (5.15)
This market mechanism is discussed in greater detail in Section 5.6.
5.3 Replication
In the first experiment we have replicated the LLS benchmark model with only RII
investors present in the market. The Figure 5.2 shows the obtained price series. In
this market there is no trade, the log prices follow random walk and there is no excess
volatility (Levy et al., 2000). Since all RII investors are identical, they agree on the
optimal investment proportion. This means that they achieve the same returns on
their portfolios and that their wealth levels are always in the same proportion. Since
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Figure 5.2: Price dynamics in the benchmark model with only RII.
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Figure 5.3: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% unbiased EMB.
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Table 5.1: Parametrization of the model used for experiments with investor overcon-
fidence
Symbol Value Explanation
M 950 Number of RII investors
M2 50 Number of EMB investors
m 10 Memory length of EMB investors
α 1.5 Risk aversion parameter
N 10000 Number of shares
rf 0.01 Riskless interest rate
k 0.04 Required rate of return on stock
z1 -0.07 Maximal one-period dividend decrease
z2 0.10 Maximal one-period dividend growth
g 0.015 Average dividend growth rate
they keep the same number of stocks throughout the simulation, there is no trade in
the market. The market price closely follows the fundamental price which is entirely
driven by the stochastic dividend process.
The second experiment is the replication of the LLS model with a small fraction of
homogeneous and unbiased EMB investors (with parametrization given in Table 5.1).
All our experiments are conducted with the same parametrization as in the original
study (Levy et al., 2000) in order to enable direct commensurability with our results.
This concerns also the 5% fraction of EMB investors and the 95% majority of RII
investors, which according to Levy et al. (2000) demonstrates the power of irrational
behavior, since even a small fraction of irrational investors can have a marked impact
on the dynamics of the market prices. EMB investors are homogeneous with respect
to their memory length and they use a uniform ex-post distribution of returns to pre-
dict future returns. Figure 5.3 shows typical market dynamics for this model setup,
including semi-predictable booms and crashes, substantial trading in the market, and
excess volatility (Levy et al., 2000). Excess volatility is used to quantify the behavior
of the market which exhibits more volatility than what fundamentals would suggest,
and for this experiment it is reported in Table 5.2 (the ’Uniform’ column).
An interesting feature of the LLS model, although not entirely realistic, is that
undervaluation never occurs, i.e. the market price never falls bellow the fundamental
price, and this feature pervades all our experiments. The explanation is as follows.
When market consists only of RII investors (or when EMB are investing only in
the risk-less asset), the market price closely follows the fundamental price, since
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RII investors assume price is converging to the fundamental price in the next period.
When EMB are investing in the risky asset, the share is overvalued, because the total
demand of RII and EMB in equilibrium has to equal the fixed amount of available
shares, which can be achieved by raising the price. Undervaluation does not occur as
the LLS model does not allow short selling, which is a common assumption in many
models. In an earlier literature, e.g. Miller (1977), a lack of short selling was proposed
as an explanation for why excess valuation occurs commonly and undervaluation does
not. According to Levy et al. (2000) this constraint is included ”in order to avoid
problems of negative wealth, bankruptcy, and negative prices”. For a more realistic
case, these constraints could be relaxed to limited short-selling and limited borrowing
(Levy et al., 2000).
The occurrence of bubbles and crashes can be related to the memory length of
investors. When a very high dividend is realized, EMB investors switch to the risky
asset, which creates a surge in the market price. Such a high capital gain entices
them into further high exposure to the risky asset. However, as the memory window
moves so that the initial jump in the price is forgotten and a low dividend is realized,
they can shift back to the risk-free asset, which in turn causes a sudden drop in the
price. As long as this market crash remains in their memory window, it reminds
EMB investors to stay invested in the bond. After the crash is forgotten, there is an
opportunity for a new bubble to start.
The silent periods after the crashes are not a realistic finding of this experiment,
since in real markets crashes usually mark a period of higher volatility. Furthermore,
although the very existence of market upheavals can be considered a realistic feature
of the model, such periodic exchange of bubbles and crashes generated by the sec-
ond experiment is not. In order to address these shortcomings, further experiments
reported in Levy et al. (2000) introduced heterogeneity in the memory lengths of the
EMB investors, and the findings showed that the resulting price became smoother
and more realistic, in the sense that the bubbles and crashes were less regular and
without the obvious predictability (observed in the case of EMB investors homoge-
neous with respect to their memory length). The smoother price of the heterogenous
experiment can be understood as the superimposition of market prices obtained for
different memory lengths, so that the bubbles and crashes of different periodicity
smooth out each other. Nonetheless, Hellthatler (1995) has shown that as the num-
ber of investor increases, these stock price developments are replaced by periodic
motion again. Also, as noted in Zschischang and Lux (2001) the model is still not
able to reproduce certain stylized facts of the financial markets, such as the power-law
behavior of both large returns and the time-dependence in various powers of absolute
returns.
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In our studies we conduct experiments mostly with EMB investors homogeneous
with respect to the memory length, except when stated otherwise. This is because
we are interested in the main effect of implemented behavioral biases, and we do
not want to mask or smooth out that effect by introducing additional heterogeneity
in the memory lengths. However, as the results of our experiments will show, the
introduction of behavioral biases can create varied and surprising market dynamics
(which in many cases eliminate the silent period after a crash and the obvious peri-
odicity of bubbles) even when all the investors are homogeneous with respect to their
memory length.
5.4 Results
Figure 5.4 through Figure 5.8 show the results of our extension of the model with
normal and overconfident EMBs investors with various degrees of overconfidence.
The simulations show that as the degree of overconfidence increases the booms and
crashes become more extreme and less frequent than in the case of unbiased Efficient
Market Believers of the original model. The results reported in Table 5.2 are the
volatility of detrended market price σ(p), the volatility of detrended fundamental
price σ(pf ), the excess volatility of the market6, and average (per period) volume of
trade in the market (expressed as the percentage of the total number of outstanding
shares N).
The results presented in Table 5.2 are averaged over 100 simulations, each con-
ducted for 1000 periods, and with a different seed of the random number generator
each time. Following the methodology of Levy et al. (2000), the excess volatility is
here calculated from the average values of σ(P ) and σ(P f ). A more detailed pre-
sentation of the results including descriptive statistics is given in Table 5.3 (there
the excess volatility is calculated per each simulation). It can be seen that more
overconfident investors increase the excess volatility of the market, reduce average
(per period) volume of trade in the market (this is evident only for higher levels of
overconfidence), but also take a better position in terms of relative wealth compared
to RII investors (Figure 5.9).
6As in Levy et al. (2000), excess volatility is calculated from the volatility of detrended market
price σ(p) and the volatility of detrended fundamental price σ(pf ):
σ(p)−σ(pf )
σ(pf )
68
5.4. Results
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
10
2
10
3
10
4
10
5
10
6
Time
P
ric
e
Market price P
Fundamental price Pf
Figure 5.4: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% normal EMB (oc = 1).
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Figure 5.5: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% overconfident EMB (oc = 0.75).
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Figure 5.6: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% overconfident EMB (oc = 0.5).
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
10
2
10
3
10
4
10
5
10
6
Time
P
ric
e
Market price P
Fundamental price Pf
Figure 5.7: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% overconfident EMB (oc = 0.25).
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Figure 5.8: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% fully overconfident EMB (oc = 0).
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Figure 5.9: Relative wealth dynamics of RII against unbiased (uniform), normal, and
overconfident EMB.
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Table 5.2: Results of the experiments with various levels of investor overconfidence.
Uniform Normal oc = 0.75
σ(p) 11.4369 12.1090 13.1782
σ(pf ) 5.7159 5.7159 5.7159
excess volatility % 100.09 111.85 130.55
mean volume p.p. % 9.92 10.59 10.65
oc = 0.5 oc = 0.25 Mean
σ(p) 15.6394 21.3250 27.4616
σ(pf ) 5.7159 5.7159 5.7159
excess volatility % 173.61 273.08 380.44
mean volume p.p. % 9.46 6.10 2.82
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have replicated the LLS model of the stock market (Levy et al.,
2000), and adapted it to study investor overconfidence. Our experiments demonstrate
how by using an incremental approach, a well known agent-based model such as
LLS, can be easily adapted to study behavioral phenomena, in this case investor
overconfidence. We show how small changes in behavior (the assumption of the
equal probability weighting of past observations) can have a marked impact on the
price dynamics.
In this study we have focused on overconfidence defined as miscalibration and
implemented as underestimated variance. Overconfident investors predict future re-
turns with more peaked distribution than what would be implied by the historical
variance. In financial literature a popular supposition is that overconfident people
trade too much, which in combination with transaction costs, leads to loss of their
money (Odean, 1999). Our findings are contrary. We found that highly overconfi-
dent investors traded less because they tended to stick more with the risky asset7.
They also performed better against the rational informed investors in terms of the
dynamics of relative wealth8.
7These results are also related to how the volume of trade is in the LLS model defined. Since LLS
is a model based on the temporary market equilibrium where trading is not modeled explicitly, the
volume is calculated as the difference in portfolio holdings between each two consecutive periods.
We know that shares exchanged hands between investors, but we do not know how exactly that
happened.
8These findings are also due to the fact that LLS model is a rising market, so strategies that
invest aggressively in the risky stock are more profitable.
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Evidence in empirical studies is also contradictory. In the experimental market of
Biais et al. (2005), miscalibration was found to have an effect of reducing trading per-
formance. However, in a study which combines psychometric measures of judgment
biases (overconfidence scores) and field data (trading records), Glaser and Weber
(2007) could not relate measures of miscalibration to measures of trading volume,
whereas they could do so with the ”better-than-average” overconfidence. Glaser and
Weber (2007) suggest that, despite being widely used, miscalibration may not be the
best proxy for overconfidence. The inconclusive results of empirical studies motivate
us to study a different type of overconfidence in Chapter 9.
Since our current experiments with overconfidence show results only for the case
of homogeneous EMB investors, it would be interesting to conduct experiments in
the case of heterogeneous EMB investors with various memory lengths (which in
the original LLS model produced more realistic market dynamics, with booms and
crashes not periodic or predictable). It could also be interesting for future work to
extend our analysis to the interplay of investors with various degrees of overconfidence
within the same market.
Another important issue in an agent-based financial market is the choice of the
market mechanism, i.e. the price formation mechanism. LLS model focuses on clear-
ing by temporary market equilibrium, which is a mechanism with well-known advan-
tages and disadvantages (LeBaron, 2006). However, models with different market
mechanisms, such as the price impact function or a simulated order book, could be
used in a further study to evaluate the robustness of the results. The model studied
in Chapter 9 uses a market mechanism based on an order book.
5.6 Appendix: Implementation Details
The model has been implemented using the numerical computing environment MAT-
LAB and associated fourth-generation programming language. Since the LLS model
is a numerical model and the pricing mechanism can be characterized as a tempo-
rary market equilibrium, we found the MATLAB environment to be suitable for the
simulations. Using a dedicated agent-based simulation toolkit and implementing in-
vestors as fully developed agents (i.e. objects in the paradigm of object-oriented
programming) would probably constitute a programming overhead. We have also
used MATLAB to analyze the results and draw graphs.
Replicating computational models can sometimes be challenging, because a lot of
implementation details needs to be reported in order for replication to be successful
or even possible. We found the book of Levy et al. (2000) very detailed in that sense
and providing the necessary implementation details. The only detail we could not
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Figure 5.10: Flowchart of the market mechanism (temporary market equilibrium).
find was information on how EMB investors operated in the first few periods of the
simulations. EMB investors need past prices from m previous periods in order to
make their investment decisions. However, this information is not available in the
first few periods of the simulation. There were two possible solutions that we could
think of. One was to generate prices in negative periods (i.e. before the first period
of the simulation) by using some stochastic process, and then to ’feed’ agents with
this information. We have opted, however, for a simpler solution. EMB investors
can use a fixed portfolio strategy as an optimal strategy during the first few periods
until they have enough prices to fill in their memory window. This fixed strategy
was to allocate half of their wealth into the risky asset and the other half into the
bond. The final investment proportion x was obtained by adding noise to this fixed
proportion, according to Equation 5.10.
5.6.1 Pricing Mechanism
The pricing mechanism of the LLS model is based on the temporary market equi-
librium, according to the classification by LeBaron (2006). RII and EMB investors
determine optimal proportion in the stock so as to maximize the expected utility of
their wealth in the next period. However, expected utility is the function of the price,
which is in the current period still unknown. Investors therefore need to determine
optimal proportions of wealth to invest in the risky asset xih(Ph), and respective de-
mands for shares N ih(Ph), for various hypothetical prices Ph (see Figure 5.10). The
equilibrium price Pt is set to that hypothetical price for which the total demand of
all investors in the market equals the total number of outstanding shares, according
to
∑
i
N ih(Pt) =
∑
i
xih(Pt)W
i
h(Pt)
Pt
= N. (5.16)
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To find the equilibrium price, we define a function f(Ph) =
∑
i N
i
h(Pt)−N . This
is a decreasing function of Ph that changes sign in the point where
∑
i N
i
h(Pt) = N ,
which is the market price we are looking for. To find that zero point, we use an
existing method in MATLAB called fzero. This method implements an algorithm
originated by T. Dekker that uses a combination of bisection, secant, and inverse
quadratic interpolation methods in order to find the root of a continuous function
(or, more precisely, the point where the function has a value near zero, with a given
tolerance).
5.6.2 Pseudo-code
The Main Program
1. set parameters and initial conditions
N = 10000 number of stocks issued
M = 950 number of RII investors
M2 = 50 number of EMB investors
r_f = 0.01 risk-free rate
T = 1000 number of time steps
k = 0.04 required rate of return on stock
z1 = -0.07 maximal one-period dividend decrease
z2 = 0.10 maximal one-period dividend growth
g = 0.015 average dividend growth rate (z1+z2)/2
alpha = 1.5 degree of risk aversion
P0 = 50 initial price -> P(1)
D0 = 0.5 initial quarterly dividend -> D(1)
Ni0 = 10 initial stock holdings of RII investors
W0 = 1000 initial wealth of RII investors
x0 = 0.5 initial proportion of wealth invested in stocks = P0*Ni0/W0
m2 = 10 memory length of EMB investors
N2i0 = 10 initial stock holdings of EMB investors
W20 = 1000 initial wealth of EMB investors
x20 = 0.5 initial proportion of wealth invested in stocks = P0*N2i0/W20
sigma = 0.2 standard deviation of noise added to the optimum solution (see Equation 5.10)
2. set seed of the pseudo-random number generator
3. preallocate all variables and store initial values
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4. for t = 2 to T+1
4a. calculate dividend
z = rand_uniform_[0,1] * (z2-z1) + z1;
D(t) = D(t-1) * (1+z);
4b. update wealth of each agent i with realized dividends and bond interest
W(t,i) = W(t-1,i) + Ni(t-1,i)*D(t) + (W(t-1,i) - Ni(t-1,i)*P(t-1))*rf;
W2(t,i) = W2(t-1,i) + N2i(t-1,i)*D(t) + (W2(t-1,i) - N2i(t-1,i)*P(t-1))*rf;
4c. generate random departures from optimal behavior for each EMB investor i
and store these values for later usage (see Equation 5.10)
x2(t,i) = rand_normal_[0,1] * sigma;
4d. determine the market clearing price (P(t-1) is the starting search value)
surplus = @(Ph) AggregateDemand(Ph, <listOfParameters>);
P(t) = fzero(surplus, P(t-1));
4e. calculate return
R(t) = (P(t) + D(t)) / P(t-1);
4f. calculate fundamental value
Pf(t) = D(t) * (1+g) / (k-g);
4g. update wealth of each agent with capital gains
W(t,i) = W(t,i) + Ni(t-1,i)*(P(t)-P(t-1));
W2(t,i) = W2(t,i) + N2i(t-1,i)*(P(t)-P(t-1));
4h. determine new holdings of investors from the optimal proportions
calculated in equilibrium (for EMB investors use optimal proportion +
noise, if needed truncated so that it falls into the [0,1] interval)
end
5. store simulation results
6. repeat experiment for different seeds
Aggregate Demand Function
function [surplus] = AggregateDemand(Ph, <listOfParameters>)
1. calculate optimal investment proportion xopt for RII investors that maximizes their EU
2. calculate demand in shares Ni(t,i) for all RII investors
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3. if (t>m2) there is enough history for the rolling window
3a. if (oc > 0) overconfidence is not full
estimate mean and standard deviation
mju = mean(R(t-1:-1:t-m2));
sig = std(R(t-1:-1:t-m2));
calculate new overconfident distribution
prob = normpdf(R(t-1:-1:t-m2), mju, sig*oc);
prob = prob/sum(prob);
elseif (oc = 0) overconfidence is full
use one value (the mean) as prediction
mean(R(t-1:-1:t-m2)
3b. find optimal proportion xopt2 for EMB that maximizes their EU
else there is not enough history for the rolling window
3a. use 50%-50% rule
xopt2 = 0.5;
4. add noise to the optimal proportion and fit into [0,1]
xopt2star = x2(t,i) + xopt2;
if (xopt2star < 0) xopt2star = 0; end
if (xopt2star > 1) xopt2star = 1; end
5. calculate demand in shares N2i(t,i) for all EMB investors
N2i(t,i) = xopt2star*Whi/Ph;
6. return the surplus between the total demand (of RII and EMB) and N
surplus = Ni(t,i) + N2i(t,i) - N;
5.6.3 Extended Replication Results
Figure 5.3 shows the replicated results of the LLS model with a small subpopulation
of EMB investors who predict future returns using a uniform distribution, and who
are homogeneous with respect to their memory length m. The dynamics of the mar-
ket price shows periodic bubbles and crashes to the fundamental value, which can
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be linked to the size of their memory window. Even though bubbles and crashes can
be considered as stylized facts of financial markets, this particular type of periodic
behavior is not very realistic. Autocorrelation function of logarithmic returns (Fig-
ure 5.11) shows negative correlation for lags somewhat larger than 10, and positive
correlation for lags somewhat larger than 20, which is the consequence of the homo-
geneous memory length of 10 periods. Figure 5.12 shows the histogram of returns
with a superimposed normal density. The returns distribution has fat tails, which is
another robust stylized fact of the financial time series, but the shape of the distribu-
tion is not entirely realistic. Its shape reflects the market dynamics which consists of
a few large movements and small intermediate movements, but not as many medium
movements as expected for a bell-shaped distribution of returns (see Figure 5.3).
The finding that large movements of the market price are followed by very little
movements (during which market prices follows the fundamental price) is not in line
with the stylized fact of volatility clustering. According to this empirical fact, large
movements should be followed by more large movements and vice versa. LLS model
is not able to replicate this stylized fact, neither in the case of homogeneous nor
heterogeneous memory lengths of EMB investors, although heterogeneity does lead
to a more realistic looking price dynamics. Some agent-based financial market models
have focused specifically on the reproduction of volatility clustering, for example the
model of Lux and Marchesi (1999).
In this section we have replicated the case of heterogeneous memory lengths
demonstrated in Levy et al. (2000). Figure 5.13 shows the price dynamics of a mar-
ket that consists of 95% RII and 5% EMB with their memory length mi normally
distributed around mean value of 10 with a standard deviation of 10 (the distribu-
tion is truncated, so that the minimum memory length is 1). Figure 5.14 shows the
price dynamics of a market with 95% RII and 5% EMB with their memory length
uniformly distributed on the interval [1, 50] (the distribution is forced by assigning
each investor a different value). Although we were not able to reproduce as smooth
of a price as in Levy et al. (2000), in both of these experiments the market showed
more irregular prices than in the case of homogeneous memory, without the obvi-
ous periodicity related to the memory length of 10 (although some autocorrelation in
simple returns could still be observed for small lags, see Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16).
Distribution histograms (Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18) still contain fat tails, but the
overall shape is more bell-shaped and therefore more realistic than the distribution
shown on Figure 5.12.
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Figure 5.11: Autocorrelation function of returns with 5% uniform EMB with homo-
geneous memory lengths.
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Figure 5.12: Histogram of logarithmic returns and normal density plot (5% uniform
EMB with homogeneous memory lengths).
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Figure 5.13: Price dynamics with 5% uniform EMB with heterogeneous memory
lengths (normally distributed).
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Figure 5.14: Price dynamics with 5% uniform EMB with heterogeneous memory
lengths (uniformly distributed).
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Figure 5.15: Autocorrelation function of returns with 5% uniform EMB with hetero-
geneous memory lengths (normally distributed).
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Figure 5.16: Autocorrelation function of returns with 5% uniform EMB with hetero-
geneous memory lengths (uniformly distributed).
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Figure 5.17: Histogram of logarithmic returns and normal density plot (5% uniform
EMB with heterogeneous memory lengths (normally distributed)).
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Figure 5.18: Histogram of logarithmic returns and normal density plot (5% uniform
EMB with heterogeneous memory lengths (uniformly distributed)).
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5.6. Appendix: Implementation Details
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics for the results of the experiments with various levels
of investor overconfidence.
Uniform Normal oc = 0.75 oc = 0.5 oc = 0.25 Mean
mean(σ(p)) 11.4369 12.1090 13.1782 15.6394 21.3250 27.4616
std(σ(p)) 5.1692 5.4447 6.3535 7.6695 11.5467 16.2047
median(σ(p)) 10.3719 11.2145 11.6131 14.6779 18.8685 23.9397
mode(σ(p)) 4.8933 5.0317 5.5169 5.8334 7.4943 9.0271
skewness(σ(p)) 1.1953 1.2956 1.2280 1.5678 1.6708 1.8115
kurtosis(σ(p)) 4.3689 4.4500 4.2629 6.4211 7.1379 6.8294
mean(σ(pf )) 5.7159 5.7159 5.7159 5.7159 5.7159 5.7159
std(σ(pf )) 1.9581 1.9581 1.9581 1.9581 1.9581 1.9581
median(σ(pf )) 5.4220 5.4220 5.4220 5.4220 5.4220 5.4220
mode(σ(pf )) 3.2044 3.2044 3.2044 3.2044 3.2044 3.2044
skewness(σ(pf )) 1.1854 1.1854 1.1854 1.1854 1.1854 1.1854
kurtosis(σ(pf )) 4.1405 4.1405 4.1405 4.1405 4.1405 4.1405
mean(excess volatility) % 95.1607 107.1606 124.5575 165.9632 262.9995 358.5883
std(excess volatility) % 34.5865 33.8699 51.2809 57.9288 115.7994 138.0770
median(excess volatility) % 90.5133 101.2600 112.4034 163.7904 238.2254 331.2748
mode(excess volatility) % 28.2464 34.1647 43.3135 55.4528 81.6186 127.0985
skewness(excess volatility) 0.7502 0.0338 0.7278 0.5526 1.3787 0.8345
kurtosis(excess volatility) 3.6452 2.2884 2.8499 3.2734 6.6708 3.6049
mean(mean volume p.p.) % 9.9153 10.5883 10.6466 9.4626 6.0993 2.8152
std(mean volume p.p.) % 0.4811 0.5926 00.5918 0.6479 0.7289 0.3759
median(mean volume p.p.) % 9.9164 10.6129 10.5730 9.4643 6.0907 2.8252
mode(mean volume p.p.) % 8.6486 8.8936 9.0445 7.9420 4.6836 2.0222
skewness(mean volume p.p.) 0.2881 -0.2392 0.4046 0.1688 0.4318 0.0115
kurtosis(mean volume p.p.) 4.0233 3.1110 3.4045 3.0765 2.9275 2.4301
5.6.4 Extended Simulation Results
Table 5.3 presents descriptive statistics for the results of the experiments with various
levels of investor overconfidence. Variable of interests are volatility of detrended
market price σ(p), volatility of detrended fundamental price σ(pf ), excess volatility
and mean volume per period, and these are calculated across 1000 time periods.
Descriptive statistics for those four variables (mean, standard deviation, median,
mode, skewness and kurtosis) are calculated across 100 simulations with different
seeds of the pseudo-random number generator. It can be seen that the variables of
interest are not exactly normally distributed across the simulations with different
seeds. However, the same results and trends can be inferred by comparing either
means, medians or mods.
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Chapter 6
Modeling Investor Optimism with
Fuzzy Connectives∗
6.1 Introduction
One of the key characteristics that govern investor behavior is the optimism or pes-
simism of the investors. The link between asset valuation and investor sentiment has
been the subject of considerable debate in the finance, and has been studied in the
context of mispricing (departures from the fundamentals) (Brown and Cliff, 2005),
the limits of arbitrage (De Long et al., 1990), as well as the underreaction and over-
reaction of stock prices (Barberis et al., 1998). Two methodological approaches can
be found in the finance literature. One is concerned with finding adequate proxies
for the aggregate investor sentiment, and using them in statistical analysis to explain
the variation of stock prices and the occurrences of mispricing, such as bubbles and
crashes. The other one is a bottom-up approach that aims at modeling individual
investor optimism and pessimism by using the insights from psychological theories.
For these theories, it is important to have a flexible framework that can be adapted
to capture the complexity of human decision making behavior.
In fuzzy decision theory, a wide range of connectives (aggregation operators) has
been proposed and studied in order to model the flexibility of human decision making.
In this sense, the use of fuzzy connectives for modeling elements of behavioral finance
is promising, since the wide range of behaviors documented in the behavioral finance
∗A preliminary version of this chapter has been published in M. Lovric, R. J. Almeida, U.
Kaymak, and J. Spronk. Modeling investor optimism with fuzzy connectives. In Proceedings of the
IFSA/EUSFLAT, pages 1803-1808, Lisbon, Portugal, July 2009a.
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literature necessitates the use of a flexible framework for aggregating information.
In this chapter, we make a step in this direction by proposing a model of investor
optimism based on fuzzy aggregation.
In probabilistic decision theory, such as the Prospect Theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and Rank-Dependent Utility Theory
(Quiggin, 1982), optimism and pessimism are modeled using the probability weight-
ing function. If, for example, the decision under risk is considered, a decision problem
is presented using risky prospects, i.e. a set of possible outcomes and their probabil-
ities. Because of the probability weighting, the decision weights associated with the
outcomes are not equal to their probabilities (as would be in the case of Expected
Value Theory or Expected Utility Theory). To model optimism we would need to
specify and parameterize such a probability weighting function that gives more deci-
sion weight to good outcomes and less decision weight to bad outcomes. However, an
empirically observed probability weighting function is usually S-shaped, which means
that when dealing with such prospects, people are at the same time optimistic about
the best outcomes, pessimistic about the worst outcomes, and insensitive to middle
outcomes (Weber, 1994).
A decision maker’s optimism or pessimism has also been studied within a fuzzy
decision making setting. Various fuzzy connectives studied in this context have pa-
rameters that denote explicitly the optimism or pessimism degree of a decision maker.
Apart from the well-known Hurwicz operator (Hurwicz, 1951), the grade of compen-
sation in Zimmermann–Zysno operator (Zimmermann and Zysno, 1980) can also be
interpreted as an index of optimism. All these operators view the decision as a
mixture of conjunctive and disjunctive behavior, and the degree of optimism deter-
mines which aggregation type dominates and to which degree. Another optimism–
pessimism index was proposed in van Nauta Lemke et al. (1983), where the parameter
of the generalized averaging operator (Dyckhoff and Pedrycz, 1984) is interpreted as
the decision maker’s characteristic degree of optimism. This is an intuitive way of
modeling the degree of optimism, since optimism is now modeled as the disposi-
tion of the decision maker to believe or give importance to positive events compared
to his/her disposition to consider negative events (Kaymak and van Nauta Lemke,
1998). An application of this operator in the risk management of power networks
has been considered in Kaymak et al. (1998).
Optimism and pessimism of investors have also been studied in the context of
agent-based simulations of financial markets. For example, the model of Lux and
Marchesi (1999) divides chartist traders into two groups, optimists and pessimists,
which, depending on the group they belong to, either buy or sell a risky stock. In that
model, optimists and pessimists could also have been labeled as buyers and sellers.
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In our model, on the other hand, the optimism of investors is explicitly related to
the investors’ opinions on the future market returns. Whether these opinions are
going to be translated into exclusive buying or selling behavior is something that is
not imposed by the definition. The implications of different levels of optimism and
pessimism are going to be tested by market simulations.
In this chapter, we propose a model of investor optimism based on the generalized
averaging operator. The advantage of the proposed approach is that the influence of
different levels of optimism can be studied by varying a single parameter. We study
the effects of investor optimism in an artificial financial market based on the Levy,
Levy, Solomon (LLS) model (Levy et al., 2000).
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 explains the basics of the LLS
model in which we study the investor optimism and pessimism. Section 6.3 describes
the setup of the conducted experiments. Section 6.4 presents the simulation results,
and Section 6.5 presents the results of the extension for investors’ heterogeneity in
memory lengths. Section 6.6 concludes the chapter and discusses possible extensions
for the future research.
6.2 Model Description
The proposed model of investor optimism is based on the LLS microscopic simulation
model with a small homogeneous subpopulation of efficient market believers (EMBs)
as described in Levy et al. (2000). LLS model is a well-known and early econophysics
model, rooted in a utility maximization framework. Variants of the model have been
published in a number of articles and a book, and the model has also been critically
evaluated in Zschischang and Lux (2001). The LLS model has been explained in
more detail in Chapter 5. Here we present only the basic setup of the model, before
moving on to the new agent behavior, namely the sentiment EMBs.
6.2.1 Asset Classes
As in the original LLS model, there are two investments alternatives: a risky stock
(or market index) and a risk-free asset (bond). This is in line with many of the
agent-based artificial financial markets, which typically do not deal with portfolio
selection in multi-asset environments. The risky asset pays at the beginning of each
period a dividend which follows a multiplicative random walk according to
D˜t+1 = Dt(1 + z˜), (6.1)
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where z˜ is a random variable distributed uniformly in the interval [z1, z2]. The bond
pays interest with a rate of rf .
6.2.2 Agent Behavior
LLS model contains two types of investors: (1) Rational Informed Investors (RII)
and (2) Efficient Market Believers (EMB). Both investor types are expected util-
ity maximizers characterized by a power (myopic) utility function with DARA and
CRRA properties (Levy et al., 2000):
U(W ) =
W 1−α
1− α . (6.2)
RII investors
RII investors know the dividend process, and therefore can estimate fundamental
value as the discounted stream of future dividend, according to the Gordon model
P˜ ft+1 =
Dt(1 + z˜)(1 + g)
k − g , (6.3)
where k is the discount factor of the expected rate of return demanded by the market
for the stock, and g is the expected growth rate of the dividend. RII investors assume
that the price will converge to the fundamental value in the next period. In each
period RII investor i chooses the proportion of wealth to invest in stocks and bonds
so that he or she maximizes the expected utility of wealth in the next period, given
by the following equation from Levy et al. (2000):
EU(W˜ it+1) =
(W ih)
1−α
(1− α)(2− α)
1
(z2 − z1)
(
k − g
k + 1
)
Ph
xDt
×
{[
(1− x)(1 + rf ) + x
Ph
(
k + 1
k − g
)
Dt(1 + z2)
](2−α)
(6.4)
−
[
(1− x)(1 + rf ) + x
Ph
(
k + 1
k − g
)
Dt(1 + z1)
](2−α)}
.
Based on the optimal proportion, they determine the number of stocks demanded
by multiplying this optimal proportion with their wealth. Since all RII investors are
assumed to have the same degree or risk aversion (parameter α), they will all have
the same optimal proportion x. The actual number of demanded shares might differ
only if investors differ in their wealth. However, as in the experiments of Levy et al.
(2000) we assume that they all start with the same initial wealth.
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EMB investors
EMB investors believe that the price accurately reflects the fundamental value. How-
ever, since they do not know the dividend process, they use ex post distribution of
stock returns to estimate the ex ante distribution. EMB investor i uses a rolling
window of size mi, and is in the original model of Levy et al. (2000) said to be unbi-
ased if, in absence of additional information, he or she assigns the same probability
to each of the past mi return observations Levy et al. (2000). Hence, the original,
unbiased EMBs assume that returns come from a discrete uniform distribution
Pri(R˜t+1 = Rt−j) =
1
mi
, for j = 1, ...,mi. (6.5)
The expected utility of EMB investor i is given by Levy et al. (2000)
EU(W˜ it+1) =
(W ih)
1−α
(1− α)
mi∑
j=1
Pri(R˜t+1 = Rt−j) (6.6)
× [(1− x)(1 + rf ) + xRt−j ](1−α) .
In accordance with the LLS model (Levy et al., 2000), for all EMB investors an
investor specific noise is added to the optimal investment proportion x∗ (that maxi-
mizes the expected utility) in order to account for various departures from rational
optimal behavior (ε˜i is truncated so that 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, imposing the constraint of no
borrowing and no short-selling), i.e.
xi = x∗i + ε˜i. (6.7)
New Agent Behavior: Sentiment EMBs
In this chapter we create a new EMB type, called the sentiment EMBs by using
a fuzzy set connective. Sentiment EMBs use generalized aggregation operator to
estimate future returns, using the rolling window of size mi. The prediction of the
next period return for each investor i is given by
R˜t+1 =
⎛
⎝ 1
mi
mi∑
j=1
(Rt−j)s
⎞
⎠
1/s
. (6.8)
The higher the parameter s, the higher the estimate of the return (more closer to the
maximum value from the sample), and vice versa. In such a way, we use parameter
s to capture the phenomena of investor optimism and pessimism. Here we are also
exploiting the fact that according to the Equation 5.5 returns are always positive, so
the Equation 6.8 can always be calculated.
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In our experiments we consider several values of the parameter s which also
coincide with the special cases of the generalized mean:
• s → −∞, the minimum of the sample;
• s = −1, the harmonic mean;
• s → 0, the geometric mean;
• s = 1, the arithmetic mean;
• s = 2, the quadratic mean;
• s →∞, the maximum of the sample.
Since there is only one value for the expected return, instead of a probability
distribution, the expected utility of sentiment EMB investor i is given by
EU(W˜ it+1) =
(W ih)
1−α
(1− α)
[
(1− x)(1 + rf ) + xR˜t+1
](1−α)
. (6.9)
The investors will maximize this expected utility if in each period they invest all
their wealth either in the stock or in the bond, depending on the actual comparison
between the expected return on the stock R˜t+1 and the return on the riskless bond
(1 + rf ).
6.2.3 Market Mechanism
LeBaron (2006) describes four types of market mechanisms used in agent-based arti-
ficial financial markets. In this paper, as in the original LLS model, we use clearing
by temporary market equilibrium. RII and EMB investors determine optimal propor-
tion in the stock so as to maximize the expected utility of their wealth in the next
period. However, expected utility is the function of the future price, which is in the
current period unknown. Investors therefore need to determine optimal proportions,
and respective demands for shares, for various hypothetical prices. The equilibrium
price Pt is set to that hypothetical price for which the total demand of all investors
in the market equals the total number of outstanding shares according to
∑
i
N ih(Pt) =
∑
i
xih(Pt)W
i
h(Pt)
Pt
= N. (6.10)
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Table 6.1: Parametrization of the model used for experiments with investor optimism
Symbol Value Explanation
M 950 Number of RII investors
M2 50 Number of EMB investors
m 10 Memory length of EMB investors
α 1.5 Risk aversion parameter
N 10000 Number of shares
rf 0.01 Riskless interest rate
k 0.04 Required rate of return on stock
z1 -0.07 Maximal one-period dividend decrease
z2 0.10 Maximal one-period dividend growth
g 0.015 Average dividend growth rate
6.3 Experimental Design
In the benchmark model where only RII investors are present in the market, there is
no trade, the log prices follow random walk, and there is no excess volatility of the
market price (Levy et al., 2000). In the experiment with a small fraction of homoge-
neous (with respect to memory length) and unbiased EMB investors (of the original
model), the market dynamics show semi-predictable (unrealistic) booms and crashes,
with substantial trading in the market and excess volatility (Levy et al., 2000). The
resulting market dynamics of the benchmark experiment and the experiment with a
small fraction of EMB investors can be seen in Chapter 5. This experimental setup
of Levy et al. (2000) is also the basis for the experiments in this chapter.
In our new model we conduct six experiments for six different levels of optimism of
EMB investors that correspond to the special cases of the parameter s, representing
the minimum of the sample, harmonic mean, geometric mean, arithmetic mean,
quadratic mean, and the maximum of the sample. In each experiment the market
consists of 95% RII investors and 5% EMB investors, with the parametrization given
in Table 6.1. We run 100 independent 1000-period-long simulations, with different
initial seeds of the random number generators. The results in the Table 6.2 are
averaged over these 100 simulations.
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Table 6.2: Results of the experiments with different levels of investor optimism
s → −∞ s = −1 s → 0
σ(p) 6.0249 12.8370 17.8668
σ(pf ) 5.7159 5.7159 5.7159
excess volatility % 5.41 124.59 212.58
mean volume p.p. % 0.48 9.04 6.40
s = 1 s = 2 s →∞
σ(p) 27.4739 28.8751 25.0327
σ(pf ) 5.7159 5.7159 5.7159
excess volatility % 380.66 405.18 337.95
mean volume p.p. % 2.82 1.18 0.12
6.4 Results
Figure 6.1 shows a typical price dynamics from the first experiment with pessimistic
EMB investors. The market price closely follows the fundamental price which is
driven by the random dividend process. Hence, this experiment resembles the bench-
mark model in which there are only RII investors in the market (see Chapter 5). Pes-
simistic investors predict next period return with the minimum return in the sample
of past returns. The minimum return is almost always below the risk-less return, so
the optimal investment for pessimistic EMB investors is to invest everything in the
bond. The actual investment proportion will slightly vary due to the error term in
Equation 6.7. Only in rare occasions when there is a series of returns higher than the
risk-less return, the EMB investors will invest in the risky asset. The results in Ta-
ble 6.2 show that for this experiment the volatility of the detrended market price σ(p)
is similar to the volatility of the detrended fundamental price σ(pf ), which means
that there is a low excess volatility. The relative mean volume per period shows that
there is very little trading in the market, i.e. from period to period the investors do
not change much their portfolio holdings.
Figure 6.2 shows the price development for the second experiment with slightly
more optimistic investors that predict future return using the harmonic mean. The
results of this experiment qualitatively and quantitatively resemble the results of
the original model with a small fraction of unbiased EMB investors (which predict
future returns using a uniform discrete distribution over the observed returns). The
market exhibits cyclical booms and crashes to the fundamental value. According to
Table 6.2, the market is more volatile, and there is also more trading. This exchange
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Figure 6.1: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% minimum sentiment EMB (s →
−∞).
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Figure 6.2: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% harmonic sentiment EMB (s = −1).
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Figure 6.3: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% geometric sentiment EMB (s → 0).
of risky assets between RII and EMB investors occurs mostly when the booms begin
and when they crash.
Figure 6.3, Figure 6.4, and Figure 6.5 depict the market dynamics when EMB
investors are even more optimistic. As the index of optimism increases the market
shows more extreme (longer lasting) booms, followed by very sharp crashes. During
these bubbles the EMB investors aggressively invest in the risky asset, while the RII
investors divest expecting that the overvalued asset would fall to its fundamental
value. The crash occurs when there is a series of low returns, due to low dividend
realizations, so the EMB investors suddenly shift toward a risk-less asset. However,
as soon as a better return is realized, EMB investors invest in the risky asset and a
new boom starts. From Table 6.2 it is also evident that the more optimistic EMB
investors are, the more volatile market price is. However, the trading is reduced
because the booms are longer lasting, i.e. the cycles of booms and crashes appear
less frequently.
In the case of full optimism, there is an ongoing market bubble, as shown in
Figure 6.6. The market does not crash because the maximum return in the rolling
window of past returns is always above the risk-less return, so the EMB investors
are always highly invested in the risky asset. The trading in this experiment is even
more reduced, but the volatility of the market price is also somewhat reduced. The
reason for the latter is that the crash does not occur within the experiments.
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Figure 6.4: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% arithmetic sentiment EMB (s = 1).
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Figure 6.5: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% quadratic sentiment EMB (s = 2).
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Figure 6.6: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5%maximum sentiment EMB (s →∞).
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Figure 6.7: Relative wealth dynamics of RII against sentiment EMBs with various
levels of optimism.
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Figure 6.7 shows the development of the relative wealth of RII investors over
time. At the beginning, RII investors possess 95% of all the wealth in the market. In
the case of extremely pessimistic EMB investors, RII investors end up asymptotically
dominating the market. This is because the LLS market is a growing market, and only
RII investors are investing in the risky asset and exploiting that growth. Conversely,
in the case of extreme optimism, EMB investors are highly invested in the stock, and
eventually dominate the market. In non-extreme cases of optimism, both types of
investors coexist in the market.
6.5 Extended Results
In this extension we study the influence of investor heterogeneity with respect to
their memory length. The experiments conducted in this chapter until now have
focused on the case of homogeneous EMB investors in that respect. However, even
from the results of these experiments we can infer something about the effects of
the memory length. We expect that the choice of the memory length has a great
impact on the occurrence of booms and crashes, particularly in the extreme cases of
optimism and pessimism. The larger the window of past returns is, the less likely it
is that all returns are below (or all returns are above) the risk-less return. Hence,
investors will stick even more with their preferred investment choices, which is the
risky asset in the case of optimism and the risk-less asset in the case of pessimism.
When investors have very short memory lengths, it is more likely that those few
recent observations they use for prediction point them in the direction of switching
their investment alternative.
To test for the impact of heterogeneity in memory lengths, we conduct the ex-
periments with EMB investors having memory lengths uniformly distributed on the
interval [1, 50] (which is actually achieved by assigning each of the 50 EMB investors
a different memory length). Figure 6.8, Figure 6.9, Figure 6.10, Figure 6.11, Fig-
ure 6.12, and Figure 6.13 show price dynamics for the case of fully pessimistic EMB
(minimum of the sample), harmonic EMB, geometric EMB, arithmetic EMB (neu-
tral sentiment), quadratic EMB, and fully optimistic EMB investors (maximum of
the sample), respectively. We can see that the main effects of optimism and pes-
simism found in Section 6.4 are still present: optimism leads to a large bubble, while
pessimism pushes the market price towards the fundamentals. However, the market
dynamics shows some differences from the homogeneous case.
It can be seen that in the case of neutral (arithmetic) sentiment (Figure 6.11)
market price shows much more departures from the fundamental price than in the
homogeneous case. This is the consequence of investors with larger memory lengths
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Figure 6.8: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% minimum sentiment EMB (s →
−∞) with memory length mi uniformly distributed on [1,50].
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Figure 6.9: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% harmonic sentiment EMB (s = −1)
with memory length mi uniformly distributed on [1,50].
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Figure 6.10: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% geometric sentiment EMB
(s → 0) with memory length mi uniformly distributed on [1,50].
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Figure 6.11: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% arithmetic sentiment EMB
(s = 1) with memory length mi uniformly distributed on [1,50].
99
Chapter 6. Modeling Investor Optimism with Fuzzy Connectives
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
10
2
10
3
10
4
10
5
10
6
10
7
Time
P
ric
e
Market price P
Fundamental price Pf
Figure 6.12: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% quadratic sentiment EMB (s = 2)
with memory length mi uniformly distributed on [1,50].
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Figure 6.13: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% maximum sentiment EMB
(s → ∞) with memory length mi uniformly distributed on [1,50].
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Figure 6.14: Logarithmic returns for a market with 95% RII and 5% geometric
sentiment EMB (s → 0) with memory length mi uniformly distributed on [1,50].
who require more negative returns or bad dividend realizations in order to switch
towards the risk-less asset. Due to investors’ heterogeneity, we do not observe many
coordinated actions which cause full price drops to the fundamental value, as can
often be seen in experiments with homogeneous memory (e.g. Figure 6.4). In the
cases of extreme optimism and extreme pessimism, we can see the effect of investors
with very short memory lengths. Those investors are driven by only few recent ob-
servations, which could be so surprising (in comparison with the risk-less rate) that
they cause them to change their portfolio allocation regardless of how optimistic or
pessimistic they are. For this reason, fully pessimistic (Figure 6.8) and fully opti-
mistic (Figure 6.13) EMB investors with heterogenous memory lengths cause some
small price deviations that do not appear in the homogenous case (Figure 6.6 and
Figure 6.1). Nevertheless, it can be seen that the main effects of investor senti-
ment are still present, and they cannot be eliminated by introducing such additional
heterogeneity into the model.
Perhaps the most interesting market dynamics are obtained for the harmonic
EMBs (s → 0), which are shown in Figure 6.10. Market price has very volatile
dynamics, but on top of this volatility contours of larger bubbles can be observed.
In order to get a better understanding of the market dynamics, we also analyze the
returns on the risky asset. Figure 6.14 shows the time series of logarithmic returns,
which are obtained by taking logarithm of returns calculated by Equation 5.5. We
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can see that large changes tend to be followed by large changes, while small changes
tend to be followed by small changes, which looks like a manifestation of volatility
clustering. In order to further explore if this stylized fact has been obtained, we
plot autocorrelation function of returns (Figure 6.15) and absolute value of returns
(Figure 6.16). For returns, the autocorrelation is largely not significant (except some
negative autocorrelation for lags 2-4). However, for absolute returns, the autocorre-
lation function is positive, significant, and slowly decaying, which is consistent with
the stylized fact of volatility clustering. In addition, as in most other experiments,
the stylized fact of fat tails is observed in return distribution (see Figure 6.17).
The finding of volatility clustering in one of the experiments is intriguing because
in the original LLS model (with EMB investors who make prediction using uniform
distribution over past return observations) it could not be achieved neither in the
case of homogeneous nor heterogeneous memory lengths. In this case we have het-
erogeneous memory lengths, but the behavior of EMB investors is even simpler, such
that instead of a uniform distribution over past returns only one value is used for
prediction and it is calculated by aggregating past information using a geometric
mean1.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have used a fuzzy connective to study investor optimism in the
modified LLS model of the stock market by Levy et al. (2000). We show how changes
in the formation of expectations by EMB investors can have a marked impact on the
price dynamics. The levels of investor optimism have been related to the occurrences
of market booms and crashes, as well as to the measures of excess volatility and
trading volume. In the first set of experiments we have focused on the case of
homogeneous EMB investors with the same memory length. Additional analysis with
heterogeneous memory lengths shows that market dynamics becomes more intricate,
although the main sentiment effect is still present in the sense that optimism increases
bubbles, while pessimism reduces market price departures from the fundamental
price. The extension for heterogeneous memory is also interesting because we were
able to obtain volatility clustering in the case of geometric sentiment, which is a
stylized fact that has not been reproduced in the original LLS model (neither with
1A geometric mean represents a sentiment that is not far from neutral, i.e. it is not substantially
pessimistic nor optimistic. We have assumed that an arithmetic mean represents this neutral senti-
ment. However, according to the literature, e.g. Kaymak and van Nauta Lemke (1998), a geometric
mean could have been a viable choice too.
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Figure 6.15: Autocorrelation function of logarithmic returns (5% geometric sentiment
EMB with heterogeneous memory length uniformly distributed on [1,50]).
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Figure 6.16: Autocorrelation function of absolute logarithmic returns (5% geometric
sentiment EMB with heterogeneous memory length uniformly distributed on [1,50]).
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Figure 6.17: Histogram of logarithmic returns and normal density plot (5% geometric
sentiment EMB with heterogeneous memory length uniformly distributed on [1,50]).
homogeneous nor heterogeneous memories). This results demonstrates how small
behavioral changes can have a large impact on the obtained market dynamics and
its statistical properties.
Since we have used the same model to study investor overconfidence, a distinct
although related behavioral phenomenon, it would also be interesting to study both
phenomena at the same time. The overconfidence in the model presented in Chap-
ter 5 refers to the peakedness of the return distribution around the mean of return
observations, while optimism in the model presented in this chapter determines how
that mean is chosen (ranging from the minimum observation to the maximum ob-
servation in the sample of past returns). This combined study of investor confidence
and sentiment is presented in Chapter 7. Furthermore, instead of focusing only on
fixed levels of investors optimism or pessimism we would like to implement an up-
dating mechanism by which the level of investor optimism changes based on the past
performance. This study is presented in Chapter 8.
This chapter demonstrates the advantage of using a fuzzy connective for modeling
investor optimism, as we were able to control investor optimism by varying only a
single parameter. The results of our experiments show that this parameter was a
valid choice for an index of optimism in the context of financial markets. In future
research other fuzzy set connectives could be investigated for agent decision making.
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Chapter 7
A General Model of Investor
Confidence and Sentiment∗
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 we have studied separate effects of investor overconfi-
dence and investor sentiment. This chapter presents a general model which allows
a combined study of both investor optimism and investor overconfidence. Each be-
havioral phenomena is modeled by only a single parameter and influences either the
mean (sentiment) or the standard deviation (confidence) of the return distribution
investors use to predict future returns. The contribution of this chapter is to study
the interaction of overconfidence and investor sentiment in the same model, as we
expect that overconfidence will have different consequences for optimistic and pes-
simistic investors. In addition, in this chapter we also study recency and primacy
effects, which concern investors who assign more importance to either more recent
or older return observations.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 7.2 explains the basics of the LLS
model in which we study investor overconfidence and sentiment. Section 7.3 describes
the setup of the experiments we have conducted. Section 7.4 presents the results of
the simulations regarding the general confidence-sentiment model, and Section 7.5
presents the results of the simulations on recency and primacy effects. Section 7.6
concludes the chapter and discusses possible extensions for the future research.
∗Part of this chapter has been published in M. Lovric, U. Kaymak, and J. Spronk. Modeling in-
vestor sentiment and overconfidence in an agent-based stock market. Human Systems Management,
29(2):89-101, 2010a.
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7.2 Model Description
The proposed model of investor sentiment and overconfidence is based on the LLS
microscopic simulation model with a small homogeneous subpopulation of efficient
market believers (EMBs) as described in Levy et al. (2000). It is a generalization of
our models presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. LLS model is a well-known and
early econophysics model, rooted in a utility maximization framework. Variants of
the model have been published in a number of articles and a book, and the model
has also been critically evaluated in Zschischang and Lux (2001). A more detailed
description including the implementation details can be found in Chapter 5. Here we
present only the basic setup of the original model, before moving on to the extension.
7.2.1 Asset Classes
As in the original LLS model, there are two investments alternatives: a risky stock
(or market index) and a risk-free asset (bond). This is in line with many of the
agent-based artificial financial markets, which typically do not deal with portfolio
selection in multi-asset environments. The risky asset pays at the beginning of each
period a dividend which follows a multiplicative random walk according to
D˜t+1 = Dt(1 + z˜), (7.1)
where z˜ is a random variable distributed uniformly in the interval [z1, z2]. The bond
pays interest with a rate of rf .
7.2.2 Agent Behavior
LLS model contains two types of investors: (1) Rational Informed Investors (RII)
and (2) Efficient Market Believers (EMB). The model is rooted in the framework
of expected utility maximization, and agents’ preferences are captured by a power
(myopic) utility function with DARA and CRRA properties (Levy et al., 2000):
U(W ) =
W 1−α
1− α . (7.2)
RII investors
RII investors know the dividend process, and therefore can estimate fundamental
value as the discounted stream of future dividend, according to the Gordon model
P˜ ft+1 =
Dt(1 + z˜)(1 + g)
k − g , (7.3)
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where k is the discount factor of the expected rate of return demanded by the market
for the stock, and g is the expected growth rate of the dividend. RII investors assume
that the price will converge to the fundamental value in the next period. In period t
RII investor i chooses the proportion of wealth to invest in stocks and bonds so that
he or she maximizes the expected utility of wealth in the next period, given by the
following equation from Levy et al. (2000):
EU(W˜ it+1) =
(W ih)
1−α
(1− α)(2− α)
1
(z2 − z1)
(
k − g
k + 1
)
Ph
xDt
×
{[
(1− x)(1 + rf ) + x
Ph
(
k + 1
k − g
)
Dt(1 + z2)
](2−α)
(7.4)
−
[
(1− x)(1 + rf ) + x
Ph
(
k + 1
k − g
)
Dt(1 + z1)
](2−α)}
,
where Ph represents a hypothetical price of the risky asset in period t. W ih represents
hypothetical wealth of investor i in period t, which consists of the previous period
wealth, interest and dividend accumulated from the last period, and capital gains or
losses incurred on the difference between Ph and Pt−1.
Based on the optimal proportion, they determine the number of stocks demanded
by multiplying this optimal proportion with their wealth. Since all RII investors are
assumed to have the same degree or risk aversion (parameter α), they will all have
the same optimal proportion x. The actual number of demanded shares might differ
only if investors differ in their wealth. However, as in the experiments of Levy et al.
(2000) we assume that they all start with the same initial wealth.
EMB investors
EMB investors believe that the price accurately reflects the fundamental value. How-
ever, since they do not know the dividend process, they use ex post distribution of
stock returns to estimate the ex ante distribution. EMB investor i uses a rolling win-
dow of size mi, and is in the original model of Levy et al. (2000) said to be unbiased
if, in absence of additional information, he or she assigns the same probability to
each of the past mi return observations. Hence, the original, unbiased EMBs assume
that returns come from a discrete uniform distribution
Pri(R˜t+1 = Rt−j) =
1
mi
, for j = 1, ...,mi. (7.5)
The expected utility of EMB investor i is given by Levy et al. (2000)
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EU(W˜ it+1) =
(W ih)
1−α
(1− α)
mi∑
j=1
Pri(R˜t+1 = Rt−j) (7.6)
× [(1− x)(1 + rf ) + xRt−j ](1−α) .
In accordance with the LLS model of Levy et al. (2000), for all EMB investors an
investor specific noise is added to the optimal investment proportion x∗ (that maxi-
mizes the expected utility) in order to account for various departures from rational
optimal behavior (ε˜i is truncated so that 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, imposing the constraint of no
borrowing and no short-selling), i.e.
xi = x∗i + ε˜i. (7.7)
In Chapter 5 we have created two new EMB types: normal EMBs and overcon-
fident EMBs.
(a) Normal EMBs assume that returns come from a stable normal distribution,
and in each period estimate the mean μˆ and standard deviation σˆ using the rolling
window of size mi. Based on the estimates of this distribution, they assign proba-
bilities to each of the past mi returns observations by calculating the values of the
probability density function (pdf) of the estimated normal distribution at each ob-
served return, and by normalizing these values so that they add up to one. In such
a way we obtain the probability mass function (pmf) for each investor i:
Pri(R˜t+1 = Rt−j) =
pdf(Rt−j |μˆ, σˆ)∑mi
k=1 pdf(Rt−k|μˆ, σˆ)
, (7.8)
pdf(x|μ, σ) = 1
σ
√
2π
e
−(x−μ)2
2σ2 . (7.9)
(b) Overconfident EMBs also estimate normal distribution from the sample, but
they underestimate the standard deviation of the distribution, making it more peaked
around the mean: σ = oc× σˆ, where oc is the overconfidence coefficient, 0 < oc < 1.
The probabilities are calculated and normalized using the pdf of that peaked normal
distribution:
pdf(x|μ = μˆ, σ = oc · σˆ) = 1
oc · σˆ√2π e
−(x−μˆ)2
2(oc·σˆ)2 . (7.10)
In the experiments of Chapter 5 we have studied different levels of overconfidence
(oc = 0.75, oc = 0.5, oc = 0.25). In the special case of the full overconfidence
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Figure 7.1: Probability mass functions of observed past returns for different levels of
overconfidence.
(oc = 0), EMBs predict with certainty that the return will be equal to the mean of
the sample, so the expected utility of wealth is given by:
EU(W˜ it+1) =
(W ih)
1−α
(1− α) [(1− x)(1 + rf ) + xμˆ]
(1−α)
. (7.11)
Figure 7.1 shows an example of obtained probability mass functions for a specific
sample of observed returns. The case of uniform distribution represents the original,
unbiased EMBs from the LLS model. As the overconfidence increases (overconfidence
coefficient decreases) observed returns that are closer (further) to the mean are given
a higher (lower) probability, so that the distribution becomes more peaked. The
special case oc = 0 is the full overconfidence where all the probability mass is given
to the sample mean.
In Chapter 6 by using a fuzzy set connective we have created a new EMB type,
called the sentiment EMBs:
(c) Sentiment EMBs use the generalized aggregation operator to estimate future
returns, based on the rolling window of size mi. The prediction of the next period
return for each investor i is given by
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R˜t+1 =
⎛
⎝ 1
mi
mi∑
j=1
(Rt−j)s
⎞
⎠
1/s
. (7.12)
The higher the parameter s, the higher the estimate of the return (more closer
to the maximum value of the sample), and the lower the parameter s the lower
estimate of the return (more closer to the minimum value of the sample). In this
way, the parameter s can be used to capture the phenomena of investor optimism
and pessimism. The following values of the parameter s represent special cases of
the generalized mean, and have been studied in Chapter 6:
• s → −∞, the minimum of the sample;
• s = −1, the harmonic mean;
• s → 0, the geometric mean;
• s = 1, the arithmetic mean;
• s = 2, the quadratic mean;
• s →∞, the maximum of the sample.
New Agent Behavior: General EMB Investors
In this chapter we propose a new, generalized behavior of EMB investors:
(d) General EMB type, which combines investor confidence and optimism to de-
termine the discrete distribution of returns. Optimism determines the mean of dis-
tribution, while confidence determines the peakedness of the distribution.
The prediction of the next period mean return μ˜t+1 is calculated as follows.
μ˜t+1 =
⎛
⎝ 1
mi
mi∑
j=1
(Rt−j)s
⎞
⎠
1/s
. (7.13)
Based on the level of optimism (or pessimism), a general EMB investor i centers his
or her prediction of the next period return around a value which can range from the
minimum to the maximum value in the rolling window Rt−1, ..., Rt−mi1.
The predicted deviation of the next period return σ˜t+1 is calculated from the
standard deviation σˆ of the sample of past returns Rt−1, ..., Rt−mi and the level of
confidence c:
σ˜t+1 = c× σˆ. (7.14)
1Value Rt is not included in the calculation because return in period t is yet to be determined
based on this prediction of the next period return.
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Figure 7.2: Probability mass functions of observed past returns for different levels of
confidence.
In this general model, we use the coefficient of confidence c ∈ [0,∞〉 instead of
the coefficient of overconfidence oc (see Figure 7.2), as we want to study both the
case of investor overconfidence (c ∈ [0, 1〉) and investor underconfidence (c > 1).
Overconfident EMBs are too confident about their predictions; they underestimate
the standard deviation of the distribution, making it more peaked around the gen-
eralized mean of the sample. Underconfident EMBs are less certain about future
returns; they overestimate the standard deviation of returns making the distribution
broader around the generalized mean.
In each period of the simulation EMB investor i predicts next period return by
the following discrete probability distribution that incorporates the effects of investor
sentiment and confidence:
Pri(R˜t+1 = Rt−j) =
pdf(Rt−j |μ˜t+1, σ˜t+1)∑mi
k=1 pdf(Rt−k|μ˜t+1, σ˜t+1)
, (7.15)
where pdf is the probability density function of a normal distribution. Since proba-
bility mass function assigns probabilities only to the returns of the rolling window,
for pronounced levels of optimism or pessimism (i.e. high offset of the generalized
mean from the arithmetic mean) the resulting discrete probability distribution will
be skewed.
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This chapter presents a general model which captures the behavior of EMB in-
vestors studied in Levy et al. (2000) and Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of this thesis. The
study of investor overconfidence presented in Chapter 5 can be considered a special
case of the general model where overconfidence is varied but sentiment is set to the
special case of s = 1, or the arithmetic mean. The study of investor sentiment in
Chapter 6 is a special case of the general model where optimism level is varied, but
confidence is set to the special case of c = 0, or the full overconfidence, where only
one value of return is given as a prediction. In the case of extreme underconfidence,
c → ∞, the distribution becomes uniform, which represents the so-called unbiased
EMBs of the original LLS model Levy et al. (2000). These original EMBs are not
influenced by the level of sentiment because the uniform distribution does not depend
on the mean.
7.2.3 Market Mechanism
The market mechanism used in the LLS model is the clearing by a temporary market
equilibrium, according to the taxonomy of LeBaron (2006). RII and EMB investors
determine optimal proportion in the stock so as to maximize the expected utility of
their wealth in the next period. However, expected utility is the function of the future
price, which is in the current period unknown. Investors therefore need to determine
optimal proportions, and respective demands for shares, for various hypothetical
prices. The equilibrium price Pt is set to that hypothetical price for which the total
demand of all investors in the market equals the total number of outstanding shares,
according to
∑
i
N ih(Pt) =
∑
i
xih(Pt)W
i
h(Pt)
Pt
= N. (7.16)
7.3 Experimental Design
Table 7.1 shows various combinations of investor optimism (pessimism) and overcon-
fidence (underconfidence) of EMB investors, that have been studied in this chapter,
in previous chapters, and in the original model of Levy et al. (2000). In this chap-
ter we conduct experiments for combinations marked by X in Table 7.1, which we
deem important to disentangle the effects of overconfidence and optimism. In each
experiment the market consists of 95% RII investors and 5% EMB investors, with
the parametrization given in Table 7.2. We run 100 independent 1000-period-long
simulations, with different initial seeds of the random number generators. The results
in the Table 7.3 are averaged over these 100 simulations. The reported values are
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Table 7.1: Combinations of investor confidence c and sentiment s that have been
studied, and information where those experimental results are reported.
uniform underconfidence normal overconfidence full
∞ 1.75 1.5 1 0.75 0.5 0.25 0
full pessimism −∞ LLS X X Ch.6
pessimism -5 LLS X X
pessimism -1 LLS Ch.6
pessimism 0 LLS Ch.6
neutral 1 LLS, Ch.5 Ch.5 Ch.5 Ch.5 Ch.5 Ch.6, Ch.5
optimism 2 LLS Ch.6
optimism 5 LLS X X
full optimism ∞ LLS * X X Ch.6
standard deviation of the detrended market price σ(pt), standard deviation of the
detrended fundamental price σ(pft ), excess volatility, and mean trading volume per
period (as a percentage of the total number of outstanding shares N). As in Levy
et al. (2000), the excess volatility is calculated from the volatility of detrended price
σ(pt) and the volatility of detrended fundamental price σ(p
f
t ) as
σ(pt)− σ(pft )
σ(pft )
. (7.17)
The experiment marked by * in Table 7.1 is one simulation made to illustrate the
effect of underconfidence on market dynamics in the case of full optimism (Figure7. 8).
In the benchmark model of the original study (Levy et al., 2000), where only RII
investors are present in the market, there is no trade, the log prices follow random
walk, and there is no excess volatility of the market price (Levy et al., 2000). In
Figure 7.3 it can be observed that in the benchmark model the market price closely
follows the fundamental price of the risky asset.
In the experiment with a small fraction of homogeneous (with respect to memory
length) and unbiased EMB investors (of the original model), the market dynamics
(Figure 7.4) show semi-predictable booms and crashes, with substantial trading in
the market and excess volatility (Levy et al., 2000). The occurrence of these cyclic
bubbles can be related to the size of the memory length of EMB investors. This
experimental setup of Levy et al. (2000) is the basis for the experiments in our
paper.
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Table 7.2: Parametrization of the model used for experiments with investor confi-
dence and sentiment.
Symbol Value Explanation
M 950 Number of RII investors
M2 50 Number of EMB investors
m 10 Memory length of EMB investors
α 1.5 Risk aversion parameter
N 10000 Number of shares
rf 0.01 Riskless interest rate
k 0.04 Required rate of return on stock
z1 -0.07 Maximal one-period dividend decrease
z2 0.10 Maximal one-period dividend growth
g 0.015 Average dividend growth rate
Table 7.3: Results of the experiments with various combinations of investor confi-
dence and sentiment.
sentiment s = 5 s = 5 s →∞ s →∞
confidence c = 1.5 c = 0.25 c = 1.5 c = 0.25
σ(pt) 15.5752 25.7670 25.8876 25.0226
σ(pft ) 5.7159 5.7159 5.7159 5.7159
excess volatility % 172.49 350.80 352.91 337.77
mean volume p.p. % 9.60 0.41 0.26 0.12
sentiment s = −5 s = −5 s → −∞ s → −∞
confidence c = 1.5 c = 0.25 c = 1.5 c = 0.25
σ(pt) 9.4627 8.3804 7.4034 6.0249
σ(pft ) 5.7159 5.7159 5.7159 5.7159
excess volatility % 65.55 46.62 29.52 5.41
mean volume p.p. % 10.82 11.16 10.90 0.56
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Figure 7.3: Price dynamics in the benchmark model of RII.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
10
2
10
3
10
4
10
5
10
6
Time
P
ric
e
Market price P
Fundamental price Pf
Figure 7.4: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% unbiased (uniform) EMB of the
original LLS model.
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7.4 Results
Figure 7.5 shows the price development for the first experiment with optimistic in-
vestors and some underconfidence. The results of this experiment qualitatively resem-
ble the results of the original model with a small fraction of unbiased EMB investors
(which predict future returns using a uniform discrete distribution over the observed
returns). The market exhibits cyclical booms and crashes to the fundamental value.
However, as we increase investor confidence for that same level of optimism (Fig-
ure 7.6), we see a large bubble in the market that eventually crashes by falling sharply
to the fundamental value. According to excess volatility in Table 7.3, the market is
more volatile than the fundamentals, but there is less trading on average. This ex-
change of risky assets between RII and EMB investors occurs mostly when the booms
begin and when they crash. During the bubble the EMB investors invest aggressively
in the risky asset, while the RII investors divest expecting that the overvalued asset
would fall to its fundamental value. The crash occurs when there is a series of low
returns, due to low dividend realizations, so the EMB investors suddenly shift toward
a risk-less asset.
Nonetheless, as soon as a better return is realized, EMB investors invest in the
risky asset and a new boom starts. In the original model, the point where a new
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Figure 7.5: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% EMB with optimism s = 5 and
underconfidence c = 1.5.
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Figure 7.6: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% EMB with optimism s = 5 and
overconfidence c = 0.25.
bubble can start (after a crash has happened) is very much related to the size of
the rolling window m - a new bubble can start only when the rolling window moves
outside of the crash so that investors ”forget” about the very bad return experienced
during the crash. When investor optimism is taken into account this is not the case,
because investors can calculate higher mean of the returns even when the bad return
of the crash is included in the window used for estimation. This is a consequence of
the generalized mean that can give more weight to higher (or lower) returns depending
on its parameter s.
Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8 depict the market dynamics when EMB investors are
fully optimistic, i.e. they base return distribution around the maximum value of the
sample of past returns. For both experiments of underconfidence and overconfidence
the market shows an ongoing bubble. The market does not crash during experiment
because the maximum return in the rolling window of past returns is always above
the risk-less return, so the EMB investors are always highly investing in the risky
asset. It is possible, however, to break this bubble by reducing investor confidence,
i.e. moving into the direction of underconfidence so that the return distribution
broadens away from the maximum value. For example, in one simulation we found
that underconfidence of c = 1.75 was already enough to break the bubble into a few
smaller bubbles (Figure 7.9).
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Figure 7.7: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% EMB with full optimism and
underconfidence c = 1.5.
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Figure 7.8: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% EMB with full optimism and
overconfidence c = 0.25.
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Figure 7.9: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% EMB with full optimism and
underconfidence c = 1.75.
Figure 7.10 depicts the case of pessimistic investors with some underconfidence.
Compared to the optimistic cases, the market now exhibits a moderate degree of
bubbles in the market. As we increase overconfidence the estimated return distri-
bution tightens around the lower (pessimistic) values observed in the rolling window
(Figure 7.11). The result is that the market is more stabilized: the bubbles appear
somewhat reduced and the market price is closer to the fundamental price, which is
also reflected in a reduced excess volatility.
In the case of extreme pessimism where investors build distribution around the
minimum value of the past returns (Figure 7.12), by increasing the overconfidence
the market reduces to the benchmark model of only RII investors where market price
follows the fundamental price (Figure 7.13). This is an interesting finding that gives
a new perspective to our results in Chapter 5, where overconfidence was shown to
increase the bubbles and destabilize the market. Now, we can see that overconfidence
has such effect only for optimistic investors and those close to neutral sentiment.
In the case of high pessimism investor overconfidence stabilizes the market. Thus,
overconfidence enhances the effects of investor sentiment, and we can conclude that
it is more relevant what investors are overconfident about rather than the mere fact
they are overconfident.
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Figure 7.10: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% EMB with pessimism s = −5 and
underconfidence c = 1.5.
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Figure 7.11: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% EMB with pessimism s = −5 and
overconfidence c = 0.25.
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Figure 7.12: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% EMB with full pessimism and
underconfidence c = 1.5.
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Figure 7.13: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% EMB with full pessimism and
overconfidence c = 0.25.
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Figure 7.14 shows the development of the relative wealth of RII investors over
time. At the beginning, RII investors posses 95% of all the wealth in the market.
In the case of extremely pessimistic EMB investors, RII investors end up asymptot-
ically dominating the market. This is because the LLS market is a growing market,
and only RII investors are investing highly in the risky asset and exploiting that
growth. Conversely, in the case of extreme optimism, EMB investors are investing
highly in the stock, and eventually dominating the market. These two cases can be
seen for overconfident investors, because underconfidence seems to reduce the effects
of extreme sentiments, particularly in the case of full optimism (for full optimism
more underconfidence is needed to observe that difference). In non-extreme cases
of optimism, both types of investor coexist in the market, as is the case with the
uniform distribution used in the original model.
We have conducted a robustness check by varying the proportion of EMB investors
from 5% to 10% and 20%, and we have observed that only the starting point on the
y-axis has changed, but the behavior thereafter was the same. Figure 7.15 shows the
development of relative wealth of RII investors for different fractions of EMB investors
who exhibit full pessimism. It can be seen that different percentages of EMB investors
influence only the initial fraction of their wealth, whereas the asymptotic behavior
is the same, since in all cases RII investors acquire all the wealth in the market,
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Figure 7.14: The dynamics of relative wealth of RII vs. EMB, in a market with 5%
EMB investors who exhibit various combinations of confidence and sentiment.
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Figure 7.16 shows wealth dynamics for different percentages of EMB investors which
use a uniform distribution (as in the original LLS model). This is the case when
both investors coexist in the market, and again, the percentage of EMB investors
influences the initial fraction of wealth, whereas the asymptotic behavior thereafter
is similar.
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Figure 7.15: The dynamics of relative wealth of RII vs. EMB for various fractions of
(fully pessimistic) EMB.
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Figure 7.16: The dynamics of relative wealth of RII vs. EMB for various fractions of
uniform (original) EMB.
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7.5 Recency and Primacy Effects
In previous experiments, we have studied the effects of investors confidence and
sentiment. They represent two psychological phenomena which are influencing the
shape of the probability distribution that investors use to predict future returns. For
both of these phenomena, the important aspect is the order of observed past returns
based on their magnitude. Sentiment, in the case of optimism, gives more weight
to higher returns observed in the memory window, while in the case of pessimism,
sentiment gives more weight to the lower returns. Confidence determines the weight
based on the departures from the mean value which is determined by the sentiment.
In this model timing does not play a role, in the sense that it does not matter whether
a particular return observation occurs at the beginning or the end of the memory
window.
In the following experiments, we want to explicitly take into account the timing
aspects of observed returns. In psychological literature two inverse effects have been
observed in the way people give salience to received stimuli or observations depending
on their serial position (Miller and Campbell, 1959). These cognitive biases are
known as recency and primacy effects. While primacy refers to the tendency to
give more weight to the first received piece of information (the oldest one), recency
describes the tendency to give more weight to the last received piece of information
(the most recent one). Recency effects have been studied in the financial literature in
relation with the overreaction hypothesis (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985). ”De Bondt
and Thaler attribute overreaction to the psychological phenomenon of recency. When
processing information, people tend to overweigh recent information compared with
their prior belief. Thus, traders who are not sure of the intrinsic value of a stock will
be too optimistic about its value when the firm is winning and too pessimistic when it
is losing” (Offerman and Sonnemans, 2009). The empirical finding that a portfolio
composed of past losers eventually beats a portfolio composed of past winners is
considered an evidence for such overreaction.
Recency and primacy in our model refer exclusively to the importance given
to observation based on their time stamp. It is not relevant whether a particular
observation was winning or losing, because those effects have already been captured
with our experiments on investors optimism and pessimism. In such a way, we are
disentangling between the effects of timing and the effects of the magnitude of return
observations.
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7.5.1 EMB Investors with Recency Effects
Here we conduct additional experiments in the LLS model in order to study recency
effects among the EMB investors. The recency effect refers to the tendency of EMB
investors to give more weight to more recent return observations compared to those
farther in the past. This is modeled by assigning exponentially decaying probability
mass towards the older return values in the rolling window of size mi. Figure 7.20
shows probability mass functions for four different levels of recency effect represented
by parameter μ ∈ [0, 1]. The case of μ = 1 represents full recency effect where only
the most recent observation is taken into account (this is equivalent to the memory
length of size m = 1). The case of μ → 0 represents no presence of recency effect,
where each observation is given the same probability mass (this is the case of a
uniform distribution, which is studied in the original model of Levy et al. (2000)).
The calculation of the probability mass function is carried out as follows. The
most recent return observation is initially given weight of μ and the weights of older
observations are iteratively reduced by factor (1− μ). These initial weights are then
normalized to give the probability mass function:
w(Rt−1) = μ (7.18)
w(Rt−j) = w(Rt−j+1)(1− μ), j = 2..mi (7.19)
Pri(R˜t+1 = Rt−j) =
w(Rt−j)∑mi
k=1 w(Rt−k)
. (7.20)
We experiment with two different models of the recency effect. In the first vari-
ation, EMB investors aggregate returns from their memory window by calculating a
weighted average of returns, and they use only this value as their prediction. The
portfolio choice is then based on the comparison between that aggregated value and
the risk-free return (similarly to the study of investor optimism in Chapter 6). In
the second variation, the investors do not aggregate returns, but they plug the entire
probability mass function (pmf) into the formula for the expected utility of next pe-
riod wealth (Equation 7.6. The difference between these two implementations stems
from the fact that the utility function is nonlinear (namely power function).
Figure 7.18 and Figure 7.19 show the market dynamics for different levels of
recency effects under aggregation and no aggregation. In the case of full recency
effect (μ = 1), we see much smaller departures from the fundamental value than in
the original model of uniform EMBs (see Chapter 5). However, the market price
is still deviating from the fundamental value. Since only the most recent return is
used, the nonlinearities in expected utility do not play a role, and two variations
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Figure 7.17: Probability mass function for different levels of the recency effect.
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Figure 7.18: Market dynamics when EMB investors show recency effects (implemen-
tation with aggregation).
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Figure 7.19: Market dynamics when EMB investors show recency effects (implemen-
tation with no aggregation).
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in implementation (aggregation and no aggregation) produce the same result. For
other values of recency (μ = 0.7 and μ = 0.4) we can see that the departures from
the fundamentals are somewhat increasing, but there is no substantial difference
between the two implementations. In the case of low recency effect (μ = 0.1), we can
see much more prominent departures from the fundamental value, and we can also
see a distinction between the two implementations. For no recency effects (μ → 0),
the case of aggregation becomes the case of neutral sentiment (arithmetic mean)
and full overconfidence (see Chapter 6), and the case of no aggregation becomes the
original market model of uniform EMB investors (see Chapter 5).
7.5.2 EMB Investors with Primacy Effects
Now we focus on experiments with EMB investors exhibiting primacy effects, which
captures the tendency of investors to give more importance to the return observations
that they encountered first, i.e. the oldest observations in their memory window.
This is modeled by assigning exponentially decaying probability mass from the oldest
return observation towards the most recent return observation in the rolling window
of size mi. Probability mass functions for four different levels of primacy effect
represented by parameter η ∈ [0, 1] are shown in Figure 7.20. In the case of full
primacy effect (η = 1) only the oldest observation is taken into account, whereas in
the case of no primacy effect (η → 0) each observation is given the same probability
mass. The latter is the case of uniform distribution, which is studied in the model of
Levy et al. (2000)). Hence, both in the case of recency and primacy effects, as those
effects diminish, the resulting behavior becomes the original behavior of the EMB
investor.
The probability mass function which captures the primacy effect is calculated as
follows. First, the oldest return observation is given weight of η, and then the weights
of more recent observations are iteratively reduced by factor (1− η). Finally, all the
weights are normalized:
w(Rt−mi) = η (7.21)
w(Rt−j) = w(Rt−j−1)(1− η), j = 1..(mi − 1) (7.22)
Pri(R˜t+1 = Rt−j) =
w(Rt−j)∑mi
k=1 w(Rt−k)
. (7.23)
Analogously to the experiments with recency effect, we show results for two vari-
ations in implementation, with and without aggregation. In the first variation (with
aggregation), EMB investors calculate a weighted average of returns and use it for
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Figure 7.20: Probability mass function for different levels of the primacy effect.
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Figure 7.21: Market dynamics when EMB investors show primacy effects (implemen-
tation with aggregation).
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Figure 7.22: Market dynamics when EMB investors show primacy effects (implemen-
tation with no aggregation).
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their prediction, while in the second variation (without aggregation) the investors
use the entire probability mass function (pmf) for their prediction. Figure 7.21 and
Figure 7.22 show the market dynamics for different levels of primacy effects under
aggregation and no aggregation. In the case of full primacy effect (η = 1), we can
see much smaller departures from the fundamental value than in the original model
of uniform EMBs (see Chapter 5). As the primacy effect becomes lower, the market
dynamics show more excess volatility and becomes similar to the behavior of the
original model with uniform EMB investors (the variation with no aggregation) and
to the case of full overconfidence and arithmetic (neutral) sentiment (the variation
with aggregation).
As can be seen from the figures with market dynamics, both primacy and recency
effects are reducing the excess volatility, when compared to the original behavior of
uniform EMB investors. In cases of full primacy and full recency effects, the in-
vestment choice is in each period based on the comparison between only one return
observation and the risk-less return. When a high return on the stock is observed, it
entices investors into buying the stock. However, as opposed to the original model
where such a high return is influencing investors as long as it is in their memory
window (creating a bubble in such a way), in this case the high return is not rel-
evant in the next time step because only the new return observation is taken into
account. Although, the effects of primacy and recency seem to be similar, there are
still some differences in their impact on market dynamics. By comparing the market
dynamics of full recency effect and full primacy effects, we can see that extrapolating
the most recent return observation (recency effect) causes somewhat higher excess
volatility than extrapolating the return observation with a larger time lag (primacy
effect). Hence, timing differences in strategies do matter, but their effects are not as
prominent as the effects of magnitude captured by the investor sentiment (optimism
or pessimism).
Figure 7.23 shows the time-series of actual rate of return for a market with EMB
investors who exhibit a medium degree of primacy effect (η = 0.6)2. When compared
to the original experiment with EMB investors who use uniform distribution to pre-
dict future returns (Figure 7.24), this time-series looks more realistic, since large
movements are not followed by calm periods as in the original model (see also Fig-
ure 7.4). In the original model, more realistic price dynamics was achieved only after
adding heterogeneity in memory lengths (see the appendix of Chapter 5), while in our
models investors are homogeneous both with respect to their memory lengths and the
type and amount of a behavioral bias they exhibit. This illustrates that variations in
behavior can have impact and add to the realism of the market dynamics. However,
2These returns can be calculated by subtracting 1 from Rt or similarly as log(Rt).
133
Chapter 7. A General Model of Investor Confidence and Sentiment
this still was not enough to obtain volatility clustering (which we checked quali-
tatively by plotting autocorrelation functions of raw returns and absolute/squared
returns, and quantitatively by means of Ljung-Box-Pierce Q-test and Engle’s ARCH
test). It appears that heterogeneity in memory lengths used in Section 6.5 was one of
the key components in obtaining volatility clustering. Nonetheless, the heterogene-
ity itself is not sufficient, since the original LLS model with heterogeneous memory
lengths does not reproduce that stylized fact.
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Figure 7.23: Returns on the risky asset for a market with 5% EMB investors exhibit-
ing primacy effects (η = 0.6).
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Figure 7.24: Returns on the risky asset for a market with 5% uniform EMB investors
of the original model.
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7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have studied investor sentiment and investor overconfidence in the
modified LLS model of the stock market by Levy et al. (2000). The overconfidence
in our model refers to the peakedness of the return distribution around the mean
of return observations, while sentiment in the model determines how that mean is
chosen (ranging from the minimum observation to the maximum observation in the
sample of past returns).
We show how changes in the formation of expectations by EMB investors can
have a marked impact on the price dynamics. However, this study is not just a
robustness test of the original LLS model, by which we relax the assumption of uni-
form distribution used for EMB investors. Here we also give a meaningful behavioral
interpretation for these moments of probability distribution, and show how conve-
niently an existing agent-based model can be extended to study various behavioral
phenomena.
The levels of investor optimism and confidence are related to the occurrences of
market booms and crashes, as well as to measures of excess volatility and trading
volume. We find that optimism increases the intensity of market bubbles, while
pessimism stabilizes the market in the sense of reducing the departures from the fun-
damental value. Overconfidence is found to amplify the effects of investor sentiment,
both in the case of optimism and pessimism. Underconfidence reduces the effects
of the sentiment, since in the case of extreme underconfidence return distribution
becomes uniform, i.e. independent of the mean. Overconfidence also decreases the
mean trading volume per each period, as more overconfident investors, depending
on their optimism or pessimism, tend to stick more with one investment alternative,
which is risky asset in case of optimism and risk-less asset in case of pessimism.
The interaction between confidence and sentiment shows us the importance of
studying these two behavioral biases at the same time, because the study of over-
confidence in Chapter 5 gave us only a partial view on overconfidence for a given
(neutral) level of investor sentiment (the arithmetic mean of the sample was taken
as the center of the distribution). When overconfidence is modeled in the sense of
miscalibration, the results suggest it is more relevant what investors are overconfident
about (the mean of the distribution) than the mere fact they are overconfident (the
distribution is peaked). Being overconfident about a correct view is beneficial, but
when investors have wrong views on the market (e.g. they are pessimistic in a rising
market) it is better to be underconfident in order to spread probability mass away
from this wrong opinion).
In this chapter we have also introduced the recency and primacy effect and mod-
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eled it by shifting probability mass from older observations towards the more recent
ones, or the other way round. We have shown how limit cases of recency effect be-
come equivalent to some special cases of confidence and sentiment, as well as to the
original experiment of the LLS model Levy et al. (2000). We can conclude that (un-
der two different variations in implementation) the recency and the primacy effects
in the LLS model reduce the departures of the market price from the fundamental
price, compared to the case of equal probability weighting used in the original model
of Levy et al. (2000). Both primacy and recency effects are in that sense interesting
as an example of a psychological bias that can stabilize the market dynamics. The re-
sults also suggest that it is not the overweighing of return observations from the past
with a given time lag (e.g. the most recent one) that causes particularly high levels
of excess volatility, but the overweighing of the highest observation in the sample,
which is consistent with the optimism bias (as demonstrated earlier in this chapter
and in Chapter 6). Hence, investors who remember extreme events are expected to
have the most impact on the market dynamics.
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Chapter 8
Self-Attribution Bias and Loss
Aversion∗
8.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 we have modeled investor overconfidence as miscalibra-
tion and studied its impact on market dynamics. However, it seems that the market
can also influence the confidence of investors: the overconfidence of successful in-
vestors can be reinforced through self-attribution bias, i.e. a belief that their trading
success should be attributed mostly to their own abilities (Odean, 1999). In Lovric
et al. (2009b) we have studied emerging overconfidence due to self-attribution bias.
That study demonstrates the advantages of agent-based approach, because we can
easily model the dynamics of investor attitudes based on some feedback from the
market. In this chapter we propose a somewhat different update mechanism using a
transformation function.
In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 we have also modeled investor sentiment using a
generalized average operator. It allowed us to conveniently model optimism and
pessimism using just one parameter. In this chapter we propose an updating mecha-
nism for investor sentiment, so that it depends on the market performance. Investors
who increase their wealth subsequently increase their optimism, while those who lose
their wealth decrease their optimism (i.e. increase their pessimism). However, loss
∗A preliminary version of this chapter has been published in M. Lovric, U. Kaymak, and J.
Spronk. Modeling loss aversion and biased self-attribution using a fuzzy aggregation operator.
In Proceedings of the World Congress on Computational Intelligence (WCCI), pages 2297-2304,
Barcelona, Spain, July 2010b.
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aversion as a robust finding of human psychology and decision making, suggests
that people can react differently towards loses and gains (”Losses loom larger than
gains.” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)). In our model we are able to incorporate this
asymmetry and study its impact on the dynamics of investor sentiment. Hence, loss
aversion in our model operates through a different mechanism than in the Prospect
Theory, where it is incorporated in the shape of the value function.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 8.2 explains the basics of the
LLS model in which we study self-attribution bias and loss aversion. This is the
general sentiment-confidence model presented in Chapter 7, so a familiarized reader
can jump to the parts of Section 8.2.2 that describe new agent behavior for updating
investor sentiment and investor confidence. Section 8.3 describes the experimental
design. Section 8.4 presents the results of the simulations and Section 8.5 concludes
the chapter and discusses possible extensions for the future research.
8.2 Model Description
The proposed model of investor sentiment and overconfidence is based on the LLS
microscopic simulation model with a small homogeneous subpopulation of efficient
market believers (EMBs) as described in Levy et al. (2000). LLS model is a well-
known and early econophysics model, rooted in a utility maximization framework.
Variants of the model have been published in a number of articles and a book, and the
model has also been critically evaluated in Zschischang and Lux (2001). This model
is an extension of the general sentiment-confidence model presented in Chapter 7.
8.2.1 Asset Classes
As in the original LLS model, there are two investments alternatives: a risky stock
(or market index) and a risk-free asset (bond). This is in line with many of the
agent-based artificial financial markets, which typically do not deal with portfolio
selection in multi-asset environments. The risky asset pays at the beginning of each
period a dividend which follows a multiplicative random walk according to
D˜t+1 = Dt(1 + z˜), (8.1)
where z˜ is a random variable distributed uniformly in the interval [z1, z2]. The bond
pays interest with a rate of rf .
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8.2.2 Agent Behavior
LLS model contains two types of investors: (1) Rational Informed Investors (RII)
and (2) Efficient Market Believers (EMB). Both of these investor groups are expected
utility maximizers, and the model uses power (myopic) utility function
U(W ) =
W 1−α
1− α . (8.2)
RII investors
RII investors are informed about the dividend process, and therefore they can esti-
mate fundamental value as the discounted stream of future dividend, according to
the Gordon model
P˜ ft+1 =
Dt(1 + z˜)(1 + g)
k − g , (8.3)
where k is the discount factor of the expected rate of return demanded by the market
for the stock, and g is the expected growth rate of the dividend. RII investors assume
that the price will converge to the fundamental value in the next period. In period t
RII investor i chooses the proportion of wealth to invest in stocks and bonds so that
he or she maximizes the expected utility of wealth in the next period, given by the
following equation from Levy et al. (2000):
EU(W˜ it+1) =
(W ih)
1−α
(1− α)(2− α)
1
(z2 − z1)
(
k − g
k + 1
)
Ph
xDt
×
{[
(1− x)(1 + rf ) + x
Ph
(
k + 1
k − g
)
Dt(1 + z2)
](2−α)
(8.4)
−
[
(1− x)(1 + rf ) + x
Ph
(
k + 1
k − g
)
Dt(1 + z1)
](2−α)}
,
where Ph represents a hypothetical price of the risky asset in period t. W ih represents
hypothetical wealth of investor i in period t, which consists of the previous period
wealth, interest and dividend accumulated from the last period, and capital gains or
losses incurred on the difference between Ph and Pt−1.
Based on the optimal proportion, they determine the number of stocks demanded
by multiplying this optimal proportion with their wealth. Since all RII investors are
assumed to have the same degree or risk aversion (parameter α), they will all have
the same optimal proportion x. The actual number of demanded shares might differ
only if investors differ in their wealth. However, as in the experiments of Levy et al.
(2000), we assume that they all start with the same initial wealth.
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EMB investors
EMB investors believe that the price accurately reflects the fundamental value. How-
ever, since they do not know the dividend process, they use ex post distribution of
stock returns to estimate the ex ante distribution. EMB investor i uses a rolling
window of size mi. As in the original model by Levy et al. (2000), the investor is said
to be unbiased if, in absence of additional information, he or she assigns the same
probability to each of the past mi return observations (Levy et al., 2000). Hence,
the original, unbiased EMBs assume that returns come from a discrete uniform dis-
tribution
Pri(R˜t+1 = Rt−j) =
1
mi
, for j = 1, ...,mi. (8.5)
The expected utility of EMB investor i is given by Levy et al. (2000)
EU(W˜ it+1) =
(W ih)
1−α
(1− α)
mi∑
j=1
Pri(R˜t+1 = Rt−j) (8.6)
× [(1− x)(1 + rf ) + xRt−j ](1−α) .
In accordance with the LLS model, for all EMB investors an investor specific
noise is added to the optimal investment proportion x∗ (that maximizes the expected
utility) in order to account for various departures from rational optimal behavior (ε˜i
is truncated so that 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, imposing the constraint of no borrowing and no
short-selling), i.e.
xi = x∗i + ε˜i. (8.7)
In Chapter 7 we have proposed general EMB type, which combines investor con-
fidence and optimism to determine the discrete distribution of expected returns.
Sentiment of investors determines the mean of that distribution, while confidence
determines the peakedness of the distribution.
The prediction of the next period mean return μ˜t+1 is calculated as follows.
μ˜t+1 =
⎛
⎝ 1
mi
mi∑
j=1
(Rt−j)s
⎞
⎠
1/s
. (8.8)
Based on the level of optimism (or pessimism), a general EMB investor i centers his
or her prediction of the next period return around a value which can range from
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the minimum to the maximum value in the rolling window Rt−1, ..., Rt−mi1. This
is achieved by using the generalized aggregation operator, which for higher values of
the parameter s gives higher estimate of the return (closer to the maximum value
of the sample), and for lower values of the parameter s gives lower estimate of the
return (closer to the minimum value of the sample). In such a way, the parameter
s ∈ 〈−∞,∞〉 captures the phenomena of investor optimism s > 1 and investors
pessimism s < 1, and we call it a sentiment index. The following values of the
parameter s represent well-known special cases of the generalized mean, which have
been studied in Chapter 6:
• s → −∞, the minimum of the sample;
• s = −1, the harmonic mean;
• s → 0, the geometric mean;
• s = 1, the arithmetic mean;
• s = 2, the quadratic mean;
• s →∞, the maximum of the sample.
The predicted standard deviation of the next period return σ˜t+1 is calculated
from the standard deviation σˆ of the sample of past returns Rt−1, ..., Rt−mi and the
level of confidence c:
σ˜t+1 = c× σˆ. (8.9)
In this general model, we use the confidence coefficient c ∈ [0,∞〉 which captures
both the case of investor overconfidence (c ∈ [0, 1〉) and investor underconfidence
(c > 1). Overconfident EMBs are too confident about their predictions. They under-
estimate the standard deviation of the distribution, making it more peaked around
the generalized mean of the sample. Underconfident EMBs are less certain about
future returns. They overestimate the standard deviation of returns making the
distribution broader around the generalized mean.
Figure 8.1 shows an example of obtained probability mass functions for a spe-
cific sample of observed returns. The case of a uniform distribution represents the
original, unbiased EMBs from the LLS model. For confidence coefficient c = 1 EMB
investors use the standard deviation of past returns from the rolling window. As the
overconfidence increases (confidence coefficient decreases below 1) observed returns
that are closer (further) to the mean are given a higher (lower) probability, so the
1Value Rt is not included in the calculation because return in period t is yet to be determined
based on this prediction of the next period return.
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distribution becomes more peaked. The special case of c = 0 is the full overconfi-
dence where all the probability mass is given to the sample mean, so only one value
represents the expected returns. Values c > 1 represent underconfidence, as investor
expectations have more spread than what the past observations would suggest. In
the limit case of extreme underconfidence, the distribution becomes uniform, as in
the case of the original LLS model.
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Figure 8.1: Probability mass functions of observed past returns for different levels of
confidence.
In each period of the simulation, EMB investor i predicts the next period return by
the following discrete probability distribution that incorporates the effects of investor
sentiment and confidence:
Pri(R˜t+1 = Rt−j) =
pdf(Rt−j |μ˜t+1, σ˜t+1)∑mi
k=1 pdf(Rt−k|μ˜t+1, σ˜t+1)
, (8.10)
where pdf is the probability density function of a normal distribution. Since proba-
bility mass function assigns probabilities only to the returns of the rolling window,
for pronounced levels of optimism or pessimism (i.e. high offset of the generalized
mean from the arithmetic mean) the resulting discrete probability distribution will
be skewed.
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New Agent Behavior (1): Updating Investor Sentiment
In this chapter we model a change in investor sentiment based on the market per-
formance of investors. The investors look at their return on investment in the last
period (the relative change in their own wealth), and based on that change they up-
date their index of optimism. If the relative return is higher than one (their wealth
has increased), they increase their optimism (increase parameter s), and if the relative
return is lower than one (their wealth has decreased), they decrease their optimism
(decrease parameter s). In order to make this update, the parameter s ∈< −∞,∞ >
is first mapped into S ∈< 0, 1 >, for which purpose we use the logistic function L
(see also Figure 8.2):
L(sit) =
1
1 + e−(sit−1)
= Sit (8.11)
The index of optimism is mapped using the logistic function in order to simplify the
update equations (Equation 8.12 and Equation 8.13). Optimism can now easily be
increased (decreased) by multiplying with a value that is higher (lower) than one. In
addition, the logistic function is translated horizontally so that the neutral sentiment,
i.e. the border between optimism and pessimism (s = 1) corresponds to the middle
point of the transformed interval (S = 0.5). This will be convenient when analyzing
the graphs of the dynamics of investor sentiment, because the upper half of the
graph represents investor optimism and lower half of the graph represents investor
pessimism (see Figure 8.5, Figure 8.8 and Figure 8.6).
After the transformation, the index S is modified based on the recent performance.
If the wealth has increased, the optimism of EMB investors is increased by a factor l:
If
(
W it
W it−1
> 1
)
then Sit+1 = S
i
t · l, (8.12)
and if the wealth has decreased, the optimism is decreased by a factor l:
If
(
W it
W it−1
< 1
)
then Sit+1 = S
i
t · l, (8.13)
where l > 1 and 0 < l < 1. Finally, the index S is mapped back into the original
interval < −∞,∞ >, using an inverse logistic function
sit+1 = L
−1(Sit+1) = ln
(
Sit+1
1− Sit+1
)
+ 1. (8.14)
We study two types of updates, a symmetric update where investors are equally
sensitive to losses and gains:
1− l = l − 1, e.g. l = 1.01 and l = 0.99, (8.15)
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and an asymmetric update in which investors are more sensitive to losses than gains:
1− l = λ(l − 1), λ > 1, e.g. λ = 2, l = 1.01 and l = 0.98. (8.16)
This can be seen as a way of modeling loss aversion, since investors are more
influenced by negative returns than positive returns. By increasing pessimism, loss
aversion decreases the mean of expected returns. Compared to the Prospect Theory,
our mechanism may be seen as more similar to the effects of nonlinear probability
weighting (which influences the weights given to negative outcomes) rather than value
function (which influences the utility of negative outcomes). In Prospect Theory the
disutility of a loss is about twice the utility of the same gain.
The inspiration for this type of model we found in literature that studied the
emotional aspects of decision under risk, particularly the effects of experienced (as
opposed to expected) losses and gains. In a study by Shiv et al. (2005), patients with
brain lesions in emotion-related parts of brain participated in an experiment with
investment decisions. At the beginning of the experiment the subjects were endowed
with 20 dollars and in each of 20 rounds they could choose whether to invest 1 dollar
in a risky prospect that has a 50%-50% chance of winning 2.5 dollars or winning
nothing. The results of the study showed that patients with brain lesions made more
investments than the normal participants and control patients, and thus earned more
on average. Normal and control patients seem to have been more affected by the
outcomes of previous decision - upon winning or losing they adopted a conservative
strategy and invested less in subsequent rounds. Compared with the target patients,
who invested in 85.2% of rounds following losses, normal participants invested in only
40.5% of rounds following losses. Similarly, target patients invested in 84% of rounds
following gains, while normal participants invested in only 61.7% of rounds following
gains. Hence, normal participants showed considerably more risk aversion following
losses than following gains.
New Agent Behavior (2): Updating Investor Confidence
Here we also implement un updating mechanism for investor confidence based on
the success of return predictions. Similarly to Lovric et al. (2009b) and Daniel et al.
(1998), we add shifts in investors’ confidence as a function of the investment outcomes.
Let μˆt and σˆt be the generalized mean (fuzzy aggregation operator) and standard
deviation of the sample Rt−1, ..., Rt−mi , respectively, and cit the confidence of investor
i in period t. For good predictions (the outcome is within two standard deviations
around the generalized mean) the overconfidence increases (c decreases), while for bad
predictions the underconfidence increases (c increases). First we map the confidence
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Figure 8.2: Logistic function used for mapping the index of optimism. The inflection
point is at s = 1 which means that the arithmetic mean is considered as a neutral
sentiment on the border between optimism and pessimism.
coefficient from c ∈ [0,∞ > into a more convenient interval C ∈< 0, 1 >, for which
purpose we use the following transformation function T (see also Figure 8.3):
T (cit) = 1− 2−c
i
t
1/4
= Cit (8.17)
Transformation function is chosen so that the normal level of confidence (c = 1) is
mapped into the middle point of the transformed interval (C = 0.5). This means
that in the graphs which depict the dynamics of investor confidence (see Figure 8.4,
Figure 8.8 and Figure 8.6), the upper half of the graph represents investor overcon-
fidence, while the lower half of the graph represents investor underconfidence.
The updating rule is given by:
If |μˆt −Rt| < 2(cit · σˆt) then Cit+1 = a¯ · Cit ,
Otherwise, Cit+1 = a · Cit , (8.18)
where a > 1 and 0 < a < 1. After the update, C is mapped back into the original
interval [0,∞ >:
cit+1 = T
−1(Cit+1) =
(
ln(1− Cit+1)
ln 0.5
)4
. (8.19)
For a biased self-attribution there is an asymmetry in update: 1 − a < a − 1
(e.g. a = 0.75 and a = 1.05), which means that overconfidence increases for good
predictions relatively more than it decreases for bad predictions. This is because
people tend to attribute success to themselves more so than they do with unsuccessful
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Figure 8.3: Transformation function used to map the confidence coefficient. The
point (1,0.5) which represents normal EMB investors (c = 0) is on the border between
overconfident and underconfident investors.
outcomes, which they rather attribute to some external effects or bad luck. We define
an unbiased self-attribution as the case of a symmetric update: 1 − a = a − 1 (e.g.
a¯ = 0.75 and a = 1.25).
8.2.3 Market Mechanism
LeBaron (2006) describes four types of market mechanisms used in agent-based arti-
ficial financial markets. In this chapter, as in the original LLS model, we use clearing
by temporary market equilibrium. RII and EMB investors determine optimal propor-
tion in the stock so as to maximize the expected utility of their wealth in the next
period. However, expected utility is the function of the future price, which is in the
current period unknown. Investors therefore need to determine optimal proportions,
and respective demands for shares, for various hypothetical prices. The equilibrium
price Pt is set to that hypothetical price for which the total demand of all investors
in the market equals the total number of outstanding shares, according to
∑
i
N ih(Pt) =
∑
i
xih(Pt)W
i
h(Pt)
Pt
= N. (8.20)
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Table 8.1: Parametrization of the model used for experiments with self-attribution
and loss aversion.
Symbol Value Explanation
M 950 Number of RII investors
M2 50 Number of EMB investors
m 10 Memory length of EMB investors
α 1.5 Risk aversion parameter
N 10000 Number of shares
rf 0.01 Riskless interest rate
k 0.04 Required rate of return on stock
z1 -0.07 Maximal one-period dividend decrease
z2 0.10 Maximal one-period dividend growth
g 0.015 Average dividend growth rate
8.3 Experimental Design
In the benchmark model of the original study Levy et al. (2000), where only RII
investors are present in the market, there is no trade, the log prices follow random
walk, and there is no excess volatility of the market price. The dynamics of the price
in the benchmark model is showed in Chapter 5, where we replicate the original study.
In the experiment with a small fraction of homogeneous (with respect to memory
length) and unbiased EMB investors (of the original model), which is also replicated
in Chapter 5, the market dynamics show semi-predictable booms and crashes, with
substantial trading in the market and excess volatility. The occurrence of these
cyclic bubbles can be related to the size of the memory length of EMB investors.
This experimental setup of Levy et al. (2000) is the basis for the experiments in this
chapter too.
In Chapter 7 we have analyzed market dynamics for various combinations of
investor confidence and sentiment. The general finding is that the more optimistic
EMB investors are, the higher the market bubbles (the departures of the market
price above the fundamental price) are. Very pessimistic EMB investors push the
market price toward the fundamental price (since they invest mostly in the risk-
less asset). Overconfidence of investors augments the impact of investor sentiment,
while investor underconfidence pushes the market dynamics towards the original LLS
model of unbiased (uniform) EMB investors.
In this chapter we study the dynamics of investor psychology (confidence and
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sentiment) based on the success of market predictions and market performance. The
aim of the first two experiments is to study the effects of sentiment update and con-
fidence update separately. Our first experiment focuses on the difference between
biased (self-attribution) and unbiased update in confidence for a fixed investor sen-
timent (neutral, i.e. arithmetic mean s = 1). Our second experiment studies the
difference between biased and unbiased update in sentiment for a given level of con-
fidence (normal confidence c = 1).
The next two experiments focus on the combined effects of sentiment update
and confidence update. The third experiment consist of unbiased updates, both
with the confidence (unbiased self-attribution) and with the optimism (unbiased sen-
timent update). The fourth experiment consists of biased updates, both with the
confidence (biased self-attribution) and with the optimism (loss aversion). In each
experiment the market consists of 95% RII investors and 5% EMB investors, with
the parametrization given in Table 8.1. The observed variables are: transformed
confidence coefficient T (c), transformed sentiment index L(s), market price and fun-
damental price, and relative wealth of RII investors compared to EMB investors.
8.4 Results
Figure 8.4 shows the dynamics of confidence for biased and unbiased self-attribution,
under a constant neutral sentiment modeled by the arithmetic mean. We can observe
that with unbiased update investors are mostly overconfident, since the transformed
value of confidence coefficient varies around value T (c) = 0.4, which corresponds to
the value of c = 0.3. However, there is a substantial variation in confidence level,
which sometimes even crosses into underconfidence. This depends on the success of
investors predictions and how often they are surprised by return observations. When
update is biased due to self-attribution bias, the investors become more overconfident,
since variation around value T (c) = 0.3, corresponds approximately to variations
around the value of c = 0.1. Hence, the simulations confirm the expectation that
self-attribution bias leads to stronger overconfidence.
With a symmetric update of sentiment, investor sentiment is very optimistic
throughout the whole simulation (Figure 8.5). When the update is asymmetric due
to loss aversion, investor sentiment drops down, but it is also in the optimistic do-
main. The reason for the optimistic sentiment in both unbiased and biased update
is that from period to period EMB investors’ wealth is more times increasing than
decreasing. This is especially the case at the beginning of the simulation where mar-
ket price simply rises with the fundamental price before it reaches the point where
more interesting dynamics starts unfolding. The simulation also demonstrates the
148
8.4. Results
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Time
T
(c
)
Unbiased self−attribution
Biased self−attribution
overconfidence
underconfidence
Figure 8.4: The dynamics of confidence for unbiased and biased self-attribution, with
a fixed neutral sentiment (arithmetic mean).
expected effect of loss aversion, since loss aversion decreases optimism level when
compared to the case of unbiased sentiment update.
Figure 8.6 shows the dynamics of investor sentiment and confidence when both
updates are unbiased. We can see that investors are very optimistic since the trans-
formed value of sentiment, L(s), varies closely to the value of one which represents
full optimism. Again, the explanation for this is that there are more positive than
negative changes in investors’ wealth from period to period. However, their confi-
dence varies greatly and is more in the area of overconfidence. An interesting finding
is that even though investors are highly optimistic, which is expected to lead to bub-
bles in the market price, the high volatility in confidence seems to prevent that from
happening (Figure 8.7). A possible explanation for this observation is that when a
good return happens such that it falls outside of the investor’s confidence interval,
the investor is surprised and becomes consequently less confident. By increasing the
standard deviation of the return distribution used for next period prediction, the
probability mass is pulled away from the high optimistic mean. This may be enough
to break down the self-reinforcing mechanism which would normally create bubbles.
Figure 8.8 shows the dynamics of investor sentiment and confidence when both
updates are biased. Throughout the simulation, investors exhibit overconfidence, but
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Figure 8.5: The dynamics of sentiment for unbiased sentiment update and loss aver-
sion, under a constant normal confidence level.
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Figure 8.6: The dynamics of sentiment and confidence for unbiased sentiment update
and unbiased self-attribution.
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Figure 8.7: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% EMB with unbiased sentiment
update and unbiased self-attribution.
their sentiment at a certain point shifts from optimism to pessimism. Market price
in Figure 8.9 shows similar behavior as in the biased case, with some bubbles being
more prominent. It is important to note that the same patterns have been observed
in experiments with different seed values of the pseudo-random number generator.
Finally, Figure 8.10 shows the dynamics of relative wealth of RII investors with
respect to EMB investors when they are biased in updates of both sentiment and
confidence, and when they are unbiased in both of these updates. The figure shows
the dynamics that is averaged across 100 simulations in order to smooth out the
volatilities of individual simulations and allow easier observation of trends. It can
be seen that in both cases RII investors and EMB investors split the total wealth
approximately in half. Interestingly, the difference between biased and unbiased
EMBs is not that prominent, with biased investors even having a slight advantage
at the beginning. This is a surprising result, as we were expecting much better
performance from unbiased investors due to their high levels of optimism. However,
market dynamics also shows a lack of bubbles which EMB investors could ride in
order to gain advantage. It seems that biased investors are better able to exploit the
combination of optimism and higher overconfidence at the beginning of the simulation
to gain some advantage, although this advantage slowly dissipates throughout the
simulation as they start decreasing their optimism levels.
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Figure 8.8: The dynamics of sentiment and confidence for loss aversion and biased
self-attribution.
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Figure 8.9: Price dynamics with 95% RII and 5% EMB with loss aversion and biased
self-attribution.
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Figure 8.10: Relative wealth dynamics of RII against 5% EMBs who use either both
biased or both unbiased updates for confidence and sentiment.
8.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have studied the dynamics of investor sentiment and investor over-
confidence in the modified LLS model of the stock market presented in Chapter 7.
The overconfidence in the general sentiment-confidence model Chapter 7, refers to
the peakedness of the return distribution around the mean of return observations,
while optimism in this model determines how that mean is chosen (ranging from the
minimum observation to the maximum observation in the sample of past returns),
which is achieved by using a fuzzy aggregation operator. Besides the unbiased up-
dates in sentiment and confidence, we have also studied biased updates in investor
sentiment (due to loss aversion) and investor confidence (due to self-attribution bias).
The simulations show that overconfidence can emerge through biased self-attribution
and that loss aversion can decrease investor optimism. The simulations with com-
bined updates exhibit interesting interactions between modeled psychological effects,
which stem from the fact that the confidence update and the sentiment update are
interrelated. Overconfidence is updated based on the success of predictions, which is
determined by checking if the return realization falls outside or within a given inter-
val around the mean. However, that same mean is also shifted through the sentiment
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update, which is based on the investor performance, i.e. the changes in wealth.
This study demonstrates the capabilities of computational agent-based approach
for studying not only various behavioral phenomena, but also the dynamics of chang-
ing investor psychology based on some market feedback. In order to facilitate this,
it is very useful if behavioral phenomena can be modeled by only one parameter.
There are, however, additional implementation choices which concern the updating
mechanism. For example, updates can be achieved with multiplicative increments
(as in our experiments), or with additive increments (when small values are added
or subtracted). It is possible that by choosing different nonlinear transformation
functions and different types of updates the sentiment (and confidence) levels would
in our experiments end up fluctuating around different values. However, this is not
of our primary concern, because we are not interested in absolute values of these pa-
rameters as much as in their comparison i.e. the relative dynamics of unbiased and
biased updates. Since the line representing sentiment dynamics for biased update
falls bellow the line representing unbiased update, we can conclude that loss aversion
decreases investor optimism. Similarly, we can see that with a biased self-attribution
investors become more confident than with an unbiased self-attribution.
If in the future we would change the rules of updating mechanisms, it would be
as follows. For optimism, we would like to incorporate a better measure of investor
performance into the updating rule. In the current implementation, to give an illus-
tration, an investor who won one euro twice and then lost one hundred euros would
become more optimistic since there were two gains and only one loss. It would be
more realistic to update sentiment based on how much the wealth has increased or
decreased, instead of only taking into account whether the wealth increase or de-
crease occurred. For confidence, instead of a discrete rule which determines whether
a prediction was good or bad (by checking if the observation falls within or outside
the confidence interval), we would like to incorporate the magnitude of the prediction
error, i.e. how far the return observation fell from the mean of the return distribution
used for prediction.
An important feature of the LLS model is a positive trend, which means that
strategies with higher exposure to the risky asset will be more lucrative. It would be
interesting, however, to investigate the role of different market motions, for example
a declining market trend, so that we could possibly draw a more general conclusion
about the role of loss aversion and self-attribution bias.
Finally, the finding that biased types of behavior can not only survive in the
market with rational investors, but also at times outperform them, as well as other
non-biased investors, is thought provoking. It suggests that what is considered a bias
with respect to some theoretical norm, may not necessarily be detrimental to the
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performance of investors. This is because specific market conditions and the structure
of the market (including the very presence of biased investors) influence what type
of behavior is successful, and such behavior may not always be in accordance with
the assumptions of normative theories and narrowly defined rational behavior.
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Chapter 9
Better-Than-Average
Overconfidence in the SSE
Model
9.1 Introduction
In previous chapters we have focused on overconfidence defined as miscalibration
and implemented as underestimated variance. The results of our study in Chapter 7
suggest that it is difficult to say whether overconfidence is bad or good for investors.
When overconfidence is understood and modeled in the sense of miscalibration, our
model shows that it is more relevant what investors are confident about than the
mere fact they are overconfident. Optimistic investors benefited from their overcon-
fidence because optimistic views were correct for the rising market of the LLS model.
However, pessimistic investors suffered from overconfidence because it enhanced their
wrong views on the market.
Importantly, psychologists have documented other kinds of overconfidence, which
can be conceptually, as well as empirically, distinguished from miscalibration (Biais
et al., 2005). They refer to ”positive illusions” such as overestimating one’s own
skills and abilities, particularly in comparison with the skills and abilities of other
people on average. Glaser and Weber (2007) suggest that, even though widely used,
miscalibration may not be the best proxy for overconfidence. In a study which com-
bines psychometric measures of judgment biases (overconfidence scores) and field
data (trading records), they could not relate measures of miscalibration to measures
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of trading volume, whereas they could do so with the ”better-than-average” overcon-
fidence Glaser and Weber (2007)1.
In this chapter we are interested in modeling a different type of overconfidence,
namely the better-than-average overconfidence. This type of overconfidence influ-
ences how investors compare their own opinions to the average opinion of other mar-
ket participants. Overconfident investors think they are better than other investors
on average, so they give more importance to their own opinions. However, since the
average opinion of market participants is expected to mainly influence the formation
of prices in the market, perhaps departing from that opinion will have measurable
consequences for overconfident investors. In this chapter we provide a definition of a
better-than-average overconfidence and run experiments using an executable version
of an existing artificial stock market model - the Sim Stock Exchange (SSE) by Hoff-
mann et al. (2007)2. After that, we propose a way of modeling better-than-average
overconfidence in the original LLS model of Levy et al. (2000).
9.2 Better-Than-Average Overconfidence
Better-than-average overconfidence is a type of positive illusion in which people think
they are better than other people on average. In the context of financial markets
it could mean that people think they have better investment skills or have better
information than other market participants. From the implementation point of view,
better-than-average overconfidence means that each agent needs to have some infor-
mation about other agents (at minimum some aggregate measure of other agents’
information). These agents could be all other agents in the model, or only agents to
which an agent is connected in a network.
In order for an agent-based market to be a good candidate for studying better-
than-average confidence, it is important that the model contains some mechanisms of
social interaction between agents. For example, the agents could be placed in a type
of network structure, or there could be a random mechanism that explains how agents
meet and interact with each other (for example randomly matching two agents as in
Kirman (1993). In the paper by Lux and Marchesi (1999), an important parameter
1A presumption in the financial literature is that investor overconfidence increases trading volume
because overconfident investors trade ”too much” (Odean, 1999). Our findings in Chapter 7 are
contrary. We find that overconfident investors decrease trading volume as they tend to stick with
one trading alternative, depending on their sentiment (see Chapter 7). In the LLS model, the
volume is calculated as the change in portfolio holdings between successive periods, since trading is
not modeled explicitly.
2We would like to thank the authors of this model for making the executable version available
online.
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of the model was the propensity of agents to switch to another strategy. This variable
could be interpreted in the light of the investor confidence. Those investors who are
more confident about their skill are less likely to switch to a neighbor’s strategy,
while less confident investors are more likely to imitate other investors’ strategies.
The problem with this approach is that it is not clear what would be an average
strategy, especially if a strategy cannot be represented by a numerical value. Also, it
is not clear what level of confidence would be considered as the neutral point (possibly
a normative choice) against which overconfidence and underconfidence biases would
be defined.
When investors are exchanging a numerical value, such as price expectations, it is
meaningful to calculate the average opinion of neighboring agents, as well as to value
this average opinion against an agent’s own opinion. The SSE model of Hoffmann
et al. (2007) proposes a model of investor confidence according to which an agent’s
private information signal is weighed against the aggregate signal of other agents’ in
the network:
Est = (Est ∗ Conf) + (NEst ∗ (1− Conf)), (9.1)
where Est is an agent’s expected price for stock s at time t, and NEst is the aggregated
expected price from agent’s neighbors. Conf, such that 0 ≤ Conf ≤ 1 is the agent’s
confidence level.
In the paper by Hoffmann et al. (2007) different levels of confidence have been
studied, yet there is no reference which levels of confidence would constitute overcon-
fidence. For our simulations we would like to designate the following values of Conf
parameter as:
• Conf = 0 - full (better-than-average) underconfidence.
• 0 ≤ Conf < 1/2 - better-than-average underconfidence.
• Conf = 1/2 - normal confidence.
• 1/2 < Conf ≤ 1 - better-than-average overconfidence.
• Conf = 1 - full (better-than-average) overconfidence.
The choice of equal weighting of the personal opinion and the average opinion
of others is taken as the neutral point or the normal level of confidence. This is to
signalize that the investor does not think that his or her opinion is better or worse
than the average opinion of others. Better-than-average overconfidence in that case
constitutes giving more than 50% of the weight to the investor’s own opinion and
less than 50% to the average opinion of others. One justification for this threshold
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level is that it semantically fits the meaning of ”better than average”. However,
it is still just an assumption that we make. Hoffmann et al. (2007) have in their
study measured confidence levels Conf of a group of investors and obtained a mean
value of 0.60 and a standard deviation of 0.17. In terms of our definition of better-
than-average overconfidence, those empirical measurements (fully reported in the
Appendix 3 of Hoffmann et al. (2007)) indicate that 44% of investors have normal
levels of confidence (Conf = 0.5), 38% of investors exhibit medium better-than-
average overconfidence (Conf = 0.63 or Conf = 0.75), 10% have very high better-
than-average overconfidence (Conf = 0.88 or Conf = 1), and 8% have better-than-
average underconfidence (Conf ∈ 0.38, 0.25, 0.13, 0). Hence, according to the chosen
threshold level, the majority of people are either overconfident or normal, while only
few are underconfident. This is consistent with our knowledge on the prevalence of
human overconfidence and rarity of underconfidence, so it can be considered as a
basic validation check for our choice of the threshold level.
9.3 SimStockExchange Model
SimStockExchange (SSE) is an agent-based model of a stock market with a goal to
replicate real-world stock market dynamics by investigating possible key elements af-
fecting stock traders’ behavior (Hoffmann et al., 2007). The novelty of the SSE model
is the inclusion of a number of behavioral theories that explain investor behavior in
the social context. The full model specification and original simulation results can
be found in Hoffmann et al. (2007) and Hoffmann (2007).
SSE model has been developed using an agent-based toolkit Repast. The ad-
vantage of using Repast over a general high-level programming language (usually
object-oriented) is that it provides libraries specifically aimed at agent-based mod-
els, which may include a time scheduler, a mechanism for agent communication,
flexible interaction topologies, facilities for storing and displaying agent states etc.
SSE model has also exploited Repast’s support for different network topologies, such
as a torus network and a Barabasi and Albert scale-free network. By comparing the
results for these two networks, Hoffmann et al. (2007) found evidence of volatility
clustering only in the case of torus network. The authors speculate that, with regard
to the information diffusion capacities, the investment population is more likely to
behave like a torus network in which information can take longer to travel to remote
corners, thus influencing the prices for a considerable amount of time (Hoffmann
et al., 2007). In our experiments we have used a torus type of network, which is a
network where every agent is connected to four neighboring agents (see Figure 9.1).
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Figure 9.1: A torus type of network.
9.3.1 Agent Behavior
The SSE can simulate markets with an arbitrary number of stocks and investors
who trade among themselves. The agents’ behavior is determined by a number of
parameters, such as wealth, confidence level and risk reducing strategies. The study
of Hoffmann et al. (2007) includes only one group of agents that differ in the values
of the parameters. That means that the SSE model does not have heterogeneity of
agents in the sense of few-type models (e.g. fundamental, technical, zero intelligence
traders), but a parametric heterogeneity. However, some of the parameters are caus-
ing substantial changes in the behavior, for example, the parameter R is determining
which combination of risk-reducing strategies is going to be used.
In each step t, an agent needs to decide how much of its wealth to invest in the
stock and how much to keep in cash (on which there is no interest received). The
decision is made based on a simple rule that compares the Current market price of
the stock at period t (Pst) and Expected (next period) price of the stock (expected)
at period t (Est). If the expected price is higher than the current price, an agent
will invest the following proportion of cash in the stock: xi = (Est −Pst)/Pst, and if
the expected price is lower than the current price, an agent will divest the following
proportion of stocks in its portfolio xd = (Pst − Est)/Pst. The restrictions of no
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borrowing (xi ≤ 1) and no short-seeling (xd ≤ 1) are imposed. In the SSE model it
is possible for agents to go bankrupt, and they can be either replaced with similar new
agents or left in the model not participating in market activities. In the simulation
experiments of this chapter, bankrupt agents are not replaced.
The expected price is based on the previous period market price and news that
enters the market. This news is the main source of heterogeneity in the model as
each agent gets different piece of news Nst. Nonetheless, Nst are for all agents pooled
from the same distribution (either normal or uniform):
Est = Pst−1 + (Pst−1 ∗Nst). (9.2)
After that, agents’ expectations are changed based on their levels of confidence
Conf. An agent’s private information signal is weighed against the aggregate signal
of the neighboring agents in the network NEst:
Est = (Est ∗ Conf) + (NEst ∗ (1− Conf)), (9.3)
The SSE model introduces some more sophistication in how NEst (the aggre-
gated expected price from agent’s neighbors) is calculated. The agents who exhibit
informational conformity behavior use the so-called clarifying risk-reducing strategy,
which means that they take average expected prices of all other agents to which they
are connected in the network. The agents who exhibit normative conformity behavior
use the so-called simplifying risk-reducing strategy. Those agents copy the majority
behavior (either buying or selling) of the people in the network. If the majority of
agents are buying then they take average expected price of those neighbors, and if the
majority of them are seeling then they take average expected price of those neighbors
(in case the number of buying and selling agents is equal, the average expected price
of all neighbors is taken). The actual behavior of agents is a combination of the
clarifying and the simplifying strategy, which is determined by the parameter R.
NEst = (SimplNEst ∗R) + (ClarNEst ∗ (1−R)). (9.4)
The value of 0 means that only clarifying strategy is used, and the value of 1 means
that only simplifying strategy is used. The study of Hoffmann et al. (2007) uses values
of R empirically obtained from a group of investors. In our experiments, we will use
only clarifying strategy, which means that the average opinion of all neighboring
investors in the network will be taken into account.
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9.3.2 Market Mechanism
The agents receive news at the same time, but the order in which they can decide
whether to buy or sell and submit their limit orders is determined randomly. The
market mechanism of the SSE model is based on the order book. This mechanism of
the SSE model can be considered a more realistic feature than the market mechanism
based on the temporary equilibrium, as with the LLS model by Levy et al. (2000).
Order book mechanism is more suitable for models in which a more detailed trad-
ing activity is observed, whereas temporary equilibrium models usually represents
a longer period within which we are not interested in detailed trading activity, but
only at the equilibrium at which demand meets supply. In the SSE model agents
submit limit orders. In the case of buying, they submit the maximum price and the
number of assets to buy, and in the case of selling they submit the minimum price
and the number of assets to sell. The market price is set to the average of the bid
and ask prices, weighted by the size of the limit orders.
9.4 Experimental Design
The aim of these experiments is to show the effects of different levels of confidence in
the better-than-average sense. Since we are not interested in the effects of different
risk-reducing strategies (simplifying vs. clarifying) we have chosen the clarifying
strategy, i.e. agents use the expectation of all the agents from the network (instead
of only those who do the majority action). Also, we have chosen not to replace the
bankrupt agents, not to weigh neighboring agents according to their wealth status,
and, not to update confidence level based on the performance. These choices were
made to exclude any additional effects that may influence the results, but are not
of our main interest. The experiments of Hoffmann et al. (2007) have been run for
500 time steps (”to allow eventual early transients to die out”) plus additional 929
steps for which the returns and results were reported. One period in the simulation
corresponds to one week in actual data, for which there were 929 observations. We run
experiments for 1500 time periods and conduct analysis for all the time steps, since
the resulting time-series appear to be stationary. Table 9.1 shows the parametrization
for the experiments.
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Table 9.1: Parametrization of the model used for experiments with better-than-
average overconfidence.
Symbol Value Explanation
N 100 Number of agents
N 1 Number of stocks
T 1500 Number of time steps
Ni 10 Initial number of stocks in portfolio
P0 10 Initial stock price
W0 100 Initial wealth of agents
Normal Type of news distribution
μ 0 News average
σ 0.020 News standard deviation
Every time step News frequency
Torus Network type
Linear Loss aversion type
No Replace bankrupt agents
No Update confidence based on the performance
No Weight friends with links
1 Seed to generate network
Table 9.2: Results of the experiments with different levels of better-than-average
confidence in the SSE market.
Conf = uniform[0, 1] Conf = 0 Conf = 0.25
σ(P ) 1.2103 1.4571 1.2648
σ(R) 0.0696 0.0768 0.0691
Conf = 0.5 Conf = 0.75 Conf = 1
σ(P ) 1.0958 0.9473 0.9067
σ(R) 0.0602 0.0568 0.0581
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9.5 Results
Figure 9.2 shows the dynamics of the market price for different levels of confidence:
the first graph is the dynamics for confidence level uniformly distributed on the
[0, 1] interval, the second graph is full underconfidence (Conf = 0), the third graph
is (better-than-average) underconfidence (Conf = 0.25), the fourth graph is normal
level of confidence (Conf = 0.5), the fifth graph is better-than-average overconfidence
(Conf = 0.75), and the last graph is the case of full overconfidence (Conf = 1).
Similarly, Figure 9.3 shows return distributions for the same levels of underconfidence
and overconfidence. We can see that compared to the normal level of confidence,
the market with underconfident investors is more volatile, while the market with
overconfident investors is less volatile. This is quantified in Table 9.2 which reports
the volatility of the market price, as well as the standard deviation of the returns.
These findings can be explained as follows. The heterogeneity of expectations
in the SSE model is generated at the beginning of each period when agents are
given their estimated price. The estimated price will differ among agents since every
agent is given different news information (sampled from either uniform or normal
distribution). From that point on, the weighting of one’s own expectation against the
neighboring expectations (through confidence and through risk-reducing strategies, if
applicable) is essentially the averaging of expectations, which results in more similar
expectations across the agents. Similar expectations create coordinated actions in
the form of limit orders, which in turn causes more prominent price changes. When
investors exhibit higher degrees of better-than-average overconfidence, they tend to
stick more with their own estimates, which preserves the heterogeneity of opinions.
Heterogeneous expectations create more heterogeneous limit orders, which result in
a smoother price dynamics.
Since similar opinions in case of underconfidence were found to increase the price
volatility, we were interested to see how far this averaging of opinions can go. Given
that in a torus network each investor has only four neighboring agents, we have
decided to conduct a robustness check by changing the network structure into a
network where information diffusion is very fast. A scale-free network shown on
Figure 9.4 is a very extreme type of network where every investor is connected to
the same central investor. In the case of full better-than-average overconfidence, we
have obtained the same market dynamics as in the case of torus network and full
better-than-average overconfidence. This is not surprising, since in the case of full
overconfidence there is no exchange of information between investors (except through
the market), so the network topology does not play a role. However, in the case of full
underconfidence when investors used the average opinion of neighboring investors, we
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Figure 9.2: Market price dynamics for different levels of better-than-average confi-
dence in the SSE model (torus network).
found that the market experienced two peaks, but at a certain point it simply crashed
(see Figure 9.5). Hence, there is a limit to how homogeneous opinions of investors can
be. Also, we can conclude that the results of the previously conducted experiments
were not only driven by the effects of the better-than-average overconfidence, but
also by the specificities of the network topology and the market mechanism.
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Figure 9.3: Return distributions for different levels of better-than-average confidence
in the SSE model (torus network).
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Figure 9.4: A scale-free type of network.
0 500 1000 1500
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Time
P
ric
e
Figure 9.5: Market price dynamics for the full better-than-average underconfidence
in the SSE model (scale-free network).
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9.6 Better-Than-Average Overconfidence in the LLSModel
In Chapter 5 through Chapter 8 we have implemented and studied a number of
behavioral phenomena using an existing agent-based financial market, namely the
LLS market of Levy et al. (2000). The reason why the same model was not our first
choice for a study of better-than-average overconfidence is that the LLS model is
missing one of the key ingredients needed for the implementation of such a bias, and
that is the notion of social interaction between investors. As opposed so the SSE
model, in the original LLS model there is no exchange of information or strategies
between investors of different types, nor between the investors of the same type.
Although it would be possible to implement a network structure along which the
individual investors in the LLS model could exchange information, we do not expect
that such a model would yield interesting or unexpected results, especially taking
into account the limited heterogeneity of investors in the LLS model. LLS model is a
two-type artificial market model whereby RII investors are completely homogeneous
and EMB investors are homogeneous up to a noisy variable influencing their optimal
strategies3. For that reason, in the LLS model we will only look at the exchange of
opinions between the two major groups of investors, and not on the individual agent
level.
Another issue for the LLS model with respect to modeling better-than-average
effect is what type of information could be exchanged between the investors. Since
RII and EMB investors do not use the same input for their strategies, instead of
exchanging information about the risky asset, these investors could exchange their
strategies. A strategy is in the LLS model represented by an optimal proportion of
wealth invested in the risky asset (x ∈ [0, 1]), and since the average between two
strategies also represents a strategy, this variable seems a good candidate for the
implementation of better-than-average overconfidence.
In the following experiments, we give an implementation of better-than-average
overconfidence in the LLS model in terms of mixing the strategies between the two
major groups of investors. The strategy of the RII investors is kept intact as it
represents the benchmark of rationality. Hence, only EMB investors will update
their strategies based on their levels of better-than-average confidence. After having
calculated their optimal strategy, EMB investors will create a new optimal strategy
3In Chapter 5 through Chapter 8 we have assumed that EMB investors are also homogeneous
with respect to their memory length m. In their study, Levy et al. (2000) have also made experiments
with EMB investors heterogeneous with respect to their memory length. They showed how a market
model with such heterogeneity leads to a more realistic (smoother) time-series without obvious pro-
cyclic price behavior. Such heterogeneity was not included in our models in order to avoid masking
the intrinsic effects of the behavioral phenomena under study.
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as a weighted average between their original optimal strategy x∗EMB and the optimal
strategy of RII investors x∗RII :
x∗∗EMB = Conf · x∗EMB + (1− Conf) · x∗RII , (9.5)
where Conf ∈ [0, 1] represents the coefficient of confidence in the better-than-average
sense. More confident EMB investors will give more weight to their personal optimal
strategy, while less confident investors will give more weight to the strategy of RII
investors. As in the experiments with the SSE model, we define the following values
of parameter c as the cases of:
• Conf = 0 - full (better-than-average) underconfidence.
• 0 ≤ Conf < 1/2 - better-than-average underconfidence.
• Conf = 1/2 - normal confidence.
• 1/2 < Conf ≤ 1 - better-than-average overconfidence.
• Conf = 1 - full (better-than-average) overconfidence.
The final strategies of EMB investors are calculated from the confidence-adjusted
optimal strategy x∗∗EMB and a small amount of noise (consistent with the experiments
in previous chapters).
The results of the simulations with various levels of better-than-average confidence
are shown in Figure 9.6 and reported in Table 9.3. It can be seen that depending
on the level of confidence, the resulting market dynamics shows the mixture of the
price that would have been generated by the original strategy of EMB investors and
the fundamental price. Hence, for all strategies that results in a behavior different
than the benchmark model (which is true for most strategies, except for those that
are very pessimistic or too risk-averse), increasing the level of overconfidence will
also increase the departures from the fundamental value (up to the behavior of the
original strategy).
9.7 Conclusion
Motivated by empirical studies in behavioral finance that emphasize the distinction
between various types of overconfidence, in this chapter we have presented a study
of better-than-average type of overconfidence. We have given a definition of better-
than-average overconfidence based on the mathematical formulation of confidence
in a social network of investors (Hoffmann et al., 2007), and studied market-wise
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Figure 9.6: Market price dynamics in the LLS model for different levels of better-
than-average confidence.
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Table 9.3: Results of the experiments with different levels of better-than-average
confidence in the LLS market.
EMB uniform Conf = 0 Conf = 0.25
σ(p) 11.4369 6.0250 5.9122
σ(pf ) 5.7159 5.7159 5.7159
excess volatility % 100.0892 5.4087 3.4352
mean volume p.p. % 9.9153 1.3765 4.6672
Conf = 0.5 Conf = 0.75 Conf = 1
σ(p) 5.9450 6.9973 11.4356
σ(pf ) 5.7159 5.7159 5.7159
excess volatility % 4.0094 22.4190 100.0682
mean volume p.p. % 7.3034 8.1441 9.9201
implications of various levels of confidence in SSE (Hoffmann et al., 2007) and LLS
(Levy et al., 2000) models of the financial market.
In order to study better-than-average overconfidence in an artificial market model,
it is useful to have the possibility to implement a network structure, since better-than-
average overconfidence takes into account the average opinion of neighboring investors
in the network. The advantage of using an agent-based modeling toolkit such as
Repast is the existence of libraries which enable straightforward implementation of
various types of networks. Another advantage of Repast is that it separates model
development from model execution. This allowed us to conduct various experiments
in terms of changing parameter values, by having only the executable version of the
SSE model. On the other hand, having no access to the actual code prevented us from
having insight into important implementation details. Furthermore, it prevented us
from making changes or additions to the model, e.g. changing the behavior of the
agents outside the scope of behaviors provided by the model developers, changing
the rules of the market mechanism etc.
In the case of the LLS model, the exchange of information did not happen through
a network of connections between individual investors, but between the two ma-
jor groups of investors. Also, as opposed to the SSE model, the investors did
not exchange their estimations of the prices, but they exchanged their strategies.
Confidence-based exchange of strategies is interesting as a possible psychological ex-
planation for the diversity of opinions on the one hand and herding types of behavior
on the other hand. This makes our study interesting because most market models
that investigated switching strategies between investors, focused either on proba-
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bilistic or evolutionary mechanisms of switching strategies, or on switching based on
more objective, deliberative reasons, such as the comparisons between wealth lev-
els or strategy performance. In the LLS model, better-than-average overconfidence
has been implemented in the sense of mixing the strategies of two investor types.
More confident EMB investors give more weight to their own optimal strategy, while
less confident investors give more weight to the optimal strategy of RII investors.
Better-than-average overconfidence in the sense of weighted average between one’s
own opinion and the opinion of others results in more diversified opinions, while
better-than-average underconfidence results in a more uniform (averaged) opinion
among investors. In the LLS model full underconfidence results in the market dy-
namics with very low trading where market price closely follows the fundamentals.
Overconfident investors in the better-than-average sense trade more than the under-
confident or normal investors, provided that they follow a strategy which does not
generate a market price that follows the fundamentals (e.g. very pessimistic investors
who invest only in the risk-less asset). This finding is in line with the assumption in
the financial literature that investor overconfidence increases trading volume, and in
the LLS model it has been achieved for better-than-average overconfidence, but not
for overconfidence as miscalibration (see Chapter 5).
The findings for the SSE model can be explained as follows. The heterogeneity
of expectations in the SSE model is generated at the beginning of each period when
agents are given their estimated price. The estimated price will differ among agents
since every agent is given different news information (sampled from either uniform
or normal distribution). From that point on, the weighting of one’s own expectation
against the neighboring expectations (through confidence and through risk-reducing
strategies, if applicable) is essentially the averaging of expectations, which results in
more similar expectations across the agents. Similar expectations create coordinated
actions in the form of limit orders, which in turn causes more prominent price changes.
When investors exhibit higher degrees of better-than-average overconfidence, they
tend to stick more with their own estimates, which preserves the heterogeneity of
opinions. Heterogeneous expectations create more heterogeneous limit orders, which
result in a smoother price dynamics, since the market price is calculated as the
average of bid and ask prices, weighted by the size of orders.
Better-than-average overconfidence can be seen as a mechanism that diminishes
the exchange of information or the weight given to information or strategies of other
investors. In such a way, overconfidence ensures the diversity of opinions and hetero-
geneity of strategies4. Underconfidence, on the other hand, gives more weight to the
4The ’differences of opinion’ literature cited in Glaser and Weber (2007) (namely, Varian (1985),
Harris and Raviv (1993), and Kandel and Pearson (1995)), shows that differences of opinion help
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opinions of other investors which results in more averaged opinions and more similar
behaviors, or even herding. Other factors that have influence on the diversity of
opinions are the initial distribution of opinions among agents before the confidence is
taken into account, and also the network structure that determines the neighboring
agents, since the averaging of opinions happens faster when agents are connected to
more people in the network. The implications of more or less diverse opinions on
the dynamics of the market price are also dependent on the market mechanism used,
as can be seen from different implications of overconfidence in the SSE and the LLS
model.
In comparison with overconfidence in the sense of miscalibration, better-than-
average type of overconfidence has a number of differences. Miscalibration is related
with the precision of individual investor’s opinion. The more confident the investor
is, the more precise his or her opinion is. Underconfidence ensures the diversity of
opinions which can be characterized by a broader distribution. Better-than-average
overconfidence is a different phenomena defined in a social context, where investor’s
individual opinion is weighed against the average opinion of other investors in the
network. As opposed to miscalibration, better-than-average overconfidence ensures
the diversity of opinions, since overconfident investors give less weight to the opinions
of others and stick with their own views. Underconfidence in the better-than-average
sense results in more equal opinions among investors. Since most people are found to
exhibit overconfidence to some extent, perhaps better-than-average effect is one of its
manifestations that contributes to the diversity of opinions as well as the observed
levels of trading in the markets. In such a way, our simulation results also seem
to support the empirical study of Glaser and Weber (2007), which distinguishes
between the effects of better-than-average overconfidence and miscalibration, and
their potential implications for finance.
explain high levels of trading volume and that a higher degree of differences of opinion leads to
a higher degree of trading volume. However, as pointed by Glaser and Weber (2007), the models
are usually silent about the reason why there are differences of opinion in the first place. Glaser
and Weber (2007) argue that ”an investor who regards himself as above average is more likely to
maintain a specific opinion about the future performance of an asset even though he knows that
other investors or the market hold a different opinion.”
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Conclusions
10.1 Summary
The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the research areas of behavioral finance
and agent-based artificial markets by providing mathematical representations for a
number of behavioral phenomena and by studying their market-wise implications
using computational simulations. The main premise for this thesis was that agent-
based models of financial markets are suitable for studying behavioral finance topics
since they are able to link the micro behavior of market participants and the aggregate
fluctuations of market prices.
Since an agent-based simulation constitutes a bottom-up approach, we need to
start from a realistic description of the behavior of market participants. For that
purpose we looked at the behavioral finance and psychological literature with an
aim to describe how individual investor behave in the markets. In Chapter 2 we
have given an overview of the main dimensions of investment decisions and sum-
marized the findings in behavioral finance related to those dimensions, particularly
with regards to various psychological biases of investors. The conceptual model of
individual investor behavior presented in Chapter 3 aims to summarize a part of this
vast knowledge on individual investor behavior, and gives the first level of structure
necessary for the development of agent-based artificial financial markets. Chapter 4
gives an overview of agent-based artificial financial markets, focusing on the relevant
aspects of individual investor behavior represented in such models and relating them
to our conceptual model.
In Chapter 5 through Chapter 9 we have provided mathematical definitions and
implementations for a number of behavioral phenomena, including overconfidence
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(miscalibration and better-than-average effect), investor sentiment (optimism and
pessimism), biased self-attribution, loss aversion, and recency and primacy effects.
In Chapter 5 we have proposed a model of investor overconfidence in the sense of
probabilistic miscalibration. In Chapter 6 we have proposed a model of investor senti-
ment based on a fuzzy aggregation operator. Chapter 7 presents a general sentiment-
confidence model in which sentiment (ranging from optimism to pessimism) deter-
mines the mean of predictions, while confidence (ranging from overconfidence to
underconfidence) determines the standard deviation of predictions. In Chapter 8 we
have studied the dynamics of investor psychology as a consequence of market feedback
and investor performance. Chapter 9 presents a study of better-than-average over-
confidence, which is a different manifestation of overconfidence than miscalibration
studied in previous chapters.
10.2 Conclusion
In this thesis we have presented a conceptual model of individual investor behavior
bringing together various behavioral and cognitive elements that play a role in the
behavior of market participants. We think this model is useful for bridging the gap
between the findings in behavioral finance literature and stylized behaviors and mar-
ket representations often found in the literature on agent-based artificial financial
markets. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provide answers to our first research question on
identifying the relevant aspects of investor behavior that could be studied using an
agent-based simulation approach. The review of behavioral finance literature results
in a collection of heuristics and biases, which operate through different cognitive and
emotional mechanisms, and manifest on various aspects of investment decision mak-
ing. The major focus of behavior literature on heuristics and biases might seem as
an implication of their utmost importance in investor behavior and the dynamics of
financial markets. However, this is not necessarily the case. From our perspective,
the usefulness of behavioral finance lies in offering a richer description of investor be-
havior than those captured by fully rational expected utility maximizers with limited
heterogeneity (e.g. in risk preferences), by giving a collection of possible heuristics
and biases, which have been documented in a financial, or sometimes a more gen-
eral decision-making setting. The relevance of each behavioral phenomenon should be
treated as a research question on its own and addressed using appropriate techniques,
whether empirical or in our case agent-based simulations.
The research strategy we have used to develop our models is an incremental
approach. We have used existing agent-based models and adapted them for the
purpose of our study. The advantage of the incremental approach is that the existing
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models first need to be replicated to reproduce the original results (which enforces
the validity of both our research and replicated studies). Then the behavior of agents
in the original model is changed, so that the agents exhibit a behavioral phenomenon
under study. Each existing agent-based model usually has restrictions on what type
of behavior can be studied and how it can be implemented. However, when we are
able to change the behavior of individual market participants in a desired way, we
can demonstrate what changes in the simulation results are due to the implemented
behavioral phenomena.
With regards to our second research question, we have provided mathematical
definitions and implementations for a number of behavioral phenomena, including
overconfidence (miscalibration and better-than-average effect), investor sentiment
(optimism and pessimism), biased self-attribution, loss aversion, recency and pri-
macy effect. From a modeling perspective, our overall conclusion for these models
is that behavioral biases should be modeled with fewest parameters possible, ide-
ally with only one, so as to ease the manipulation and study of different levels of
these biases. This has been particularly demonstrated in our sentiment-confidence
model, where each phenomenon is conveniently modeled using only one real-valued
parameter. Confidence refers to the precision of investor predictions, while senti-
ment determines the mean of those predictions. When overconfidence is modeled
in the sense of miscalibration, i.e. too narrow confidence intervals, it is difficult to
say whether overconfidence is good or bad for investor performance. If predictions
are correct it is good to be overconfident about it, but if they are wrong it is better
to be underconfident in order to spread the probability mass away from the wrong
prediction. In addition, theoretically expected relationship between overconfidence
and overtrading has not been observed. Quite the contrary, overconfident investors
were found to trade less throughout the simulations as they chose to stick with their
current portfolio choices. We found that sentiment (optimism and pessimism) had
much more impact on the market dynamics in the studied agent-based model. Bub-
bles and crashes were caused by investors who remember (and extrapolate) extreme
past events, i.e. highly positive returns in case of optimism or highly negative re-
turns in case of pessimism. Overconfidence is only found to enhance those effects of
investor sentiment.
In this thesis we have confirmed the added value of agent-based financial mar-
ket models in studying the topics of behavioral finance. The usefulness of agent-
based simulations stems from their ability to relate micro-level behavior of individual
market participants (agents) and macro behavior of the market (aggregate market
dynamics) as well as the consequences of such macro behavior (e.g. investor per-
formance). This micro-macro mapping of agent-based methodology is particularly
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useful for behavioral finance, since that link is often broken when studying behavioral
finance topics using different methodological approaches. The levels of these behav-
ioral biases have been related to various stylized features of market dynamics, such
as the bubbles and crashes, the excess volatility of the market price, the fat tails of
return distributions, and volatility clustering. Also, the impact of behavioral biases
on the performance of investors has been studied. Hence, we have provided answers
to the third research question on market-wise implications of investor biases.
Another contribution of this research and the advantage of computational agent-
based models can be found in the link between investor behavior and his or her market
performance or some other changing value in the simulation. In such a way, agents
can change their behavior according to the market movements, or as in our experi-
ments, the strength of a behavioral bias can be influenced by the market dynamics.
Agent-based models are particularly useful for studying complex adaptive systems in
which such feedback loops occur, and in which interaction between micro elements
can lead to emerging phenomena that cannot be easily deducted from the behav-
ior of individual components. For example, we have modeled how investors update
their confidence level based on the success of their predictions. In case this update
is asymmetrical (biased self-attribution), investors can become more overconfident.
We have also modeled loss aversion as an asymmetry in sentiment update when in-
vestors wealth is decreasing or increasing. The results of our sentiment-confidence
model as well as our models of self-attribution bias and loss aversion suggest that
studying only individual effects of several biases is not sufficient. This is because
of the possible interaction between those effects. That means that we should study
more complex implementations of agents behavior that contain a number of such be-
havioral phenomena. These findings are increasing the importance of having a richer
conceptual model of individual investor behavior that can capture the complexity of
investor behavior, such as the one presented in this thesis.
In relation with the fourth research question, this thesis has also demonstrated the
importance of definitions of behavioral phenomena under study. Unless an explicit
definition of a bias, such as overconfidence, is given, the claims for possible effects of
such behavior cannot be proven or falsified. Agent-based modeling approach forces
us to provide operational definitions of behavioral phenomena, since such behavior
needs to be represented and implemented in a computational model. This is partic-
ularly helpful for distinguishing between behavioral phenomena that seem related in
their psychological effects and possible implications on investor behavior, for exam-
ple overconfidence, optimism and risk taking. Moreover, one particular behavioral
phenomena can have multiple definitions and manifestations, and in this thesis we
have presented two distinct implementations of investor overconfidence. Our results
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suggest that overconfidence in the sense of miscalibration and overconfidence in the
better-than-average sense are indeed different phenomena with different implications
for the market participants and the market dynamics. Hence, the results of our sim-
ulations are confirming the empirical research which clearly distinguishes between
these two types of overconfidence and suggests more modeling efforts should be made
in the direction of the better-than-average effect.
10.3 Future Research
We think that the future research of agent-based financial markets should develop
in several directions. Firstly, agent-based research methodology should be seen as
a complementary methodology to other approaches for studying behavioral finance
topics, such as experiments and empirical research. In order to make this possible, it
is important to develop flexible toolkits that will enable easy construction of agent-
based models as well as easy implementation of agents behaviors. An example of such
framework is ABSTRACTE environment developed at the Econometrics department
of Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam and described in
the PhD thesis of Boer-Sorban (2008).
Constructing an agent-based model can be a time consuming process, whether the
model is implemented using a general high-level (possibly object-oriented) program-
ming language, or an existing toolkit for agent-based simulations (such as Repast).
Specialized toolkits should provide additional features which are specific to artificial
markets, such as the choice of various market mechanisms, a library of simple stylized
agents behaviors (e.g. zero intelligence, fundamental, technical), as well as demos for
a number of well-known market models. Since the results can very depending on the
model used, to the researchers interested in this area, we would suggest modeling and
testing the same behavioral phenomena using a couple of agent-based models, based
on different market mechanisms and market conditions. Also, we would suggest try-
ing one of the newer models that are able to replicate the more advanced stylized
facts of financial markets.
The agent-based models could also be strengthened and validated by using the
experimental measurements of behavioral biases and parametric values that represent
them. When biases are represented by parametric values, by a comparison of these
values it can be easily determined which investor is exhibiting a bias to a larger
extent. However, it is more difficult to interpret these parametric values in absolute
terms. For this purpose, fuzzy logic and its ability to express expert knowledge
using linguistic variables and natural language could be useful. For example, fuzzy
membership functions could be used to model which values of confidence coefficient
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represent a ”very high degree of overconfidence” or a ”medium underconfidence”.
Another direction in which agent-based models should advance, so that they
cross the border between theoretical market models and practical tools for financial
practitioners, is the inclusion of empirical financial data into agent-based models.
Empirical data can be used not only to calibrate the parameters of the model, but
also as the source of information that agents can utilize in their decision making. We
expect that the increased availability of fine-granularity financial data and improved
capabilities of distributed computing will only further the collaboration between em-
pirical and simulation research to the benefit of both behavioral finance and other
financial areas.
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Samenvatting
Het doel van deze dissertatie is om bij te dragen aan de onderzoeksgebieden ’be-
havioral finance’ en ’agent-based financie¨le markten’ door wiskundige representaties
te verstrekken voor een aantal gedragsgerelateerde verschijnselen en door de mark-
tgerelateerde effecten hiervan te bestuderen door gebruik van computationele sim-
ulaties. De voornaamste voorafgaande stelling van dit proefschrift is dat op agen-
ten gebaseerde modellen geschikt zijn voor het bestuderen van ’behavioral finance’-
onderwerpen, aangezien deze modellen geschikt zijn om het micro-gedrag van deel-
nemers aan de markt en de gezamenlijke fluctuaties van marktprijzen te verbinden.
Aangezien op agenten gebaseerde simulaties onderdeel zijn van een ’bottom-up’
benadering, moeten we beginnen bij een realistische beschrijving van de marktdeelne-
mers. Hiervoor hebben wij gekeken naar de ’behavioral finance’ en psychologieliter-
atuur met als doel het beschrijven van het gedrag van investeerders in de markten. In
hoofdstuk 2 hebben wij een overzicht gegeven van de belangrijkste dimensies van in-
vesteringsbeslissingen en hebben wij de bevindingen gerelateerd aan deze dimensies
samengevat vanuit het perspectief van ’behavioral finance’, met speciale aandacht
voor de verschillende psychologische neigingen van investeerders. Het conceptuele
model van het gedrag van investeerders dat in hoofdstuk 3 werd gepresenteerd richt
zich op het samenvatten van deze uitgebreide kennis over het gedrag van investeerders
en verstrekt een basisstructuur voor het ontwikkelen van agent-based kunstmatige
financie¨le markten. Hoofdstuk 4 geeft een overzicht van agent-based kunstmatige
financie¨le markten, met aandacht voor relevante aspecten van het gedrag van in-
vesteerders in dit soort modellen, dit tegelijkertijd in verband brengende met ons
conceptueel model.
In de hoofdstukken 5 tot en met 9 hebben wij wiskundige definities en implemen-
taties ge¨ıntroduceerd voor een aantal gedragsgerelateerde verschijnselen, namelijk
’overconfidence’ (’miscalibration’ en ’better-than-average effect’), het sentiment van
investeerders (optimisme en pessimisme), ’biased self-attribution’, ’loss aversion’, ’re-
cency effect’ en ’primacy effect’. In hoofdstuk 5 hebben wij een model van investor
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’overconfidence’ voorgesteld in de zin van ’probabilistic miscalibration’. In hoofd-
stuk 6 hebben wij een model van het sentiment van investeerders ge¨ıntroduceerd,
gebaseerd op een ’fuzzy aggregation operator’. Hoofdstuk 7 introduceert een al-
gemeen sentiment-vertrouwen model waarin sentiment (varie¨rend van optimisme tot
pessimisme) het gemiddelde van voorspellingen bepaalt, terwijl vertrouwen (varie¨rend
van ’overconfidence’ tot ’underconfidence’) de variantie van de voorspellingen bepaalt.
In hoofdstuk 8 hebben wij de dynamiek van de psychologie van investeerders bestudeerd
als gevolg van de markt feedback en de prestaties van investeerders. Hoofdstuk 9 pre-
senteert een studie over ’better-than-average overconfidence’, een ander soort ’over-
confidence’ dan de in voorgaande hoofdstukken bestudeerde ’miscalibration’.
In dit proefschrift hebben wij een conceptueel model van het gedrag van in-
vesteerders gepresenteerd dat de verschillende gedragsgerelateerde en cognitieve el-
ementen samenbrengt die een rol spelen in het gedrag van marktdeelnemers. Wij
denken dat dit model nuttig kan zijn bij het overbruggen van de kloof tussen bevindin-
gen in de ’behavioral finance’ literatuur en gestileerde feiten en marktrepresentaties
die vaak worden gevonden in de literatuur over agent-based kunstmatige financie¨le
markten. De hoofdstukken 2 en 3 geven een antwoord op onze eerste onderzoeksvraag
over het identificeren van de relevante aspecten van het gedrag van investeerders die
bestudeerd kunnen worden door het gebruik van een benadering gebaseerd op agent-
based simulaties.
Met betrekking tot onze tweede onderzoeksvraag hebben wij wiskundige defini-
ties en implementaties verstrekt voor een aantal gedragsgerelateerde verschijnselen,
inclusief ’overconfidence’ (’miscalibration’ en ’better-than-average effect’), het sen-
timent van investeerders (optimisme en pessimisme), ’biased self-attribution’, ’loss
aversion’, ’recency effect’ en ’primacy effect’. Onze algemene conclusie voor deze
modellen is dat gedragsgerelateerde neigingen gemodelleerd moeten worden met zo
weinig mogelijk parameters, in het meest ideale geval met alleen een parameter,
om de manipulatie en de studie van de verschillende niveaus van deze neigingen de
vergemakkelijken.
De onderzoekstrategie die wij hebben gebruikt om onze modellen te ontwikkelen
bestaat uit een incrementele benadering. Wij hebben bestaande agent-based mod-
ellen gebruikt en deze aangepast voor het doel van onze studie. Het voordeel van onze
incrementele benadering is dat bestaande modellen eerst gerepliceerd moeten wor-
den om de oorspronkelijke resultaten weer te geven (wat de validiteit van onze studie
waarborgt, zowel als die van de oorspronkelijke studies). Vervolgens is het gedrag
van agenten in het oorspronkelijke model aangepast, zodat agenten het gedragsgere-
lateerde verschijnsel vertonen dan bestudeerd wordt. Iedere bestaande agent heeft
meestal beperkingen wat betreft het type gedrag dat bestudeerd en ge¨ımplementeerd
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kan worden. Echter, wanneer we in staat zijn om het gedrag van de deelnemers aan
de markt aan te passen op een gewenste manier, kunnen we de verschillen in de
resultaten van de simulaties relateren aan de ge¨ımplementeerde gedragsgerelateerde
verschijnselen.
De resultaten van onze sentiment-vertrouwen model en onze modellen van ’self-
attribution bias’ en ’loss aversion’ suggereren dat het bestuderen van alleen individu-
ele effecten van verschillende neigingen niet genoeg is. Dit komt door de mogelijke
interactie tussen deze effecten. Dit betekent dat we meer complexe implementaties
van het gedrag van agenten moeten bestuderen, die dit soort gedragsgerelateerde
verschijnselen bevatten. Deze bevindingen vergroten het belang van een conceptueel
model van investeerders die de complexiteit van het gedrag van investeerders kan
bevatten.
In dit proefschrift hebben wij de waarde van agent-based modellen van financie¨le
markten voor het bestuderen van ’behavioral finance’-onderwerpen bevestigd. Het
nut van agent-based simulaties vindt zijn oorsprong in het vermogen om het gedrag
op microniveau van de marktdeelnemers te relateren aan het macro-gedrag van de
markt (’aggregate market dynamics’) en aan de gevolgen van dergelijk macro-gedrag
(e.g. ’investor performance’). Dit micro-macro mapping van agent-based methodolo-
gie is met name bruikbaar voor ’behavioral finance’, aangezien deze link vaak wordt
verbroken bij het bestuderen van ’behavioral finance’ onderwerpen gebruikmakend
van verschillende methodologische benaderingen. De niveaus van deze gedragsgerela-
teerde neigingen werden gerelateerd aan de kenmerken van de markt dynamiek, zoals
’bubbles en crashes’, en de overmatige volatiliteit van de marktprijs. Tevens, hebben
wij de invloed van gedragsgerelateerde neigingen op de prestatie van investeerders
bestudeerd. Op deze manier hebben wij antwoorden op de derde onderzoeksvraag
verstrekt.
Een andere contributie van dit onderzoek en het voordeel van computational
agent-based modellen kan gevonden worden in de link tussen het gedrag van in-
vesteerders en zijn of haar marktprestatie of een andere veranderende waarde in de
simulatie. Op deze manier kunnen agenten hun gedrag aanpassen afhankelijk van
de bewegingen in de markt of, zoals in onze experimenten, kan de sterkte van een
gedragsgerelateerde neiging be¨ınvloed worden door marktdynamiek. Agent-based
modellen zijn vooral bruikbaar voor het bestuderen van complexe adaptieve syste-
men waarin zulke feedbacklussen voorkomen, en waarin de interactie tussen de micro-
elementen kan leiden tot opkomende verschijnselen die niet makkelijk afgeleid kunnen
worden uit het gedrag van de individuele componenten. Zo wij hebben bijvoorbeeld
de manier waarop investeerders hun vertrouwen niveaus aanpassen gemodelleerd aan
de hand van het succes van hun voorspellingen. Als deze bijwerking asymmetrisch is
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(’biased self-attribution’), kunnen investeerders ’overconfident’ worden. We hebben
ook ’loss aversion’ gemodelleerd als een asymmetrie in het bijwerken van sentiment
wanneer de waarde van de investeerde toeneemt of afneemt.
In verband met de vierde onderzoeksvraag heeft dit proefschrift het belang van
definities van de gedragsgerelateerde verschijnselen die bestudeerd worden gedemon-
streerd. Tenzij een expliciete definitie van een neiging, zoals ’overconfidence’, wordt
gegeven, kunnen de beweringen over mogelijke effecten van zulk gedrag niet wor-
den bewezen of gefalsificeerd. De agent-based benadering dwingt ons om opera-
tionele definities te verstrekken voor gedragsgerelateerde verschijnselen, aangezien
dit soort gedrag gerepresenteerd en ge¨ımplementeerd moet worden in een computa-
tioneel model. Onze resultaten suggereren dan ’overconfidence’ als ’miscalibration’
en ’overconfidence’ in de zin van ’better-than-average’ zijn inderdaad verschillende
verschijnselen met verschillende gevolgen voor de marktdeelnemers en de marktdy-
namiek.
Wij denken dat toekomstig onderzoek van agent-based financie¨le markten zich kan
ontplooien in verschillende richtingen. Ten eerste, agent-based onderzoeksmethod-
ologie zou gezien moeten worden als aanvullende methodologie op andere benaderin-
gen voor het bestuderen van ’behavioral finance’-onderwerpen, zoals experimenten
en empirisch onderzoek. Om dit mogelijk te maken, is het belangrijk om flexibele
toolkits te ontwikkelen die het makkelijk bouwen van agent-based modellen in staat
zullen stellen evenals het makkelijk implementeren van het gedrag van agenten. Een
voorbeeld van zo een framework is de ABSTRACTE omgeving ontwikkeld door het
Econometrisch Instituut van de Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University
Rotterdam, en beschreven in het proefschrift van Boer-Sorban (2008).
Het bouwen van een agent-based model kan tijdrovend zijn, hetzij het model
ge¨ımplementeerd is gebruikmakend van een high-level (mogelijk objectgeorie¨nteerde)
programeertaal, of een bestaande toolkit voor agent-based simulaties (zoals Repast).
Gespecialiseerde toolkits zouden aanvullende kenmerken moeten verstrekken die spec-
ifiek zijn voor artificie¨le markten, zoals de keuze van verschillende markt mechanis-
men, een library van eenvoudige gestileerde voorbeelden van het gedrag van agenten
(zoals zero intelligence, fundamenteel, technisch), evenals demo’s voor een aantal bek-
ende marktmodellen. Een andere richting waarin agent-based modellen voortgezet
kunnen worden, zodat ze de kloof tussen theoretische marktmodellen en praktische
gereedschappen toepassingen kunnen overbruggen, is de introductie van empirische
data in agent-based modellen. Empirische data kan niet alleen gebruikt worden, voor
het kalibreren van de parameters in het model, maar ook als bron van informatie die
agenten kunnen gebruiken bij het nemen van beslissingen.
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l)BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND AGENT-BASED ARTIFICIAL MARKETS
Studying the behavior of market participants is important due to its potential impact
on asset prices and the dynamics of financial markets. The idea of individual investors who
are prone to biases in judgment and who use various heuristics, which might lead to
anomalies on the market level, has been explored within the field of behavioral finance. In
this dissertation, we analyze market-wise implications of investor behavior and their
irrationalities by means of agent-based simulations of financial markets. The usefulness of
agent-based artificial markets for studying the behavioral finance topics stems from their
ability to relate the micro-level behavior of individual market participants (represented as
agents) and the macro-level behavior of the market (artificial time-series). This micro-
macro mapping of agent-based methodology is particularly useful for behavioral finance,
because that link is often broken when using other methodological approaches. In this
thesis, we study various biases commented in the behavioral finance literature and propose
novel models for some of the behavioral phenomena. We provide mathematical definitions and
computational implementations for overconfidence (miscalibration and better-than-average
effect), investor sentiment (optimism and pessimism), biased self-attribution, loss aversion,
and recency and primacy effects. The levels of these behavioral biases are related to the
features of the market dynamics, such as the bubbles and crashes, and the excess volatility
of the market price. The impact of behavioral biases on investor performance is also
studied. 
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